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Abstract 
 
Previous research has shown that people are biased when providing summary 
assessments about past experiences. Retrospective evaluations seem based on 
specific moments within the to-be-assessed episode (e.g., Fredrickson & 
Kahneman, 1993; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). Here, drawing on some of the 
parallelisms between memory phenomena and judgment and decision making 
biases (e.g., distinctiveness; Hunt, 2006), a memory-based approach is outlined 
and  explored. By doing so, the research also addressed the broader debate 
surrounding the relationships between memory and judgment, fuelled by 
conflicting results about memory–judgment correlations (e.g., Hastie & Park, 
1986). In the first set of studies, participants recalled lists of words, after having 
assessed each list for pleasantness. The results showed clear associations 
between memory and judgment, which appeared moderated by the cognitive 
demands associated with the memory task. Retrospective evaluations were 
predicted by both the content of recall and the ease with which distinctive 
information was brought to mind (Schwarz, 1998). The nature of these 
associations was further investigated in the second set of studies. By hindering 
the memorability of negative information, it was possible to reduce its impact on 
retrospective assessments; this finding can easily be interpreted if one assumes a 
causal relationship between memory and judgment. The last study corroborated 
the memory-based approach with more cohesive stimuli – namely short stories 
told through slideshows. These results also suggested that memory-judgment 
relationships are vulnerable to experiment-related factors; they are easily 
hindered if the way memory is probed is not aligned with the information that 
underlies the judgment task. Overall, the findings suggest that, in order to assess 
an event in retrospect, people rely on their memory but in a way that is biased by 
the relative availability of certain features of the event. These results are at odds 
with the predictions of on-line judgment theories (e.g., Anderson, 1989), which 
postulate functional independence between memory and judgment. The 
theoretical and practical implications of this work are discussed and future 
directions for research on the role of memory in retrospective evaluations are 
suggested.  
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1.1. Overview of the General Introduction 
The General Introduction is divided into main sections. First, 
retrospective evaluations are defined – and their importance in everyday 
cognition highlighted. Then, the social cognition and decision-making literatures 
which investigated summary assessments are reviewed, with a focus on the most 
frequently observed biases.  
By outlining some of the parallels between memory and judgment 
phenomena, it is argued that memory functioning can account for the array of 
judgment biases in retrospective evaluations. I review the literature on the 
relationships between memory and judgment and justify why it is important to 
gather further – and more direct – evidence on the role of memory in 
retrospective judgments.  
An overview of the present thesis completes the present chapter. Finally, 
I briefly introduce each of the following four chapters, outlining the rationale and 
objectives of each.  
 
1.2. Biases in retrospective evaluations 
 
1.2.1. Why is it important to study RE? 
The complexity of evaluating the past 
Think back to the last film you watched at the cinema. How was it? Did 
you like it? How much did you like it? The responses people provide to these 
sorts of questions, despite often being provided effortlessly, conceal an important 
and complex aspect of everyday cognition. Films – as most of the episodes in our 
- 13 - 
lives – are experiences that unfold over time. Undoubtedly, the perceived quality 
of the film was not constant from its beginning to its end: Some scenes were 
more effective than others, some parts more interesting. How do people provide 
retrospective evaluations? That is, how do they answer questions about the 
overall quality of extended episodes?      
When people assess past events, they tend to provide summary 
assessments of the episode under consideration – instead of moment-by-moment 
accounts about how they felt while the event was unfolding (Fredrickson, 2000; 
Kahneman, 2000b). It follows that people must somehow take into consideration 
the quality of the different moments which defined the episode in order to 
evaluate the latter in hindsight. When this is done, a global assessment is 
produced and it represents a unitary and coherent judgment – about an event that 
may not have been so.  
 
Ubiquity of retrospective evaluations  
Summary assessments are not only about the quality of extended episodes 
or experiences. Often people evaluate a target stimulus on the basis of the 
information they acquire about it. Inevitably, the pieces of information we 
acquire about something are often different in quality and importance; 
nevertheless, we are able to provide a global judgment – a coherent answer 
which represents potentially incoherent dimensions of the information. Consider 
the task participants were faced with in the seminal work of Solomon Asch on 
personality impression formation (1946; cited in Zauberman, Diehl, & Ariely, 
2006). Asch (1946) asked participants to provide a global rating of likeableness 
of a hypothetical character, which was described through a series of adjectives. 
- 14 - 
The person was described as envious, stubborn, critical, impulsive, industrious, 
and intelligent. Clearly, participants had to summarise divergent information (or 
inputs of different quality) in order to complete the task – similarly to what is 
done when rating how much a film is liked.  
Evaluating information that is presented sequentially or events that 
unfolded over time is a common cognitive task that people have to perform 
everyday, and it is not surprising that many studies have investigated how people 
provide summary assessments. Retrospective evaluations have been studied in 
multiple domains, including: consumer behaviour (Russo, Meloy, & Medvec, 
1998), economics (Betsch, Plessner, Schwieren, & Gütig, 2001; Langer, Sarin, & 
Weber, 2005), medical settings (Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996; Stone, 
Schwartz, Broderick, & Shiffman, 2005), jury simulations (Reyes, Thompson, & 
Bower, 1980), personality attribution (Asch, 1946; Lichtenstein & Srull, 1987), 
perception (Ariely, 2001), and politics (Lodge, McGraw, & Stroh, 1989).   
 
Importance of retrospective evaluations 
Understanding how people evaluate the past has important implications. 
The work by Kahneman and colleagues suggests that how people summarise 
experiences in hindsight drives the choices they will make in the future 
(Kahneman, 2000a; 2000b; Kahneman & Thaler, 2006; Kahneman, Fredrickson, 
Schreiber, & Redelmeier, 1993; Kahneman, Wakker, & Sarin, 1997; see also 
Read, 2004). Retrospective evaluations appear to be an important input into 
decisions to repeat (or not repeat) past experiences. For example, a survey by 
Baines, To, and Wall (1990), revealed that patients’ memories of unpleasant 
medical procedures influenced their decisions about future treatment choices; for 
- 15 - 
example, about 20% of women who did not attend a routine mammogram 
screening mentioned the remembered pain of previous screenings as the reason 
for their decision (see also Elwood, McNoe, Smith, Bandaranavake, & Doyle, 
1998). More strikingly, about 40% of patients who survived a cardiac arrest 
decided not to undergo future revival procedures – and again the remembered 
discomfort of the treatment appears to have been a strong determinant of their 
choice (Bedell, Delbanco, Cook, & Epstein, 1983).  
Most importantly, Kahneman and colleagues (see also Oishi & Sullivan, 
2006) have argued that the way people summarise the past (the remembered 
utility) can be a better predictor of future choices (decision utility) than what they 
actually experienced (experienced utility). Let me illustrate by briefly describing 
one of their studies (Kahneman et al., 1993). Participants volunteered to immerse 
both hands (at different times) in cold water – experiences which were 
uncomfortable in nature. A “short” immersion lasted for 60 seconds and the 
water was at a temperature of 14°C. The “long” immersion was the same as the 
short one, with the only difference of an additional 30 seconds at a temperature 
of 15°C – i.e. warmer, but still at uncomfortable levels. Thus, participants 
experienced more overall discomfort during the long immersion, as it lasted for a 
longer time; that is, its experienced utility was lower. However, when asked to 
rate the two immersions on a series of dimensions (e.g., “overall discomfort”, p. 
402) participants disliked the long immersion the least; that is, they rated its 
remembered utility as higher. This finding already exemplifies how the 
summarised quality of an episode can differ from its actual quality – point which 
I will discuss in further detail in the next sections. Ultimately, when participants 
were asked to choose which of the two immersions they would repeat – that is, 
- 16 - 
they were asked to provide the decision utility – they preferred the long 
immersion. This choice was therefore predicted by how participants summarised 
the experience, rather than its actual overall quality. As participants’ choice led 
them to be exposed for a second time to the longer immersion (i.e. characterised 
by a higher total amount of discomfort) the authors argue that remembered utility 
can push people into counterintuitive and potentially maladaptive choices 
(Kahneman et al., 1993). 
In summary, it would appear that it is not what we experience that drives 
our choices for the future – it is how we summarise it in hindsight. As we will 
discuss further in the next paragraph, this is a very important distinction: Very 
often the way people summarise experiences departs significantly from what 
they actually experienced.  
 
Are people biased when evaluating the past?  
When summarising past episodes (or information presented sequentially), 
do people equally weigh each moment of the experience (or piece of information 
within the sequence)? Or, is the perceived quality of an outcome (its utility) 
equal to the summed quality of its components (e.g., Samuelson, 1937; cited in 
Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006)? The following two sections will cover the 
research that attempted to answer the above questions. In order to do so, two 
separate lines of research need to be reviewed; one is from the judgment and 
decision-making literature while the other is taken from the information 
integration and social cognition literatures.  
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1.2.2. Biases in judgment and decision making 
The “Peak-End” rule 
Recent work by Kahneman and colleagues (e.g., Fredrickson & 
Kahneman, 1993; Schreiber & Kahneman, 2000; Varey & Kahneman, 1992) has 
suggested that when people summarise the quality of an event in hindsight, they 
are largely influenced by the quality of two of its defining moments “in an 
almost rule-like fashion” (Fredrickson, 2000; p. 579). First, the “Peak”: this is 
the moment during which the intensity of the experience is at the highest; at this 
moment, the quality departure from the average quality of the whole event is the 
maximum. Second, the “End”: this is the quality of the final moments of the 
experience. By averaging the quality (utility) experienced during these two 
moments, it is possible to successfully predict the summary assessments for the 
experience as a whole (Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993); how pleasant or 
unpleasant a specific episode is on average does not seem to matter as much (but 
see Cojuharenco & Ryvkin, 2008).  
In a study ran by Varey and Kahneman (1992), participants were 
presented with a series of ratings indicating the discomfort that a hypothetical 
character experienced during activities like standing in an uncomfortable position 
and being exposed to loud noises. The participants’ task was to rate the 
character’s global discomfort. Ninety-four percent of the variance in the global 
assessments was accounted for by the average of the “Peak” – the most extreme 
discomfort reported by the character – and the “End”, i.e. the final ratings 
(Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993; Schreiber & Kahneman, 2000). In their 
discussion, the authors conclude that “the results showed that extended aversive 
- 18 - 
episodes are not evaluated by integrating the disutility of successive intervals” 
(Varey & Kahneman, 1992; p. 181).  
Similar conclusions were reached in a study where participants directly 
experienced the to-be-assessed events – namely computer-generated sounds 
(Schreiber & Kahneman, 2000). First, the authors asked participants to 
continuously appraise their annoyance while being presented with unpleasant 
sounds of varying intensity. As the reported annoyance closely tracked the 
sounds intensity, the authors could use the latter as a measure of the discomfort 
experienced by participants at any moment. In the next experiments, the authors 
manipulated the intensity and duration of sequence of annoying sounds; the 
participants’ task was to rate the overall (un)pleasantness of each sequence of 
sounds, once it finished. The results supported the authors’ claim that “…peak 
and end are good predictors of remembered utility” (p. 40). Most notably, a 
simple average of the intensity at the “Peak” moment and at the “End” better 
predicted participants’ summary assessments than the total or the average 
intensity of the sound sequences.   
Peak-End phenomena have been observed in many laboratory-based 
studies. Some of these studies involved experiences relatively aversive in nature, 
like discomfort from immerging a hand in cold water (Kahneman et al., 1993), 
from annoying sounds (Västfjäll, 2004), and pain from heat or mechanical 
pressure (Ariely, 1998). In other studies, participants had to evaluate relatively 
more pleasant experiences, such as TV advertisement (Baumgartner, Sujan, & 
Padgett, 1997), movie clips (Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993), musical selections 
(Rozin, Rozin, & Goldberg, 2004), monetary sequences (Langer et al., 2005), 
and material goods (Do, Rupert, & Wolford, 2008). Moreover, Peak-End effects 
- 19 - 
have been observed in real-life situations, including medical (Oliver, 2008; 
Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996; Stone, Broderick, Kaell, DelesPaul, & Porter, 
2000) and job settings (Clark & Georgellis, 2004). The range of experiences 
where the Peak-End rule seems to apply is rather large; this includes episodes 
that were either short or prolonged (Clark & Georgellis, 2004; Schreiber & 
Kahneman, 2000) and finally, episodes that were continuous or formed of a 
sequence of discrete stimuli (Kahneman et al., 1993; Langer et al., 2005). 
 
Duration neglect and the violation of the temporal monotonicity principle  
A direct – and experimentally validated – consequence of “Peak” and 
“End” being overweighed in summary assessments is that the principle of 
“temporal monotonicity” (cf. Fredrickson, 2000) is often violated. This principle 
states that adding a period of negative affect to an ongoing experience should 
make the overall experience worse; on the other hand, extending the experience 
with positive affect should instead make the overall experience better. This 
would follow if retrospective evaluation was based on an averaged impression of 
an experience; however, if the main determinants of remembered utility are the 
Peak and End of a sequence, the overall duration of an event should not be an 
important factor in is appreciation in hindsight. In an oft-cited clinical study, 
Redelmeier, Katz and Kahneman (2003) showed that adding an extra period of 
pain can actually improve the evaluation of a painful medical screening 
procedure. Patients undergoing colonoscopy were randomly assigned to either a 
control group, who underwent the standard procedure, or an experimental group. 
In the latter condition, the procedure was extended by leaving the apparatus in 
place for an average two minutes after the clinic examination was completed. 
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This added experience was mildly uncomfortable – but less painful than the 
preceding moments. That is, the period of added pain represented a noticeable 
improvement. Indeed, as patients in both groups were given the possibility of 
rating their current pain in a real-time mode, it was possible to determine that the 
experimental group rated the final moments as less painful. The main results 
confirmed the authors’ predictions. First, the patients in the experimental group 
rated the colonoscopy as a whole as less painful than patients in the control 
group. The authors argued that this result was due to the “End” being largely 
overweighed in summary assessments. Indeed, despite the overall amount of 
experienced pain being greater for the experimental group, the final moments 
were perceived as less painful. Second, confirming the link between 
retrospective evaluations and decisions about the future, the patients from the 
experimental group were slightly—but significantly—more likely to attend 
future recommended screenings.  
As people seem to summarise the quality of past events on the basis of a 
few of their defining moments (“snapshots”; cf. Fredrickson & Kahneman, 
1993), it follows that more holistic features are often neglected. For instance, it 
seems that people tend to disregard the duration of the events when evaluating 
them in hindsight (e.g., Diener, Wirtz, & Oishi, 2001; Hands & Avons, 2001; 
Rode, Rozin, & Durlach, 2007; Rozin et al., 2004). Closely related to the 
violation of the temporal monotonicity principle, duration neglect may lead 
people to puzzling choices. Going back to a study on pain perception, Kahneman 
et al. (1993) showed that, despite being able to judge correctly the duration of 
two pain-inducing experimental trials, participants chose the one which lasted 
longer (see also Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996).  
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Limits of the “Peak-End” rule: When holistic features matter 
Although there is considerable empirical evidence that supports the 
“Peak-End” rule, several authors have questioned its generality. For example, 
according to Ariely and colleagues, people do not always neglect event duration 
when assessing experiences in hindsight – especially when it is made an explicit 
and salient attribute of the episode (see Ariely, 1998; Ariely & Loewenstein, 
2000; Ariely, Kahneman, & Loewenstein, 2000; Ariely & Zakay, 2001). In 
addition, Liersch and McKenzie (2009) have recently suggested that duration 
neglect may be moderated by situational factors – for instance, the way the 
information is presented to participants. The authors, similarly to Varey and 
Kahneman (1992), asked participants to rate the overall discomfort of a 
hypothetical character who was engaged in uncomfortable activities and had 
rated the moment-by-moment the discomfort while experiencing them. When the 
momentary ratings were presented via a sequence of numerical values, 
participants displayed duration neglect in their overall assessments. However, 
when the information was presented via graphs, duration did affect participants’ 
retrospective evaluations – as the rated unpleasantness of the experiences 
increased along with their duration.   
Some authors have argued that, beyond the experience duration, other 
holistic features of an event may be important, too (e.g., Ariely & Carmon, 
2000). For instance, some studies highlighted how the episode trend – the overall 
rate and direction of hedonic change – affects summary assessments (Ariely & 
Zauberman, 2000; 2003; Diehl & Zauberman, 2005; Hsee, Abelson, & Salovey, 
1991; Jochen & Cropanzano, 2007; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993). Simply put, it 
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seems that experiences that improved over time were preferred to experiences 
whose quality decreased in the last moments (Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993). As 
the trend of an experience must involve some processing of relational 
information, it might be an over-generalisation to assume that retrospective 
evaluations are always based on ‘stills’ or moments of a remembered experience.  
Another line of evidence suggests that specific task conditions may 
moderate “Peak”, “End” – and even “trend” – biases in retrospective evaluations. 
Ariely (1998) had participants experience short and unpleasant episodes, i.e. 
exposure to heat or mechanical pressure. In one condition, participants were 
asked to rate the intensity of the stimuli while experiencing them (“On-line +” 
condition; p. 31) and to rate their overall discomfort. In the control condition 
(“On-line –”; p. 31), participants only rated the experience once it ended. The 
results clearly showed that continuously reporting the intensity of the stimuli 
reduced the bias in the overall assessments. Indeed, the retrospective evaluations 
provided by the participants in the On-line + condition were less affected by the 
“Peak”, “End” and “trend” features of the episodes – and reflected more closely 
the average quality of the experience (see also Ariely & Zauberman, 2000). 
 
Conclusions about hedonic episodes 
Despite the above mentioned caveats, a general conclusion can be safely 
drawn from the literature reviewed so far: When assessing the past, people seem 
to overweigh specific parts of the experience – may they be the “Peak”, the 
“End” or the more general “trend”. Indeed, it has been shown that the parts of the 
trend of an experience that matter the most are those at the end of the experience 
(Ariely & Zauberman, 2000; 2003); hence, the influence of the trend on 
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retrospective evaluations can be reformulated as the influence of the final part of 
the experience – rather than its final moments as predicted by the “Peak-End” 
rule. 
Thus, the answer from the judgment and decision-making literature to the 
question previously introduced– whether people are biased when evaluating the 
past – seems to be a resounding “yes”. Specific moments within the to-be-
assessed hedonic event are largely overweighed. Situational factors unrelated to 
the experience may moderate the bias in retrospective evaluations (e.g., 
personality disposition; Barrett, 1997). Nevertheless, it can be safely put forward 
that summary assessments are largely influenced by key moments within the to-
be-assessed outcome.  
Next, we will explore whether the above – general – conclusion still 
holds for a different branch of research, which investigated information 
integration in hindsight judgment.  
 
1.2.3. Order effects in information integration 
“First takes all” and “save the last dance for me” 
Evaluating streams of information that have been provided in a sequential 
manner is another frequent activity that people are faced with. When talking to a 
sales assistant about selecting a laptop to purchase, it is likely each laptop will be 
associated with a list of features, presented in sequence for each potential 
‘candidate’; the assessment of this sequence of features will guide our evaluation 
of the laptops, and consequently the choice about which one to buy.   
- 24 - 
The extensive work by Russo and colleagues highlighted how 
information encountered early can bias the evaluations of later information – 
leading to primacy biases in retrospective judgments (Bond, Carlson, Meloy, 
Russo, & Tanner, 2007; Russo, Carlson, & Meloy, 2006; Russo, Medvec, & 
Meloy, 1996; Russo, Meloy, & Wilks, 2000; Russo et al., 1998; see also Kardes, 
1986; Kardes & Kalyanaram, 1992). When people express preferences for 
options (e.g., restaurants, dry cleaners etc.) whose attributes they learn via 
sequential displays, they tend to distort the evaluation of subsequent information 
on the basis of an emerging preference, which is established on the basis of the 
first few attributes. As soon as people develop a preference for option 1 over 
option 2 (because early attributes favoured option 1), they interpret any 
following information in a biased way in favour of option 1 (Russo et al., 1996; 
1998).  
In contrast to the above described “first takes all” perspective, recent 
findings have highlighted how the opposite pattern can also be true (Bruine de 
Bruin, 2005; see also Bruine de Bruine & Keren, 2003; Page & Page, in press). 
Bruine de Bruin (2005) performed a meta-analysis of the scores given by the 
judges of the Eurovision Song Contest and the European and World Figure 
Skating Championships. In both cases, the results suggested that the scores 
increased with the position of each performer; simply put, the later a candidate 
performed, the higher the chance of receiving high ratings. The general 
conclusion was that, once again, judgments provided when information is 
presented serially are biased by the order in which the decision-maker processes 
each piece of information. Performing at a later stage in the competition induced 
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more favourable ratings from the judges – a bias that can be generally labelled as 
a recency bias.   
When people summarise information presented in a sequential manner, 
they seem to be biased by the order in which the information is provided to 
them. As for hedonic episodes, the relative importance of each piece of 
information (or moments within the episode) can be affected by when the 
information was encountered within the sequence (e.g., Anderson & Hubert, 
1963; Bruine de Bruin, 2005; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992; Russo et al., 1998). The 
most frequently observed biases are primacy and recency effects – that is, early 
or late information within a sequence is overweighed when summary 
assessments are provided.  
 
Order effects in the social cognition literature 
In the social cognition literature, order effects have been observed in 
evaluation tasks like personality impression formation (Anderson & Hubert, 
1963; Asch, 1946; Dreben, Fiske, & Hastie, 1979; Lichtenstein & Srull, 1987), 
causality attribution (Collins & Shanks, 2002; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992), and 
defendants’ guilt (Pennington & Hastie, 1986; 1992; Reyes et al., 1980). Early 
(primacy) or late (recency) information has been found to disproportionately 
influence summary assessments.  
For instance, in a study by Lichtenstein and Srull (1987), participants 
were presented with a sequence of behaviours. After the presentation, 
participants were asked to rate the likeability of the person who exhibited the 
behaviours. The extent of order effects was examined by relating these summary 
assessments to the number of positive (e.g. “lent money to a friend in financial 
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straits”, p.102) and negative descriptions (e.g. “shot a songbird with his .22-
calibre rifle”, p.102) that were presented early and late in the sequence. Even if 
the total number of positive and negative statements was the same across trials, 
primacy bias was observed since likeability ratings were higher when positive 
information was presented early rather than late in the sequence. Primacy effects 
were also observed in the research run by Asch (1946; cited in Zauberman et al., 
2006) and previously mentioned in section 1.2.1. The author asked participants 
about a person who was described as “envious”, “stubborn”, “critical”, 
“impulsive”, “industrious” and “intelligent”. Other participants were presented 
with the same adjectives, but in the opposite order. The latter group of 
participants rated the hypothetical character more highly than the former group, 
as more positive adjectives were presented early in the sequence. Strikingly then, 
the same descriptive attributes could yield very different ratings depending on 
the order in which the descriptors were presented. When attributes with more 
positive connotations were given first, followed by less positive attributes, the 
person was rated more positively than when the order was reversed (Asch, 1946; 
cited in Zauberman et al., 2006). 
On the other hand, in a study by Collins and Shanks (2002) participants 
were asked to perform a causal judgment task for which the evidence was 
presented in a sequential manner. Participants were mostly affected in their 
judgments by the most recent information (Experiment 1, p.1140), hence 
providing evidence for recency biases (see also Anderson, 1981; Hogarth & 
Einhorn, 1992).  
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The “Belief-Adjustment” model 
In a review of these conflicting order effect results, Hogarth and Einhorn 
(1992) outlined the major factors that may play a role in determining whether 
primacy or recency effects will be observed in summary assessments. Their 
“Belief-Adjustment” model (1992) is based on a meta-analysis of the literature 
on summary assessments of sequential information; in this model, they draw a 
distinction between the response mode and the type of processing that a task 
involves. The response mode encompasses the type of judgment task people have 
to deal with. In Step-by-Step tasks, participants are asked to provide an 
evaluation after each piece of information is processed. On the other hand, in 
End-of-Sequence tasks participants are asked to express their evaluation only 
after all the relevant information has been presented to them.  
At the same time, people can mentally process the information in two 
different ways. First, they can perform Step-by-Step processing, during which 
they review their opinion of the whole sequence after each piece of information 
is encountered. In Step-by-Step processing, the judgment is adjusted as many 
times as there are steps in a sequence of information, something that is thought to 
require a relatively high cognitive effort. Most importantly, according to the 
Belief-Adjustment model, Step-by-Step processing will lead to recency effects in 
summary assessments, as the last information will have approximately the same 
weight in the overall evaluation as all the aggregated information that preceded 
it. Conversely, in End-of-Sequence processing participants perform a single 
adjustment, as they adjust an initial impression based on early information “by 
the aggregate impact of the succeeding set of evidence” (Hogarth & Einhorn, 
1992; p. 12). According to the authors, End-of-Sequence processing will 
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therefore lead to primacy effects, as early information has roughly the same 
impact on summary assessments as all the information that followed it.  
Importantly, the way the participants mentally process information 
(processing) does not necessarily have to reflect the task instructions (response 
mode). If the task is Step-by-Step, participants have to perform Step-by-Step 
processing – as they are asked to provide a judgment after each piece of 
information. On the other hand, if the task is End-of-Sequence, then participants 
are free to rely on either Step-by-Step or End-of-Sequence processing. The 
Belief-Adjustment model suggests that this choice is determined by other task-
related variables like the familiarity of the task, and the complexity and length of 
the to-be-evaluated stimuli. Complex and long information series (or evaluations 
tasks with which participants are rather unfamiliar) would be more likely to lead 
to Step-by-Step processing; hence recency effects should be observed. On the 
other hand, simple and short information (or familiar tasks) would be associated 
with End-of-Sequence processing – and consequently with primacy biases. 
With respect to the present thesis, an important consideration should be 
taken from the above review. In the Belief-Adjustment model (Hogarth & 
Einhorn, 1992) there is no explicit mention or description of the role that 
memory processes may play in biasing retrospective evaluations – a question 
which is at the core of the work reported here.   
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1.3. The role of memory 
 
1.3.1. Parallelisms between memory and judgment bias 
Why are people biased when evaluating the past? 
In light of the phenomenology described above, a question that naturally 
arises is the following: Why do biases in summary assessments arise? Despite the 
divergence of the reviewed findings, a general principle can be extrapolated: 
People overweigh some moments of an experience – or information within a 
sequence – when assessing it in hindsight. Why is that? It can be argued that 
psychological models of these biases should provide a causal explanation for 
these phenomena in terms of the cognitive processes that generate them.  
The literature on the “Peak-End” rule (e.g., Fredrickson & Kahneman, 
1993) does not empirically address the ‘why’ of biases in retrospective 
evaluations. “Peak” and “End” are simply defined as “gestalt” features of an 
event; a full explanatory interpretation about their effects is clearly missing 
(Ariely & Carmon, 2000; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993; Read, 2004). Fredrickson 
(2000) offers the following post-hoc discussion of Peaks and Ends “…earn their 
privileged status because they carry more personal meaning than other moments” 
(p. 589). In the same paper, the author claims that the affect experienced during 
the Peak moment “…is the single moment that defines the personal capacity 
needed to face the experience again” (p. 590). Although interesting, these 
attempts to explain the impact of Peaks and Ends rely on general post-hoc ideas, 
which remain untested. Similarly, Ariely and Carmon (2000) put forward the 
notion of extrapolation, according to which people can predict how experiences 
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will unfold in the future by summarising specific features of the experience at 
hand (e.g., trend and end). Also, extracting just a few moments of the experience 
while summarising it in hindsight might benefit people as this process may 
counter their limits in encoding capacity. Once again, though, no detailed 
explanatory account of the biases has been suggested (but see Hogarth & 
Einhorn, 1992). 
In the present thesis, I examine an account of biases in retrospective 
evaluation which relies on well-known cognitive phenomena, i.e. memory 
operating characteristics.  
 
Judgment bias as a memory bias 
When reviewing the biases in retrospective evaluations, striking parallels 
can be drawn with well documented memory phenomena. For instance, the effect 
of a “Peak” on retrospective evaluations can be associated to its distinctiveness 
relative to the other moments in the to-be-assessed experience. In the memory 
literature, distinctiveness is a relational feature in that it relates to “the extent to 
which an item stands out from or is distinct from the other items in the search 
set” (Neath & Surprenant, 2003; p. 458). In a to-be-recalled list, items which are 
distinctive are usually better recalled than the surrounding items (e.g., Hulme, 
Neath, Stuart, Shostak, Surprenant, & Brown, 2006; Hunt, 1995; Hunt & Lamb, 
2001; Nairne, 2005; Neath, Brown, McCormack, Chater, & Freeman, 2006). 
Consider the following experiment on the isolation effect (or “Von Restorff” 
effect) (Rabinowitz & Andrews, 1973). Participants were asked to recall 11-item 
lists; the items were presented on cards and they were typed in black capital 
letters. In some lists, one of the words was presented in larger capital red letters, 
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which undoubtedly made it perceptually distinctive compared to the remaining 
ten items. The results were clear-cut: When isolated, the recall of the distinctive 
item was dramatically increased compared to its neighbours – with the recall 
advantage over non-isolated items presented in the same position reaching 
approximately 35%.   
A simple memory-based approach could then explain the influence of 
“Peaks” on retrospective evaluations. The logic is as follows:  “Peaks”, or the 
most intense moments of an experience, are by definition more distinctive 
compared to the other (less intense) moments. As “Peaks” are distinctive, they 
are more likely to be retrievable from memory at the time a summary evaluation 
is required. If memory plays a central role in biasing retrospective evaluations, 
then this recall advantage for the “Peaks” should translate into a larger impact on 
summary assessments – compared to the remainder of the experience.  
Moreover, if we were adopt a memory-based approach, primacy and 
recency effects observed for summary assessments (see Hogarth & Einhorn, 
1992) can be related to primacy and recency effects in memory, i.e. the recall 
advantage for early and late information within a series (e.g., Murdock, 1962; 
Neath & Surprenant, 2003; Tan & Ward, 2000). Just to re-iterate the above 
described logic, in a number of circumstances, we could expect the first and last 
moments of an experience (or information within a sequence) to enjoy a recall 
advantage compared to intermediate moments – which could explain their larger 
impact on summary assessments.  
Situational or task-related factors may moderate the extent to which 
either primacy or recency information is more prominent in memory. In turn, this 
could explain why either early or late information has been observed to influence 
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summary assessments (e.g., Anderson, 1981). For instance, if the delay between 
the study phase (the time during which some to-be-recalled items are learnt) and 
the test phase (when participants recall the items) is increased, the recall for early 
items increases while the recall for late items decreases (the “recency–primacy 
shift”; e.g., Knoedler, Hellwig, & Neath, 1999). Also, the modality of 
presentation of the to-be-recalled (and to-be-evaluated) information may 
influence its memorability: Late information is usually better recalled if a 
sequence is presented aurally rather than in the visual modality (e.g., Corballis, 
1966; Murray, 1966). 
To summarise, by referring to the influence of memory processes, a 
comprehensive account of judgment bias in retrospective evaluations can 
potentially be developed. Moreover, such a theoretical approach would go some 
way towards bridging together the research on memory on the one hand and on 
judgment on the other. A memory-based approach can probably not provide a 
complete account of all the phenomena reported in retrospective assessments; 
however, it appears clear from the above and from the work reported hereafter 
that considering memory operation and retrieval dynamics is likely to contribute 
to a better understanding of judgment in hindsight. Moreover, previous research 
has neglected the role of memory in decision making, prompting Dougherty, 
Gronlund and Gettys (2003) to claim that “research on behavioural decision 
theory has largely failed to address the memory processes underlying judgment 
and decision making” (p. 125; see also Weber, Goldstein, & Barlas, 1995; 
Weber, Goldstein, & Busemeyer, 1991; Weber & Johnson, 2006).  
 
- 33 - 
1.3.2. Availability and accessibility 
Evidence of memory-driven judgment bias 
Although there has been very little systematic investigation into the role 
of mnemonic processes in retrospective judgment of hedonic episodes, there is 
no paucity of hypotheses that suggest this would be a worthwhile endeavour 
(e.g., Higgins, Rholes, & Jones, 1977; Loken & Hoverstad, 1985). Taylor (1982) 
claims that judgment must depend on memory processes, as “one’s judgments 
are always based on what comes to mind” (p. 199). Indeed, several theoretical 
models maintain that memory processes, at least to some extent, influence 
people’s decision-making (e.g., Fuzzy-trace theory; Brainerd & Reyna, 1990; 
MINERVA-DM; Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999; Decision by Sampling; 
Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006; see also Kashima & Kerekes, 1994).  
What is more, several empirical findings support the suggestion of a close 
association between memory and judgment processes. In their seminal work on 
the availability heuristic, Tversky and Kahneman (1973) asked participants to 
judge whether some letters (e.g., “k”) appear more often either in first or third 
position within English words. Despite the fact that in English there are more 
words with a “k” in third position than in first position, the overwhelming 
majority of participants reckoned the opposite was true. The authors argued that 
these biased frequency estimates were due to a memory-based heuristic; namely, 
participants brought to mind – i.e., they retrieved from memory – words that 
started with a “k” (e.g., “kitchen”) more easily than words with a “k” in third 
position (e.g., “acknowledge”). 
Similarly, people tend to overestimate the occurrence of violent deaths, 
presumably because they are more thoroughly covered by media reports and 
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hence more available in memory (Combs & Slovic, 1979; Lichtenstein, Slovic, 
Fischhoff, Layman, & Combs, 1978). The work by Dougherty and colleagues 
(Dougherty, 2001; Dougherty & Franco-Watkins, 2003; Dougherty & Hunter, 
2003a; 2003b; Dougherty & Sprenger, 2006; Sprenger & Dougherty, 2006) has 
suggested that working memory is an important determinant of hypothesis 
generation and probability judgment. For example, in a series of studies, it was 
showed that participants with higher working memory capacity managed to 
generate more alternative hypotheses – and consequently performed probability 
judgments more accurately (Dougherty & Hunter, 2003a). 
Finally, a study by Reyes et al. (1980) investigated whether changes in 
the memory trace due to delay may result in different judgments about the same 
information – depending on when the evaluation is prompted. In their study, 
participants partook in a mock trial during which a defendant was charged with 
drink driving. Participants were presented with arguments, half of which were in 
favour of the prosecution, while the remaining half were in favour of the 
defendant. Each of these arguments was presented either in a vivid or a non-vivid 
form. For instance, an argument that described how the defendant was drunk 
before leaving the party was non-vividly formulated as follows: “On his way out 
the door, Sanders [the defendant] staggered against a serving table, knocking a 
bowl to the floor.” (p. 4). The vivid version was instead: “On his way out the 
door, Sanders staggered against a serving table, knocking a bowl of guacamole 
on the white shag carpet.” (p. 4). There were two groups of participants; the first 
group heard the prosecution arguments in vivid form and the pro-defendant 
arguments as non-vivid. The second group heard the opposite. As predicted by 
the authors, there was no difference between the two groups in their judgment of 
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the defendant’s guilt – when participants were tested immediately after the 
arguments presentation. This was attributed to participants’ accurate memory of 
all the arguments, which, to reiterate, were half in favour of the defendant and 
half in favour of the prosecution. However, when participants were tested two 
days later, participants who saw the prosecution arguments in vivid form judged 
the defendant more severely than the other participants. The authors argued that, 
as some time had passed, the vivid arguments were “more available for recall 
and hence they should dominate the non-vivid counterarguments.” (p. 3). The 
results of a memory test supported this prediction, as vivid arguments were better 
remembered than non-vivid arguments. Also, across participants there was a 
correlation between the judgment about the defendant’s guilt and the recall 
advantage for prosecution arguments – as compared to pro-defendant arguments.  
 
Retrieval content vs. Ease of access 
The above reviewed studies also introduce an important debate about how 
memory processes may influence judgment. The work by Schwarz and his 
colleagues (Schwarz, 1995; 1998; Schwarz, Bless, Wanke, & Winkielman, 2003; 
Schwarz & Vaughn, 2002; see also Tybout, Sternthal, Malaviya, Bakamitsos, & 
Park, 2005) has highlighted that memory can affect judgment because of its 
retrieval content or because of its ease of access (“retrieval fluency”; cf. 
Benjamin & Bjork, 1996; see also the Accessibility model; Koriat, 1993; 1995; 
Koriat & Levy-Sadot, 2001)1. The former (retrieval content) refers to the fact 
                                                
1
 Schwarz and colleagues (e.g., Schwarz, 1998; Schwarz & Vaughn, 2002) experimentally 
investigated how the effects of retrieval content can be disentangled from those of ease of access. 
Normally, people seem biased by the ease or difficulty with which information is brought to 
mind. However, people rely more on what they can retrieve from memory “when the subjective 
recall experiences are considered non-diagnostic” (Schwarz & Vaughn, 2002; p. 118). 
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that people base their judgments on what comes to mind (e.g., Higgins, 1989; 
1996). For instance, in the above study by Reyes et al. (1980), participants were 
more inclined to judge the defendant as guilty when they remembered more 
arguments in favour of the prosecution. Bias in judgment would then stem from 
people’s tendency not to retrieve all the presented information in order to 
evaluate it; rather, they seem to provide a judgment on the basis of the sub-set of 
information that comes to mind most readily (e.g., Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1987; 
Higgins, 1996).  
On the other hand, the formulation of the availability heuristic (Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1973) states that it is the experienced ease of retrieval that 
determines judgment. In the example mentioned above, participants 
overestimated the frequency of words with a specific letter in first position as it 
was easier for them to retrieve such exemplars from long-term memory – as 
compared to items where the letter appears in third position (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973; see also Lichtenstein et al., 1978).  
So far, the evidence and theoretical accounts reviewed support the 
general claim that memory processes influence judgment. However, several 
findings from the social cognition literature (e.g., Hastie & Park, 1986; but see 
Betsch et al., 2001) question the value and generality of a memory-based 
approach.  
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1.3.3. Independence accounts 
Evidence against the role of memory in evaluations 
If the evaluation of the past is based upon our memory of events it 
follows that memory and judgment must be functionally related at some level. 
Therefore, if people are asked to evaluate an experience and they are also tested 
for their memory of it, clear associations should be observed between judgment 
and memory measures. That is not always the case. In their influential study on 
personality impression formation, Anderson and Hubert (1963) instructed 
participants to rate the likeability of a hypothetical character who was described 
through a series of adjectives. The authors also asked participants to perform a 
memory task, which involved recalling the adjectives. The results did not display 
the expected association between memory and judgment measures. On one hand, 
the findings revealed a primacy bias in that early adjectives in the list had more 
influence on the likeability ratings. On the other hand, a recall advantage was 
displayed for the last adjectives (recency effect). The results suggested a 
dissociation between memory and judgment processes, in that the most 
memorable adjectives were not those which biased the ratings. The authors 
formulated what later on was going to be defined as the “two-memory 
hypothesis” (cf. Hastie & Park, 1986) by concluding that “the impression 
response is based on a different memory system than that which underlies the 
verbal recall.” (p. 388).  
Other empirical evidence also points towards the functional independence 
of memory and judgment (e.g., Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993; Dreben et al., 
1979; Fiske, Taylor, Etcoff, & Laufer, 1979). For example, the exposure effect, 
which refers to the increased preference for some items only because they are 
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repeatedly presented, can occur in the absence of increased recognition for those 
specific items (Zajonc, 1980).  
More recently, Betsch et al. (2001) proposed the “Value-Account” model, 
which explains these dissociations between memory and judgment with a logic 
similar to that of the “two-memory hypothesis” (Anderson, 1981; 1989; 
Anderson & Hubert, 1963). In their study, participants were presented with an 
incidental judgment task. They were told that the experiment was about their 
memory for pictorial ads presented on the screen, one at the time. They were also 
told to read the return values of five different stock exchange shares, which were 
displayed together with the ads. At the end of the presentation they were asked to 
both estimate the sum and average return of each share and to express their 
attitude towards them, answering the generic question “How do you find this 
share?” (p. 245) Despite being rather inaccurate in estimating the return of the 
shares, participants’ attitudes were most favourable towards the most profitable 
shares. The authors interpreted these findings as evidence of a dissociation 
between memory and judgment. They suggested that participants shaped their 
attitude towards the shares while they were presented with the relevant 
information; at the end of the presentation, their impression of each share was 
stored in a hypothetical structure (the “value-account”). When prompted with a 
judgment task, the value-account was more easily accessible than the actual 
information about the shares; this in turn led to the dissociation between 
participants’ estimations of the shares and their attitudes towards them (Betsch et 
al., 2001).  
 
- 39 - 
On-line vs. memory-based judgment 
The literature reviewed in the previous sections provides us with 
conflicting views about the role of memory in summary assessments. Does 
judgment depend on memory processes? 
In their seminal work about the relationships between memory and 
judgment, Hastie and Park (1986) provide an interpretation of these inconsistent 
findings. The authors suggest that, when providing summary assessments, people 
can engage in one of two information processing strategies. If a memory-based 
strategy is used, relevant information is retrieved from memory and integrated to 
produce an evaluation. When this is done, correlations between memory and 
judgment are observed, as the latter depends on retrieval processes (e.g., 
Dougherty et al., 1999; Schwarz, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). 
Conversely, if on-line processing is relied upon, an impression of the target 
stimulus is formed while it is being encountered; this impression is adjusted after 
each piece of new evidence is processed. When an overall evaluation is elicited, 
this impression formed on-line is retrieved and it forms the basis of retrospective 
evaluations. Correlations between memory and judgment are therefore not 
necessarily observed, as the summary assessment does not rely on specific 
information about the target stimulus retrieved from memory (e.g., Anderson, 
1996; Betsch et al., 2001; Lichtenstein & Srull, 1987). On-line judgment seems 
to refer to a cognitive process which is rather similar to the Step-by-Step 
processing included in the Belief-Adjustment model (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992).  
According to Hastie and Park (1986; see also Hastie & Pennington, 
1989), on-line judgment is the predominant form of processing people implement 
when evaluating reality. In support of this claim, experimental evidence has 
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suggested that trait (e.g., Winter & Uleman, 1984) and causal inferences are 
performed spontaneously and on-line (Weiner, 1985). Moreover, it is argued 
that, as the on-line judgment is readily available, searching memory for specific 
information about the to-be-assessed target stimulus is a cognitively costly and 
unnecessary process. Hastie and Park suggest that memory-based judgments are 
relatively rare; they are performed when there is no forewarning about the 
judgment task, and when people are not able to spontaneously form an 
impression. In these cases, as the on-line judgment is hindered, people have to 
rely on the information they stored in memory about the to-be-assessed target in 
order to evaluate it. In one of their studies, Hastie and Park (1986) had 
participants listen to taped sentences which described actions performed by a 
person. Some of the actions were indicators of the person’s intelligence, 
friendliness and likeability. In order to prevent spontaneous personality 
impression formation, the authors asked one group of participants to rate the 
correctness of the grammar of each sentence before evaluating the person’s 
intelligence, friendliness and likeability (memory-based judgment condition). 
The other group of participants were instead told to simply attend to each of the 
sentences (on-line judgment condition). As predicted by the authors, correlations 
between memory for the sentences and the evaluations of the character’s 
personality were observed only for the memory-based group (see also Bargh & 
Thein, 1985; Beauvois & Cambon, 1998; Bizer, Tormala, Rucker, & Petty, 2006; 
Custer & Hurts, 2003).  
To sum up, while several findings suggest that memory and judgment 
may be functionally related (e.g., Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), other evidence 
points towards a different conclusion and supports “Independence” accounts 
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(e.g., Anderson, 1981). In the next sections, we will argue that a number of 
theoretical and methodological issues must be addressed before the memory–
judgment relationships can be adequately understood.  
 
1.4. Summary and overview of the thesis 
 
1.4.1. Summary 
General objectives  
The present thesis aims to systematically investigate whether memory 
processes may be underlying some of the above described biases in retrospective 
evaluations (e.g., “Peak” and “End” effects; Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993; 
Primacy and recency effects; Anderson & Hubert, 1963; Collins & Shanks, 
2002). In doing so, we are attempting to bridge together different literatures 
which reported biases in summary assessments – namely the behavioural 
decision making, the social cognition and the information integration literatures 
(e.g., Ariely & Carmon, 2000; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). 
 
Issues that need to be addressed  
In order to thoroughly assess whether memory processes are related to 
evaluations, a series of methodological and theoretical issues must be addressed. 
Although an overview of these issues is reported and discussed in each of the 
following experimental chapters, some of the more important questions that 
motivated the present work are summarised here.  
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One important issue relates specifically to the biases in retrospective 
evaluations. The literature on the Peak-End rule, when predicting retrospective 
evaluations, often did not isolate early moments (primacy) as one of the potential 
predictors (e.g., Ariely & Carmon, 2000). At the same time, the paradigms used 
in the social cognition literature did not allow one to disentangle the effects of 
“Peak” information from those of the order of presentation (e.g., Hogarth & 
Einhorn, 1992). In the studies reported here, it was possible to disentangle and 
investigate the separate contributions of primacy, recency and “Peak” 
information on judgments. 
When investigating the relationships between memory and judgment 
correlations, previous research mostly adopted a simple correlational approach 
(Hastie & Park, 1986). Memory and judgment measures were collected, and any 
possible association was investigated post-hoc. In the present thesis, a priori 
hypotheses were put forward about judgment outputs depending on the 
memorability of specific information.  
Moreover, research that attempted to directly assess the causal nature of 
the relationship between memory and judgment mainly investigated frequency 
judgments – during which people judge the frequency of a target stimulus or the 
likelihood of its occurrence (e.g., Gabrielcick & Fazio, 1984; Hanita, Gavanski, 
& Fazio, 1997; Lewandowsky & Smith, 1983). In the present thesis, we will 
investigate instead quality judgments, where people summarise the hedonic value 
of affective stimuli. This is an important distinction as it is likely that different 
cognitive processing is underlying the two judgment tasks – namely frequency 
and hedonic judgments. As Hogarth and Einhorn (1992) suggest in their “Belief-
Adjustment” model, frequency judgments fall into the category of evaluation 
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tasks (p. 9). That is, people have an a priori hypothesis (e.g., a given theory is 
true), and any incoming information is encoded as either supporting or not 
supporting such hypothesis. The data for this type of judgment task can be 
accounted for by additive models, where the final judgment (bipolar itself) 
depends on the total amount of information in favour of the hypothesis as 
compared to the amount of the information that disproves the hypothesis. On the 
other hand, in estimation tasks (p. 9) people provide impressions which reflect 
the degree to which something (or someone; Anderson & Hubert, 1963) is liked. 
In these cases, which more closely reflect summary assessments for hedonic 
events, averaging models seem to be more appropriate in order to predict 
people’s judgment (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992).  
Compared to previous research on the relationships between memory and 
judgment (e.g., Hastie & Park, 1986), more comprehensive and detailed memory 
measures are used here. It is argued that these are necessary if the influence of 
memory processes on judgment is to be detected. More specifically, memory 
measures relating to availability were used; availability refers to  what is 
accessed in memory at the time of judgment (e.g., Schwarz, 1998). We also used 
additional measures in order to detect any potential effect of accessibility – 
namely the ease of access of information in memory (e.g., Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973).  
A further methodological improvement involves controlling for variables 
that may be affecting retrieval of information from memory. For instance, 
stimulus frequency and familiarity may influence retrieval of verbal information; 
at the same time, though, these factors may not affect the processes underlying 
retrospective judgments (e.g., likeability of a person). This, in turn, could reduce 
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the possibility of detecting any underlying correlation between memory and 
judgment outputs. Thus, by controlling variables like stimulus frequency and 
familiarity, it is argued that any conclusions about the relationships between 
memory and judgment are more reliable.  
 
1.4.2. Thesis outline 
Three groups of studies are reported, each of them addressing different 
but related theoretical questions. Chapter 2 investigated the judgment bias in 
retrospective evaluations of short and discrete affective episodes, namely lists of 
words. More importantly, it addressed the open question whether a reliable 
relationship between memory and judgment can be observed. Compared to 
previous research, some important methodological improvements were 
implemented.  
As a clear association between memory and judgment was found, Chapter 
3 investigated further the nature of the relationship. Biases in retrospective 
evaluations were predicted on the basis of the memorability of the to-be-assessed 
information, which was experimentally manipulated. Also, this study addressed 
the potential confounding effects of the dual nature of the paradigm, where 
participants are asked to both evaluate and recall the presented information.  
Chapter 4 extended the above findings to less abstract and more cohesive 
experiences, i.e. short stories told through slideshows. The outlined memory-
based approach also held for this type of stimuli and accounted for the biases in 
retrospective evaluations – which differed from those observed in the previous 
two chapters. Finally, this series of studies provided some support for the idea 
that the choice of the memory task is important when studying the relationship 
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between memory and judgment. More specifically, it is suggested that if the 
memory task does not call for the retrieval of the same information called upon 
for judgment, the relationship between judgment and memory can be obviated. 
The argument is basically that previous null effects could be attributable to 
misalignment between the judgment and memory tasks in terms of what is 
retrieved to comply with the demands in each task.  
Finally, in Chapter 5, the findings reported here are summarised and 
discussed in light of recent memory-driven theories of decision making. Also, 
future directions for the research on the role of memory in judgment and 
decisions making are suggested. 
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Chapter 2: 
The Role of Memory in Retrospective 
Evaluations 
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Introductory note 
In the following pages, three experiments are reported, in journal article 
form. This paper represents the first empirical chapter of the thesis – and it has 
been submitted for publication. The objectives of the present experiments are 
two-fold. First, the nature of the biases in retrospective evaluations for short 
episodes is explored. Second, it is investigated whether memory and judgment 
measures are associated. 
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2.1. Abstract 
Current research shows that when evaluating experiences retrospectively, people 
tend to base their assessments on specific moments of the experience. For 
instance, the Peak-End rule (e.g., Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993) states that the 
most intense (“Peak”) and final moments (“End”) of an event exert a large 
influence on retrospective evaluations, while more holistic features (e.g., event 
duration) have little impact. In the present series of studies, the role memory 
plays in biasing retrospective evaluation was explored. Participants recalled word 
lists after having assessed each of them for pleasantness. The results showed that 
the assessments were significantly influenced by the presence and the position of 
a negative item. Primacy and recency effects were observed for both memory 
and judgment measures. Further analyses confirmed that recalling the negative 
information was associated with more unpleasant judgments. The relationship 
between memory and judgment was clearest in the last experiment, where the 
memory task demands were lowered. The results are discussed in relation to a 
memory-based approach to the judgment biases in retrospective evaluations.  
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2.2. Introduction 
It is a common experience to reflect on past events, evaluating them in 
hindsight. When such evaluations are reported, people tend to provide a 
summary assessment of the episode under consideration instead of a moment-by-
moment account of how they felt during the experience (Fredrickson, 2000). The 
event may have been long-lasting and changed in quality over time (e.g., a 
lecture, a holiday etc); nevertheless, evaluations typically involve a cohesive 
unitary response. How do people summarise the quality of an experience as a 
whole into a global assessment? That is, how do they construct retrospective 
evaluations?  
Recent findings have highlighted the importance of better understanding 
the processes that underlie retrospective evaluations. For example, Kahneman 
(2000) showed that an event’s remembered utility—i.e. how it is assessed in 
hindsight—better predicted decisions to repeat the experience than its actual 
experienced quality or experienced utility (measured while the event was taking 
place). Kahneman’s view highlights the idea that retrieval from memory may 
play a determining role in the construction of retrospective evaluations. The aim 
of the work reported herein was to appraise this memory-based view. 
Although it might seem obvious on first examination that memory must 
play a significant role in retrospective evaluations many proposals do not adopt 
this premise. In effect, there is considerable controversy in the literature 
regarding the role that memory plays in retrospective evaluations. For instance, 
“on-line” theories hold that people evaluate events as they experience them (e.g., 
Anderson, 1981). According to this view, to judge an event, the only thing 
needed from memory is the result of the on-line assessment. Retrospective 
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evaluations are thought to be based on this on-line processing; retrieving 
information about the event itself is seen as cognitively costly and unnecessary. 
This approach is supported by a number of studies that found no relationship 
between what is remembered from an episode and its retrospective evaluation 
(e.g., Betsch, Plessner, Schwieren, & Gütig, 2001); we will return to these 
findings below.  
On the other hand, theoretical approaches in line with the “Availability 
Heuristic” (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) predict that retrospective evaluations 
will depend on the information that can be remembered about the event – and the 
ease with which it can be accessed in memory. Results which highlight 
correlations between memory and judgment support this view (e.g., Reyes, 
Thompson, & Bower, 1980).  
In the present paper, we set out to contribute to this debate by 
systematically investigating the role of memory in retrospective evaluation. 
Relative to previous work, our approach has a number of novel characteristics. 
Our strategy was to design an experimental paradigm where we could measure a) 
retrospective evaluations and b) memory for the assessed material. Importantly, 
we adopted a transfer-appropriate-processing perspective: it is suggested that 
conflicting results were obtained in the past at least in part because memory is 
surprisingly flexible; what is remembered is highly dependent on the specific 
retrieval cues provided at the point of retrieval. This fact is easy to 
underestimate—however, one has only to consider the findings on false memory 
or the misinformation effect to realise that small changes in the cueing 
information can produce big changes in what is remembered (see Loftus, 2005, 
for a review). If retrospective evaluation is obtained in one context and memory 
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for the material is assessed within a different procedure this may well alter the 
cueing environment enough to significantly reduce any relationship between 
memory and judgment. Hence, if one is to clarify the role that memory plays in 
retrospective evaluation, it is important to show that how memory is probed is 
aligned with the information that underlies the judgment task. This objective was 
pursued here and was the dominant motivation for our choice of task and 
materials, as will be explained below.  
Another important element of our strategy involved manipulating the 
memorability of the material. Based on a perspective where memory plays an 
important role in judgment in hindsight, we predicted the effect memorability 
would have on retrospective assessment. Therefore, contrary to several previous 
studies on the relationships between memory and judgment (for a review, see 
Hastie & Park, 1986), the causal role of memory processes could be more 
confidently assessed. 
Finally, in the studies reported below, we systematically considered 
accessibility, i.e. the ease with which information is accessed in memory (see 
also Schwarz, 1995). This allowed us to test the hypothesis that accessibility 
moderates the impact of memory on retrospective evaluations; if this is the case 
then the easier it is to retrieve a given feature or part of an experience, the larger 
its effect on retrospective judgment.  
Before providing more detail relative to the above, we first briefly review 
the relevant literature on retrospective evaluation as well as the work that relates 
to the role of memory in the process.    
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Judgment biases in retrospective evaluations (RE)  
A number of studies have investigated how people construct or develop 
retrospective evaluations (cf. Fredrickson, 2000). This research examined 
retrospective evaluations in many domains. The latter have included personality 
impression formation (Anderson & Hubert, 1963; Asch, 1946; Dreben, Fiske, & 
Hastie, 1979; Lichtenstein & Srull, 1987), perception of pain (Ariely, 1998; 
Ariely & Carmon, 2000; Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996), the profit profile of 
market shares (Betsch et al., 2001), payment sequences (Langer, Sarin, & Weber, 
2005), movie clips (Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993), video output quality 
(Hands & Avon, 2001), causality attribution (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992), 
perceived guilt of defendants (Reyes et al., 1980), aversive experiences 
(Schreiber & Kahneman, 2000; Varey & Kahneman, 1992) and TV 
advertisements (Baumgartner, Sujan, & Padgett, 1997). 
One of the conclusions of this work has invariably been that judgment in 
hindsight it biased in various ways. For example, in a number of social judgment 
tasks, order effects have been observed (e.g., Collins & Shanks, 2002; 
Pennington & Hastie, 1986; for a review, see Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992). Early 
(primacy) or late (recency) information has been found to disproportionately 
influence summary assessments. Consider a well-known study by Anderson and 
Hubert (1963). In this study, participants were presented with a sequence of 
adjectives. Participants were then asked to rate the likeability of the hypothetical 
person whom the adjectives referred to. Even if the number of positive and 
negative statements was held constant across sequences, primacy effects were 
observed:  likeability ratings were higher for those lists where the positive 
information was presented early in the sequence and significantly lower when the 
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negative descriptors were presented first. These order effects suggest that certain 
moments of the assessed episode weigh more heavily in retrospective evaluations 
than others, biasing the assessments provided. This is also a conclusion that can 
be drawn from another important body of work—the one examining what is 
known as the Peak-End rule.  
The “Peak-End” rule (Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993) proposes that the 
final moments and the most intense2 parts of an experience disproportionately 
affect judgments in hindsight (Ariely & Carmon, 2000; Baumgartner et al., 
1997). The Peak-End rule’s predictions have been supported with many types of 
stimuli: Positive (Do, Rupert, & Wolford, 2008) and negative experiences 
(Kahneman et al., 1993), very short (Schreiber & Kahneman, 2000) and 
prolonged events (Clark & Georgellis, 2004; Redelmeier et al., 2003), 
continuous (Baumgartner et al., 1997; Kahneman et al., 1993) and discrete 
episodes (Clark & Georgellis, 2004; Langer et al., 2005), and finally experiential 
(Ariely, 1998) and semantic content (Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993). Although 
some issues remain controversial, the work on the Peak-End rule clearly supports 
the general point that judgment in hindsight is biased. Moreover, we would 
suggest that in many instances, these biases appear connected to well known 
characteristics of memory functioning, a suggestion to which we now turn.  
 
What is the role of memory? Availability Vs On-line judgment 
One of the important questions motivating the present investigation was: 
why do certain parts of what is assessed exert a larger impact on retrospective 
evaluations than others? When consulting the literature on memory 
                                                
2
 Intensity is defined as the magnitude of the hedonic dimension that is being evaluated (e.g. pain, 
pleasantness etc.)  
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phenomenology, striking parallelisms with the above mentioned judgment biases 
are easily identifiable. For instance, distinctiveness (i.e. the extent to which a 
piece of information stands out against the background created by associated 
material; Neath & Surprenant, 2003) usually leads to a memory advantage in 
standard memory tasks (e.g., Hunt, 1995). If we were to adopt an approach to 
retrospective evaluations biases where memory plays an important role, then it 
could be suggested that the most intense moments of a just-experienced event are 
more likely to be distinctive – relative to the background of less intense moments 
comprising a given experience. It is an easy step to then suggest that these more 
intense moments are also going to be most readily available in memory. 
Consequently, it seems reasonable to argue that such a memory advantage could 
result in a larger impact for the distinctive moments on summary assessments. 
According to the same line of reasoning, primacy and recency effects in memory 
(e.g., Tan & Ward, 2000) would be reflected in primacy and recency effects in 
retrospective judgment.   
An implication of the memory-based approach, in line with the 
availability heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), is the prediction of a 
relationship between memory and judgment: The information that is most readily 
accessible in memory at the time of judgment should weigh more heavily in 
summary global assessments. Several empirical findings (e.g., Higgins, 1996) 
have pointed in that direction and revealed how people perform their judgment 
depending on the episodic information that is most readily available in memory, 
without retrieving all the information they could about a just-experienced event 
or information sequence.  
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However, a number of studies from the social cognition literature have 
not found any correlations between memory and judgment measures (for a 
review, see Hastie & Park, 1986). For example, in the above mentioned study by 
Anderson and Hubert (1963), participants provided likeability ratings of 
hypothetical characters after being presented with a series of adjectives. Having 
asked participants in some conditions to recall the adjectives as well, the authors 
could relate judgment and memory measures for the same information. 
Strikingly, while a strong primacy effect was observed for the likeability ratings, 
recency effects were noted for the recall of the adjectives. In this case, what 
seemed most memorable (the most recently presented adjectives) was not related 
to what was biasing evaluations (the positive or negative information that came 
first on the list of adjectives).   
Some theoretical approaches have attempted to account for these 
dissociations by proposing functional independence between two cognitive 
processes (Hastie & Park, 1986). The “two-memory hypothesis” (Anderson, 
1981; Anderson & Hubert, 1963) suggests that evaluations of events or 
sequences and the storage of their verbal traces into long-term memory are two 
independent processes, that are differentially called upon depending on the type 
of task participants are asked to perform. Simply put the suggestion is that the 
evaluation and integration of information necessary for the judgment task is 
performed in parallel to the encoding of the event information as such into long-
term memory. Because both sources of information are independently encoded, 
they are also accessed separately, producing the dissociations referred to above. 
A similar approach, also hypothesising independence between memory and 
judgment processes, is the “value-account” (Betsch et al., 2001). Betsch and 
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colleagues hold that the summary evaluation of any episode is formed on-line, 
i.e. while the event is being experienced. At the end of the event, this impression 
is stored in a hypothetical structure (the “value-account”) which is more easily 
accessed when a judgment is required than the memory trace of the event itself.  
In order to explain the contradictory findings relating to memory-
judgment correlations, Hastie and Park (1986) insisted on an analysis of the 
judgment task itself. According to these authors, in almost all the studied 
situations participants are either aware of the subsequent judgment task or are 
capable of performing spontaneous judgments; therefore, it is possible to form an 
impression of the event while it is being experienced (on-line judgment). The 
implication is that there is no need to retrieve information from memory about 
the event itself to provide a retrospective evaluation, since retrospective 
judgment can be based on the impression formed on-line. It follows that the only 
situations in which participants would rely on episodic information about an 
event in order to assess it retrospectively, are the instances where they are neither 
able to form a spontaneous judgment nor forewarned of a subsequent judgment 
task. Arguably, this would exclude many if not most of the experiences we 
encounter in our everyday lives. 
Here, we adopt a position that is not so removed from the basic 
perspective adopted by Hastie and Park (1986): The information retrieved in a 
typical verbally based recall task can be significantly different from the 
information that a retrospective evaluation was based on. However, we do not 
think this necessarily leads to the conclusion that retrospective judgment is 
independent of episodic memory. Rather, we would suggest that this is an 
argument for carefully considering how the judgment and memory tasks are 
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aligned. From the perspective of experimental memory research, this perhaps has 
not been given all the needed consideration in the past. We address this issue in 
the experiments presented here. 
Moreover, from a more methodological perspective, it is argued that a 
number of issues must be addressed before the memory-judgment relationship 
can be adequately understood. For example, together with several other studies 
which investigated memory-judgment correlations (e.g., Lichtenstein & Srull, 
1987; Reyes et al., 1980) Hastie and Park (1986) used a ratio measure for the 
memory output. For instance, in their Experiment 1, participants heard a 
recorded 5-min conversation between two people, after which they had to assess 
the job suitability of one of the two characters. The authors then computed a 
memory ratio by dividing the positive arguments recalled (i.e. those supporting 
candidate suitability) by the total number of arguments remembered: the higher 
the ratio, the more favourable the memory for the specific candidate. This 
memory measure was then correlated with the overall job suitability rating the 
participant provided for the hypothetical character.  
An implicit assumption underlying the use of this type of ratio is that 
each argument recalled (and possibly each item on participants’ mind at the time 
of judgment) has the same weight in the overall evaluation. Such an assumption 
is disputable in light of the work reviewed above showing significant biases in 
the weight various elements have in retrospective judgments. In addition, the 
availability heuristic (Schwarz & Vaughn, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) 
suggests that the ease of recall of a given piece of information moderates its 
effect on evaluations. Accordingly, it can be argued that the availability of each 
item at the time of judgment will impact on retrospective evaluations: the more 
- 58 - 
easily accessible a specific item is at the time of evaluation, the higher its 
influence on the evaluation itself. This would in turn entail that a memory 
measure (like a ratio) which assigns the same weight to each item recalled does 
not adequately represent the memory content accessed in order to produce 
overall assessments. Finally, by using a positive divided by positive + negative 
ratio as the memory measure, the memory output for a participant who recalled 4 
positive and 2 negative items is identical to that of a participant who retrieved 2 
positive and 1 negative item. Hence, the information about the accuracy of the 
memory representation at the time of its evaluation is ignored.  
A second methodological issue is worthy of mention. To our knowledge 
none of the previous studies in the social cognition literature which investigated 
the correlations between memory and judgment measures controlled for variables 
which are known to affect memory performance (e.g., stimulus frequency and 
familiarity). It seems reasonable to suggest that such factors could affect the 
retrieval of verbal information while not influencing the processes that underlie 
retrospective evaluations of the same information sequence. This could in turn 
hinder – at least in some studies – the underlying correlation between memory 
for a specific event and its retrospective evaluation. For instance, in their study 
on personality impression formation, Dreben et al. (1979) utilised sentences 
relative to certain behaviours to describe hypothetical characters. Even if control 
over the valence of stimuli (which is thought to affect the judgment task) was 
exercised, the authors do not mention control over length, familiarity or 
frequency of target items - factors all well known to influence memory 
processes. Likewise, Anderson and Hubert (1963) used sequences of trait 
adjectives: Once again stimuli were selected depending on their diagnostic 
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quality (e.g., being “favourable”, “medium” or “unfavourable”, p. 380), and none 
of the selection criteria involved parameters which could well be affecting 
memory performance. In the experiments described below, we addressed these 
design issues.  
 
Overview of Experiments 
The main objective of the present paper was to explore the predictions of 
a memory-based approach to judgment bias in retrospective evaluations. In doing 
so, we investigated the relationships between memory and judgment and tested 
the predictions of two contrasting approaches. On the one hand, theoretical 
accounts that suggest independent processes underlying memory and evaluation 
processes (Anderson, 1981; Betsch et al., 2001; Hastie & Park, 1986) predict 
experimental dissociations between memory and retrospective evaluations. On 
the other, recent work as well as more classic papers has highlighted the biases 
that are present in summary assessments – biases that indicate that certain 
moments or characteristics of an event weigh much more heavily in retrospective 
evaluations than others (e.g., Ariely & Carmon, 2000; Fredrickson & Kahneman, 
1993).  A review of these biases makes a memory-based approach very 
compelling in terms of developing our understanding of retrospective 
evaluations. Such an approach can easily and parsimoniously account for the 
larger impact of specific moments on retrospective evaluations simply by 
predicting their heightened accessibility in memory (Fredrickson, 2000; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1973).   
The studies reported below revisit this approach by providing a strong 
test of the role of memory in retrospective judgment. The task is simple: 
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participants are presented with a list of words and their task is to assess the 
pleasantness of the list; moreover all the experiments except the first, they also 
have to recall the items from each list that most easily come to mind. One 
important point to note about this setup is that as participants were told before 
hand about the evaluation task, on-line judgment formation was not inhibited. If 
the “on-line” judgment accounts are tenable, little or no association between 
memory and retrospective judgment should be observed as participants could 
entirely rely on the impression formed on-line. Secondly, the nature of the 
associations between memory and judgment was explored by manipulating the 
memorability of materials: first, one of the items was made distinctive; it was a 
negative stimulus amongst otherwise neutral materials; second, memory was 
manipulated through serial position effects (e.g., Tan & Ward, 2000). Based on 
these manipulations and a memory-based approach, we made predictions as to 
the changes in retrospective judgments that would appear in the various 
experimental conditions.  
Finally, the studies reported below avoided the methodological pitfalls 
discussed previously. Firstly, we used a range of memory measures, including 
the ratio discussed above. Secondly, the design called upon included systematic 
controls over variables which could potentially confound any judgment and 
memory measurements. Hence, in the present series of studies, valenced and 
non-valenced words were selected as the components of to-be-evaluated lists, 
and length, familiarity and frequency of stimuli were all taken into account.  
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2.3. Experiment 1 
  
The aim of the first study was to determine if the summary evaluations of 
word lists were susceptible to biases in the same way as other stimuli are; also, 
we wanted to examine if these biases would be the ones expected from the 
perspective of a memory-based approach. The rationale underlying the selection 
of words as the “units” of the to-be-assessed events (i.e. word lists) was 
threefold. First, extensive research has been conducted on memory for lists of 
words and mnemonic behaviour where they are concerned is well documented. 
Secondly, it was possible to exercise control over variables that affect judgment 
(i.e. valence), while at the same time controlling for other factors that are known 
to influence memory processes (i.e. stimulus length, frequency and familiarity).  
Different predictions can be derived from the various approaches briefly 
reviewed in the introduction. A comparative assessment of our predictions and 
those of other views is provided in the general discussion. According to a 
memory-based approach, negative items presented in the first (primacy) and last 
(recency) positions of a list would have a memory advantage compared to 
negative items which are presented in the middle positions (e.g., Murdock, 
1962). It follows that a memory-based approach predicts that lists with negative 
items presented in the first (primacy) or last (recency) positions would be rated 
as more unpleasant than lists where the negative items are presented in the 
middle positions.  To our knowledge, no other theoretical account predicts both 
primacy and recency effects in retrospective judgment for the same stimuli – 
unless the nature of the task is manipulated (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992; 
Zauberman, Diehl, & Ariely, 2006).  
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2.3.1. Method 
 
2.3.1.1. Participants 
A total of 21 participants (10 females) took part in this study; their ages 
ranged from 21 to 40 years (M = 27.9, SD = 4.9) and they were recruited via an 
e-mail advert.  
 
2.3.1.2. Design and Materials  
A pool of 192 words was selected from the Affective Norms of English 
Words database (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1999). Twenty-four negative items 
were selected along with 168 neutral ones. The selection was based on the 
valence (i.e. how positive or negative they are) and arousal scores (e.g., how 
much activation the normative sample reported on reading the word) of each 
item on database scales. Negative items were selected to be low in valence (less 
than 3, on a scale of 1-9) and high in arousal (over 5.9, on a scale of 1-9). Neutral 
items scored in the middle range for valence (4.5 to 6.9) and low on the arousal 
scale (less than 5). The selected negative items scored significantly lower than 
neutral items on valence scores (M = 2.3 and M = 5.7, respectively), t(190) = 
25.3, d = 6.1,3 and had a significantly higher arousal rating (M = 6.5 and M = 4.1, 
respectively), t(190) = 21.1, d = 4.8. 
From the resulting word pool, 32 six-word lists were created, as follows. 
Eight lists included a negative item in the first position followed by 5 neutral 
words—hereafter identified as P1 lists. Four “P3” lists had a negative item in 3rd 
position while four “P4” lists had a negative item in 4th position. Eight “P6” lists 
                                                
3
 Cohen’s d is being used as the measure of effect size (Cohen, 1988) 
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comprised five neutral items and a negative word in last position. Finally, eight 
control lists contained only neutral words. 
Within-list matching between the negative (if any) and the neutral items 
ensured that negative and neutral words were equated on familiarity ratings 
(Coltheart, 1981), number of phonemes, and the Kucera-Francis frequency index 
(Kucera & Francis, 1967).   
 
2.3.1.3. Procedure 
After having agreed over e-mail to take part in the experiment, 
participants were provided with an application written in Authorware 7.0 (Adobe 
/ Macromedia, 1987-2003). A series of introductory screens familiarised 
participants with the computer-controlled procedure and gathered demographic 
data.  
Participants were told that the aim of the experiment was to collect 
normative data regarding the pleasantness of some word lists. They were 
instructed to attend to the lists and to provide an overall pleasantness rating for 
each one immediately after its presentation. The ratings were on a 0-100 scale (0 
= very unpleasant, 100 = very pleasant), and participants were encouraged to 
make use of the whole range in their responses.  
Each word of the 6-word lists was presented for one second with an inter-
stimulus interval of 0.75 seconds. Immediately after the presentation of each list, 
participants were prompted to provide their rating, by typing in their numerical 
response. There was no time limit for the rating task. Participants also had the 
chance to become familiar with the procedure, through two practice trials.  
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In order to control for list presentation order, seven pre-defined versions 
of the experiment were prepared and randomly distributed to an equal number of 
participants. Each version included a pseudo-random order of the lists, since the 
randomisation process had one constraint: No more than three exemplars of each 
of the 5 list types (P1, P3, P4, P6 & Control) could occur consecutively.  
Once the participants completed the experiment, they were instructed to 
return the results file to the experimenter via e-mail. 
 
2.3.2. Results and Discussion 
 
Figure 2.1 presents the mean pleasantness ratings as a function of list 
type. The mean pleasantness rating for the control lists (M = 68.3, SD = 10.0), 
with no negative item, was higher—that is more positive—than the ratings for 
the other list types. Moreover, there is some evidence of both primacy and 
recency in the ratings: P1 and P6 lists—which had a negative item in the first and 
last position respectively—received more negative ratings than the lists with a 
negative item in the middle positions.   
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Figure 2.1 Mean pleasantness ratings as a function of list type. Error bars 
indicate SEM (Exp.1) 
 
The inferential statistics confirmed these observations. Alpha was set to 
.05 for all analyses. A one-way ANOVA was run, with list type (P1, P3, P4, P6 
and Control) as the within-subject factor. There was a significant main effect of 
list type, F(4, 80) = 22.3, p < .001, p2 = .53.4 Planned contrasts revealed that 
pleasantness ratings for P1, P3, P4 and P6 lists were significantly lower than for 
Control lists (all ps < .001). Conversely, judgments for P6 or recency lists were 
lower than those for P4 lists (pre-recency lists), t(20) = 3.3, p < .01, d = .71. 
Finally, ratings for P1 or primacy lists were lower than ratings for P3 lists, t(20) 
= 2.1, p < .05, d = .46.  
                                                
4
 Partial Eta Squared is used as the measure of effect size 
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In sum, it can be concluded that the inclusion of a negative item affected 
perceived list pleasantness. More importantly, the negative item’s effect was 
moderated by its presentation position, since a peak in first or last position 
exerted a larger impact on summary assessments than did negative items 
presented in comparison positions elsewhere in the lists.  
When considering the judgment pattern, a straightforward interpretation 
can be derived from a memory-based approach. According to this view, the 
extent to which the negative item was available at the time of judgment would be 
the best predictor of its effect on retrospective evaluations. One of the most 
robust findings in the memory literature for lists of the type used here are 
primacy and recency effects (e.g., Tan & Ward, 2000), namely the enhanced 
memorability for items presented at the beginning and at the end of a series. 
Therefore, one interpretation of the reported results is that the primacy and 
recency effects in retrospective evaluations observed in Experiment 1 are linked 
to a memory advantage for the negative items which were presented either in 
first or last positions. Experiment 2 examined this hypothesis.  
 
2.4. Experiment 2 
 
The main objective of Experiment 2 was to introduce a memory measure 
into the retrospective evaluation task in order to more directly investigate the 
relationship between retrospective judgment and memory for each series. As in 
Experiment 1, primacy and recency effects in retrospective judgment are 
predicted in that lists with a negative item in either the first or last position are 
expected to be more negatively assessed than the other lists, the latter including 
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control lists and lists with negative items in the middle positions. At the same 
time it is expected that negative items presented either at the beginning or at the 
end of the sequence will be characterised by a memory advantage compared to 
distinctive items presented in the middle positions. Simply put, the prediction is 
that primacy and recency effects should be observed for the recall of the negative 
items.  
The predictions of the memory-based approach are tested further through 
various means. First, correlations between memory and judgment were 
examined. In doing so, we compared different measures. We computed a global, 
ratio-type, memory measure, as this was called upon in previous studies and we 
have argued that it may have masked the relationship between memory and 
judgment (e.g., Hastie & Park, 1986; Lichtenstein & Srull, 1987). This memory 
ratio measure reflected the degree of isolation with which the negative item was 
recalled: the higher the ratio, the fewer neutral items recalled together with the 
negative word. We then correlated this measure of memory with a retrospective 
judgment measure.  
Secondly, judgment was required first and memory for the content of the 
word-list obtained second (details of how this was done follow below). Hence, it 
was possible to contrast the mean pleasantness rating obtained when the negative 
item was recalled with the mean rating for the trials when it was not recalled. 
Presumably, if a distinctive item is available for later recall, it is more likely to 
have been available at the time of judgment; conversely, if the negative item is 
not available for recall, the probability that it was available at the time of 
judgment is reduced. Hence, we would expect that on average, the pleasantness 
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rating will be lower in the cases where the negative item was available for the 
memory component of the task.   
Thirdly, the effect of negative item availability was further analysed by 
examining ease of recall. As a measure of relative memory accessibility, we used 
output position in the memory task. Since participants were asked to perform free 
recall (hence no output constraints were implemented), we made the simplifying 
assumption that items recalled first are on average more readily accessible in 
memory. It was assumed that negative items recalled early on were more easily 
accessible than negative items that are recalled later on and would have had more 
impact on the retrospective assessment. Hence, our hypothesis was that the 
earlier a negative item was recalled, the stronger its impact on retrospective 
evaluations. For this reason, the effect of this differential accessibility of negative 
words was analysed in relation to the retrospective evaluations participants 
provide for the lists as a whole. 
 
2.4.1. Method 
 
2.4.1.1. Participants 
Thirty-six undergraduate students (31 females) from City University 
London took part in the study. Age ranged from 18 to 56 years (M = 26.7, SD = 
10.6). Participants were granted course credits for an introductory course in 
psychology for their participation. 
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2.4.1.2. Design and Materials 
The materials employed were the same as in Experiment 1.  
 
2.4.1.3. Procedure 
All participants took part in an individual testing session that lasted 
approximately 45 minutes. The experiment was controlled by a computer 
program developed specifically for Experiment 2 with Authorware 7.0 (Adobe / 
Macromedia, 1987, 2003).  
As in Experiment 1, participants were told that the aim of the experiment 
was to collect normative data about the pleasantness of word-lists. Word lists 
contained six words here also. The scale used for the participant ratings was the 
same as in Experiment 1. In this study, a series of asterisks appeared on the 
screen for 3 seconds to signal the end of the list presentation. Also, instead of 
typing in their responses, participants were required to use the mouse to click on 
a slide bar (with extremes of 0 and 100) on the position they felt was closest to 
their impression of the list. In order to limit the extent of anchoring effects (e.g., 
Chapman & Johnson, 2002) a sliding marker would appear on the bar (with its 
equivalent numerical value underneath) only after participants clicked for the 
first time on the slide bar. Participants then had the opportunity to adjust this 
initial rating by sliding the marker, and were to confirm their final one by 
clicking on a “Continue” button.  
After rating a given list’s overall pleasantness, participants were required 
to perform a free recall task, i.e. they were to type all the words they could 
remember from the most recently presented list. The instructions emphasised that 
spelling errors would not affect scoring and that both the assessment and recall 
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tasks were equally important; participants were asked not to overlook the rating 
task in order to proceed more quickly to the recall task. After participants had 
completed the recall task, the following list was presented, and so on.  
Three practice trials were provided. List presentation order was 
randomised independently for each participant and no time limits were set for the 
rating and recall tasks. A post-experimental questionnaire was used at the end of 
the session in order to gather information about how participants completed both 
the judgment and recall tasks.  
 
2.4.2. Results and Discussion 
 
Because of the dual nature of the task, a precautionary measure was taken 
in order to exclude from the analyses any participant who neglected the judgment 
task in order to proceed more quickly to the memory task. Participants whose 
judgment scores were characterised by a standard deviation of 5 or less (5% of 
the scale) were eliminated from the analyses. One participant was excluded 
according to this criterion. Moreover, in the post-experimental questionnaire, the 
same participant indicated that s/he performed the pleasantness ratings according 
to list memorability rather than perceived pleasantness.  Alpha was set to .05 for 
all analyses.   
 
Judgment. Figure 2.2 presents the mean pleasantness ratings as a function of list 
type.  A perusal of Figure 2 shows a pattern of results that is very similar to the 
one obtained for Experiment 1. First, pleasantness ratings for the Control lists 
were the highest (M = 60.8, SD = 12.4). Moreover, lists with a negative item in 
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either first (M = 44.3, SD = 13.3) or last position (M = 44.2, SD = 12.5) were 
rated as more unpleasant than lists with a negative item in either 3rd or 4th 
positions (M = 49.3, SD = 13.3; M = 49.4, SD = 12.8, respectively). 
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Figure 2.2 Mean pleasantness ratings as a function of list type. Error bars 
indicate SEM  (Exp.2) 
 
A one-way ANOVA was run, with list type (P1, P3, P4, P6 and Control) 
as the within-subject factor.  Overall, there was a significant main effect of list 
type, F(4, 136) = 35.9, p < .001, p2 = .52.  Planned contrasts indicated that 
pleasantness ratings for P1, P3, P4, and P6 lists were significantly lower than for 
Control lists (all ps < .001). 
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Planned contrasts also revealed that the pleasantness ratings for P1 
(primacy) lists were lower than for P3 lists, t(34) = 3.9, p < .001, d = .65. 
Moreover, a recency effect was observed too as the ratings for P6 lists were 
lower than for P4 lists, t(34) = 4.3, p < .001, d = .73. 
 
Memory.  Figure 2.3 represents the mean recall proportion for the items as a 
function of word position and valence. It seems that overall there was a memory 
advantage for the negative items as compared to the neutral ones presented in the 
same position; participants exhibited higher recall rates for the Peaks than for the 
neutral items, across presentation positions. More importantly, memory primacy 
and recency effects for the negative items can be observed: Peaks presented in 
either first (M = .78, SD = .17) or last position (M = .71, SD = .23) were better 
recalled than Peaks presented in either 3rd or 4th positions respectively (M = .56, 
SD = .28; M = .56, SD = .30). 
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Figure 2.3 Mean recall as a function of word position and valence. Error bars 
indicate SEM (Exp.2) 
 
The data were analysed using a 2 (valence: negative vs. neutral) × 4 
(position: 1st, 3rd, 4th, and 6th) repeated measures ANOVA. Main effects of 
position (F(3, 102) = 22.2, p < .001, p2 = .40) and valence (F(1, 34) = 8.8, p < 
.01, p2 = .21) were noted.  The word valence by position interaction was not 
significant (F < 1), indicating that the memory advantage for the “Peaks” over 
the corresponding neutral items was relatively constant across positions.  
To test for primacy and recency effects in the recall of the negative items, 
planned contrasts analyses were computed. The results showed that P1 recall was 
higher than P3 (t(34) = 5.4, p < .001, d = .92) and also that P6 recall was higher 
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than P4 (t(34) = 2.6, p < .05, d = .44). Hence, primacy and recency effects were 
observed for the recall of the negative items. 
 
Memory-Judgment relationships.  In order to reduce the influence of potential 
anchoring effects (e.g., Chapman & Johnson, 2002) and of inter-individual 
differences in the use of the 0-100 scale, judgment scores were transformed as 
follows: For each participant, the average pleasantness rating for the Control lists 
was subtracted from the pleasantness ratings for each P1, P3, P4 and P6 list – 
that is the lists that contained a negative item. The new corrected judgment 
scores (J’) therefore represented how much more unpleasant each P1, P3, P4, and 
P6 list was in comparison to the average Control list for each participant. J’ 
scores were then averaged for each participant, according to the negative item 
presentation position and whether the negative item presented in the list was 
recalled or not.5  
Then a “global” memory score for each participant was computed (e.g., 
Hastie & Park, 1986). This score was the average ratio between the negative 
information recalled and the total amount of words recalled: the higher the value, 
the more negative the memory for the list. Thus, the lowest possible score of 0 
corresponds to neutral items being recalled and the maximum score of 1 refers to 
lists where only the negative item was recalled. We then correlated this measure 
with the overall average corrected judgment (J’) for each participant: It was 
expected that the more negative the memory for the list, the lower the 
pleasantness ratings. However, the correlation yielded non significant results, 
Spearman’s  (33) = -.118, p > .49, and revealed how memory and judgment 
                                                
5
 This analysis yielded a total of 9.6% missing values. Missing values were replaced using 
different methods, including mean substitution by subject, grand mean, and Expectation-
Maximization algorithm (Schafer & Olsen, 1998). As all the analyses returned the same results, 
we will be reporting the data obtained via mean by subject substitution.   
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measures were not associated – at least when using this ratio-style memory 
measure.  
Second, we computed more comprehensive memory measures: we 
compared the corrected average pleasantness rating for lists where the negative 
item was recalled versus lists where the negative item was not recalled. Overall, 
when the negative item was recalled in the memory task, pleasantness ratings 
were lower (M = -15.7, SD = 11.3) than when the negative item was not recalled 
(M = -9.9, SD = 9.3). When these results were broken down by list-type, the 
same pattern appeared for P1 and P4 and P6 lists. For P3 lists, the pleasantness 
ratings seem low regardless of whether the negative item was recalled or not.   
A 2 (Memory: Negative item recalled Vs. not recalled) by 4 (List type: 
P1, P3, P4 and P6) within-subjects ANOVA confirmed these observations. The 
main effect of Memory was significant (F(1, 34) = 16.7, p < .001, p2 = .33), 
confirming that overall ratings were more unpleasant for those lists where the 
negative word was recalled. The List by Memory interaction was significant, too 
(F(3, 102) = 5.5, p < .01, p2 = .14). Follow-up analyses revealed that the main 
effect of Memory was significant for P1 and P4 lists (t(34) = 4.5, p < .001, d = 
.75; t(34) = 3.2 p < .01, d = .72, respectively). However, for the P3 and P6 lists 
the pleasantness ratings were invariably low regardless of the negative item 
being recalled or not (both ps > .05). Table 2.1 below summarises these findings.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
- 76 - 
 
Table 2.1 Mean corrected pleasantness ratings (J') as a function of list type and 
"Peak" being recalled or not (Exp.2) 
  List type 
  P1 P3 P4 P6 
Was the Peak recalled?      
No M -7.5 -11.9 -5.5 -14.8 
 SD (12.7) (13.2) (11.8) (14.9) 
Yes M -19.1 -11.8 -14.7 -17.2 
 SD (13.3) (13.4) (13.4) (11.0) 
 
 
 
Finally, retrospective evaluations were analysed depending on the 
negative item recall position (see Table 2.2). In other words, the pleasantness 
ratings (J’) were examined according to the position in which the negative item 
was recalled by the participants (regardless of its presentation position). The 
underlying rationale was that items that are more accessible in memory are likely 
to be recalled earlier—if the negative item is more accessible and recalled early 
we would expect its impact on retrospective evaluations to be higher than when it 
is recalled later in the protocol or not at all.   
 
Table 2.2 Mean corrected pleasantness ratings (J') as a function of "Peak" recall 
output position (Exp.2) 
  Peak recall output position 
  Not recalled 
 
Recalled in pos 1,2 
 
Recalled in pos 3-6 
 
Pleasantness 
 ratings (J’)  
M -10.3 -18.9 -13.8 
 SD (10.7) (11.7) (10.8) 
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Overall, the pleasantness ratings varied depending on the negative item 
output position: They were lowest when the participants recalled the negative 
item as either the first or second response (M = -18.9, SD = 11.7) and they were 
the highest when participants did not recall the Peak at all (M = -10.3, SD = 
10.7). The lists were rated somewhere at an intermediate level when the negative 
item was recalled as either 3rd, 4th, 5th or 6th response (M = -13.8, SD = 10.8).  
A significant main effect of recall position on pleasantness ratings (F(2, 
68) = 16.0, p < .001, p2 = .32) confirmed these observations. A planned contrast 
analysis revealed that judgments were lower when the negative item was recalled 
amongst the first two responses than when it was recalled amongst the last four 
responses, t(34) = 4.3, p < .001, d = .72, which in turn were lower than for those 
lists where the Peak was not recalled at all, t(34) = 2.3, p < .05, d = .38.  
An overview of the results of this second experiment indicates that they 
confirm the pattern observed in Experiment 1. Once again, a negative item 
presented either at the beginning or at the end of the series exerted a larger 
impact on pleasantness evaluations.  
Furthermore, the recall results were as expected from the perspective of a 
memory-based approach: Negative items were better remembered than 
corresponding neutral items, across presentation positions. More importantly, the 
memory pattern for the negative items displayed both primacy and recency 
effects, providing support to the possible contribution of memory processes to 
judgment biases in retrospective evaluations.  
The results of the correlational analyses produced different outcomes, 
depending on the memory measure that was being used. When a global, ratio-
style, memory measure was utilised (e.g., Hastie & Park; Lichtenstein & Srull, 
- 78 - 
1987) – where each recalled item holds the same weight – no significant 
associations were observed between memory and judgment. However, when the 
role of memory was tested through more comprehensive measures – or measures 
which took item accessibility into consideration also (e.g., Schwarz, 1995) – the 
results provided support for a memory-based approach. Pleasantness ratings for 
those lists where the negative item was recalled were significantly lower than for 
those lists where the negative item was not recalled. This result supports the idea 
that when a negative item was easily available in memory at the time of 
judgment it exerted a higher impact on judgment. The assumption was that when 
a negative item was not recalled in the memory task, it was also less likely to be 
available at the time of retrospective evaluations; on average, this would lead to a 
less negative assessment of the list. 
These results suggest that participants relied at least to some extent on 
episodic information stored in memory when providing retrospective evaluations. 
If they had exclusively relied on on-line judgment formation, there would be no 
reason to expect an association between memory and judgment measures, 
although as is always the case with a correlational approach a third factor could 
perhaps be causing changes in both memory and retrospective evaluations. 
However, accessibility in memory of a negative item seemed to moderate 
retrospective judgment, since lower ratings were associated with the negative 
item being recalled early in the response sequence. The on-line view does not 
lead to the expectation that the accessibility of the distinctive-negative item 
would have an impact on retrospective evaluation. 
Some of the more detailed follow-up analyses showed how the above 
mentioned association between memory and judgment was not observed when 
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the negative item was presented in either 3rd or last position. This absence of 
relationship is of course potentially attributable to the reduction in power 
associated with the more detailed breakdown of data. In order to assess whether 
this finding was a reliable one or not, a further experiment was conducted. Also, 
Experiment 3 involved a change in the memory task. In Experiment 2, 
participants were required to remember as many words as they could from each 
list, in any order. Previous research has shown that people rarely retrieve all the 
information that is available in order to perform a judgment task. It seems instead 
that people “…truncate their search process as soon as enough information has 
come to mind to form a judgment with sufficient subjective certainty” (Schwarz 
& Vaughn, 2002; p.105). Generally speaking, it seems reasonable to argue that 
typical retrospective evaluations do not place high demands on memory 
precision. It follows that in a scenario more closely related to typical 
retrospective evaluations situations participants would not be asked to recall all 
the information they can about a specific experience after having assessed it in 
hindsight.  
Moreover, in Experiment 2, there were some concerns about the effect of 
the demands of the memory task—as list length exceeded memory capacity, 
participants had less than perfect performance. It was not clear what effect the 
difficulty of the free recall task was having on the retrospective evaluations 
component of the Experiment. One criticism could perhaps be that the difficulty 
of the memory task biased the retrospective evaluations in such a way as to 
artificially inflate the relationship between the summary assessments and the 
memory measures. Experiment 3 revisited the memory-assessment relationship 
while addressing the issues above. 
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2.5. Experiment 3 
 
In this study, in order to reduce the cognitive demands of the memory 
task, participants were asked to recall only the first two items that came to mind 
from the just-seen list, instead of performing a free recall task requiring the recall 
of all the presented words. Hence, this experiment investigated a situation where 
the retrospective evaluations were coupled with a much less demanding memory 
task: Recalling two items from a six-item list is well within the memory capacity 
of normal adult participants and can be done without any deliberate effort to 
memorise the presented items.    
 
2.5.1. Method 
 
2.5.1.1. Participants  
A total of 38 participants (21 females) took part in the study. Ages ranged 
from 19 to 55 years (M = 40.9, SD = 11.4). Participants were recruited through 
local advertising and were rewarded with £7 per hour in exchange of their 
participation. 
 
2.5.1.2. Design and Materials 
The materials selection process changed slightly as compared to 
Experiments 1 and 2. The same pool of 192 words was employed, but new lists 
were generated and a few further controls were implemented. Through within-list 
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matching between negative and neutral items, 32 six-word lists were constructed 
as before. The lists were then assigned to 4 different blocks of 8 lists each, with 
blocks A, B and C including “negative” lists (which included 5 neutral and 1 
negative items) and block D consisting of  the “Control” lists (6 neutral items). 
The four blocks were closely matched on familiarity ratings (Coltheart, 1981), 
with block averages ranging from 525.7 to 536.1 (scale from 100 to 700), 
number of phonemes (from 4.3 to 5) and the Kucera-Francis frequency index 
(Kucera & Francis, 1967), with blocks averages ranging from 37.2 to 41.2 (scale 
from 1 to 10,000).  
Moreover, negative items were rotated, so that each of the 24 negative 
words selected from the database (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1999) appeared in 
each possible position (1st, 3rd, 4th and 6th) an equal number of times across 
participants.  
 
2.5.1.3. Procedure 
Each participant took part in an individual testing session that lasted 
approximately 40 minutes. The whole experiment was run on Authorware 7.0 
(Macromedia, 1987-2003). The overall procedure was identical to Experiment 2, 
the only difference being the nature of the memory task. After providing an 
overall pleasantness rating, participants were asked to type the first two words 
that came to mind from the just-seen list, and then to click the “Continue” button. 
On the following screen they had the chance to type in any additional words they 
might remember, but it was stressed that it was equally fine to proceed directly to 
the next trial. 
 
- 82 - 
2.5.2. Results and Discussion 
 
Two participants were excluded from the analyses: One participant rated 
list memorability instead of pleasantness, while the other participant’s standard 
deviation for the pleasantness ratings across trials was equal to 3.4, hence lower 
than the a priori determined cut-off point of 5 (see Experiment 2). Alpha was set 
to .05 for all analyses.   
 
Judgment.  Figure 2.4 presents the mean pleasantness ratings as a function of list 
type. In accord with the two previous experiments, Control lists were rated as the 
most pleasant lists (M = 65.0, SD = 14.4). Once again, primacy (P1, M = 48.9, 
SD = 16.8) and recency lists (P6, M = 50.6, SD = 17.1) were rated as more 
unpleasant than middle lists (P3, M = 53.1, SD = 16.1; P4, M = 54.6, SD = 17.3). 
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Figure 2.4 Mean pleasantness ratings as a function of list type. Error bars 
indicate SEM (Exp.3) 
 
Analyses were conducted with a one-way ANOVA, with list type (P1, 
P3, P4, P6 and Control) as the within-subject factor.  In line with Experiments 1 
and 2, there was a significant main effect of list type, F(4, 140) = 22.8, p < .001, 
p
2 
= .41. The pleasantness ratings for the Control lists were significantly higher 
than for P1, P3, P4 and P6 lists (all ps < .001). Once again, P1/ primacy lists 
were rated as more unpleasant than P3 lists, t(35) = 2.1, p < .05, d = .36. 
Moreover, recency effects were again observed, as pleasantness ratings were 
lower for P6 lists as compared to P4 lists, t(35) = 2.2, p < .05, d = .35.  
 
Memory.  First, let us briefly comment on the effect of the change in memory 
task. For each participant we computed the proportion of trials (out of 32) where 
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they recalled two or fewer items. A t-test was carried out, with the proportion as 
the dependent variable and Recall task (Exp 2, free recall and Exp 3, two-item 
recall) as the between-subjects factor. The t-test was significant, t(69) = 2.2, p < 
.05, d = .52, and it confirmed that participants were more likely to report two or 
fewer items in the current experiment (M = .28) – relative to Experiment 2 (M = 
.19).  
Secondly, memory performance was analysed depending on item valence 
and presentation position. In line with Experiment 2, memory was superior for 
negative items than for neutral ones, across positions. Moreover, participants 
more often recalled the negative items presented in either the first (primacy, M = 
.77, SD = .20) or the last positions (recency, M = .63, SD = .23), as compared to 
the middle ones (P3, M = .60, SD = .31; P4, M = .51, SD = .31). Figure 2.5 
represents the mean recall proportion as a function of word position and valence. 
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Figure 2.5 Mean recall as a function of word position and valence. Error bars 
indicate SEM (Exp.3) 
 
These data were analysed using a 2 (valence: negative vs. neutral) X 4 
(position: 1st, 3rd, 4th and 6th) repeated measures ANOVA. Corroborating the 
findings in the previous two experiments, the main effects of position (F(3, 105) 
= 17.3, p < .001, p2 = .33) and valence (F(1, 35) = 11.0, p < .01, p2 = .24) were 
significant. As before, the word valence by position interaction was not 
significant, F(3, 105) = 1.0, ns. Planned contrasts analyses confirmed that 
primacy and recency effects were observed for the recall of the negative items. 
When presented in the first position they were better remembered than when 
presented in 3rd position, t(35) = 3.6, p < .01, d = .59. Moreover, recall of 
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negative items in last position was higher than recall of negative words in 4th 
position, t(35) = 2.1, p < .05, d = .35. 
 
Memory-Judgment relationships.  As in Experiment 2, judgment scores were 
transformed; once again, the corrected judgment score (J’) for each list 
represented how much more unpleasant (or pleasant) that specific list was 
compared to the average rating that each participant assigned to the Control lists. 
As in Experiment 2, analyses were performed on the corrected scores, comparing 
mean judgment scores depending on whether the negative item was recalled or 
not.6 
First, as in Experiment 2, a global, ratio-style memory measure was 
computed for each participant: the higher the ratio, the more negative the 
memory for the list. This memory measure was then correlated with the average 
corrected pleasantness rating for each participant. Contrary to Experiment 2, this 
correlation was significant, Spearman’s  (34) = -.351, p < .05. This preliminary 
analysis suggests that, as memory task demands are lowered, the relationship 
between memory and judgment is strong enough to show up with a global ratio-
like memory measure.  
Then, as in Experiment 2, further analyses were run to investigate the 
nature of the relationships between memory and judgment. Overall, pleasantness 
ratings again were lower for those lists where the negative item was recalled (M 
= -15.7, SD = 10.7) as compared to lists where it was not (M = -8.5, SD = 9.2). 
                                                
6
 As for Experiment 2, this analysis yielded missing values (10.4% of the total cells). Different 
strategies were again called upon for dealing with these missing values - including mean 
substitution by subject, grand mean, and Expectation-Maximization algorithm (Schafer & Olsen, 
1998). As all the analyses returned the same results, we will be reporting the data obtained via 
mean by subject substitution.  
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Contrary to Experiment 2, this relationship between memory and judgment was 
evident across list types.  
A 2 × 4 repeated-measures ANOVA was run with Memory (negative 
item recalled Vs. not recalled) and List type (P1, P3, P4 and P6) as factors. The 
analyses yielded a significant main effect of Memory (F(1, 35) = 15.3, p < .001, 
p
2 
= .30), confirming that overall pleasantness ratings were significantly lower 
for those lists where the negative word was recalled. In contrast to Experiment 2, 
the relationship between memory and judgment was observed regardless of 
presentation position, as the List by Memory interaction was not significant (F(3, 
105) = 1.4, p > .24). Table 2.3 below summarises these findings.  
 
 
Table 2.3 Mean corrected pleasantness ratings (J') as a function of list type and 
"Peak" being recalled or not (Exp.3) 
  List type 
  P1 P3 P4 P6 
Was the Peak recalled?      
No M -7.7 -8.5 -6.8 -11.1 
 SD (12.1) (14.8) (12.3) (12.5) 
Yes M -18.3 -13.7 -15.2 -15.6 
 SD (13.0) (15.9) (14.8) (11.4) 
 
As a final analysis, retrospective evaluations for all list types were 
analysed depending on the negative item recall or output position, regardless of 
its presentation position (see Table 2.4). Ratings were averaged across list types 
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and compared depending on the position in which the participant recalled the 
negative item.7  
An examination of the means shows that, overall, the most unpleasant 
ratings were provided for those lists where the negative item was recalled 
amongst the first two responses (M = -19.6, SD = 12.5), followed by the ratings 
for those lists where the negative item was recalled as either the 3rd, 4th, 5th or 6th 
response (M = -11.6, SD = 9.4). Once again, the least unpleasant ratings were 
provided for those lists for which the negative word was not recalled at all (M = -
7.6, SD = 8.5).  
In accord with Experiment 2, the main effect of negative item recall 
position (F(2, 70) = 21.8, p < .001, p2 = .38) was significant. A planned contrast 
analysis revealed once again that average judgment scores were lower when the 
negative word was recalled either first or second compared to when it was 
recalled as either 3rd, 4th, 5th or 6th response, t(35) = 5.0, p < .001, d = .83. 
Finally, when the negative word was not recalled ratings were more pleasant than 
when it was recalled among the last 4 responses, t(35) = 2.4, p < .05, d = .40.  
Hence, here also, the findings suggested that if the negative item was more easily 
accessible its impact on retrospective evaluation was larger than when it was less 
accessible or not retrievable.   
 
 
 
                                                
7
 This analysis yielded a total of 2.8% missing values, which were once again imputed via mean 
by subject substitution.  
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Table 2.4 Mean corrected pleasantness ratings (J') as a function of "Peak" recall 
output position (Exp.3) 
  Peak recall output position 
  Not recalled 
 
Recalled in pos 1,2 
 
Recalled in pos 3-6 
 
Pleasantness 
 ratings (J’) 
M -7.6 -19.6 -11.6 
 SD (8.5) (12.5) (9.4) 
 
In summary, these results reproduced the judgment score patterns 
observed for the previous two experiments: Both primacy and recency were 
observed in retrospective evaluations. If a negative item was presented either in 
the first or last positions, its effect on the pleasantness ratings was higher than if 
it was presented in the middle positions. This pattern was once again mirrored in 
the memory participants displayed for the negative items, which were better 
remembered if presented in first or last positions. Also, the effect of a negative 
stimulus on retrospective evaluations could be predicted by its recall position: the 
more accessible in memory an item was, the larger its impact on summary 
assessments.  
Experiment 3 also suggested that lowering the memory task demands 
affected the relationship between memory and judgment relative to Experiment 
2. More specifically, memory-judgment correlations were observed irrespective 
of the presentation position of the distinctive information, thereby providing 
stronger support for memory-based judgment in retrospective evaluations. 
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2.6. General Discussion 
 
The general objective of the present paper was to investigate the 
contribution of memory processes to judgment biases in retrospective 
evaluations. A memory-based approach was put forward and its predictions 
systematically tested. We would argue that this constitutes a strong test of the 
influence of memory on retrospective judgment, as the latter was successfully 
predicted on the basis of the former. Relative to previous research that focused 
on the relationships between memory and judgment (e.g., Anderson & Hubert, 
1963; Dreben et al., 1979), the present study implemented more stringent 
controls over variables that are known to influence memory performance; also, 
more comprehensive memory measures were utilised. By doing so, a more 
thorough investigation into the role of memory in retrospective judgment could 
be carried out and the results could serve to make sense of contradictory results 
reported in the literature in the area.  
The pattern of results for summary assessments of lists containing a 
distinctive negative item was largely constant across experiments. More 
specifically, the position in which a distinctive negative stimulus was presented 
exerted differential effects on judgment; negative items presented either in the 
first or last position of a list affected overall pleasantness ratings to a greater 
extent than negative items presented in the middle positions. Simply put, primacy 
and recency biases were observed for retrospective evaluations of sequences 
containing a distinctive event.   
Such findings are somewhat at odds with the predictions that can be 
derived from the Peak-End rule (Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993). Based on this 
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heuristic, it would be reasonable to expect that the effect of a negative item on 
pleasantness ratings should be the greatest when the “Peak” was presented last: 
In these situations, the “Peak” and the “End” would overlap; hence, no averaging 
would be required in order to best predict the summary evaluations. When the 
negative item was not presented in last position, the averaging predicted by the 
Peak-End rule would involve the last item (a neutral word) and the Peak item 
(the negative word), and no differences in the evaluations should stem from the 
negative item being presented in first or middle positions8.  
At the same time, simple summative approaches (e.g., the “value-
account”; Betsch et al., 2001) would predict neither primacy nor recency effects 
in retrospective evaluations: The decisive factor for summary evaluations is the 
quality of each piece of information, and not its position within the sequence. 
Hence, these approaches cannot account for the present array of results.  
Finally, the fact that clear associations between memory and judgment 
were observed is contrary to the predictions of approaches that postulate 
functional independence between memory and judgment (e.g., Anderson, 1981; 
Betsch et al., 2001). These views hold that stimulus evaluation and encoding into 
memory are two independent processes, which are called upon depending on the 
nature of the task at hand. Hence, according to on-line approaches to summary 
evaluations, no correlations should have been observed between the overall lists 
pleasantness ratings and the memory performance participants exhibited for the 
items included in the lists. Moreover, according to Hastie and Park (1986), 
memory-judgment correlations should arise only when participants are not aware 
                                                
8
 It could be argued that the nature of the stimuli considered in the present experiments vary from 
the majority of studies finding Peak-End effects (e.g., Kahneman et al., 1993). However, recent 
evidence has suggested that the Peak-End rule may also apply to discrete and semantic stimuli 
(e.g., Do et al., 2008; Langer et al., 2005) and not only to continuous and experiential stimuli.   
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of the subsequent judgment task – condition that does not apply to the present 
paradigm, as participants were told about the rating task beforehand.   
Considering the memory performance for the negative items, it can be 
argued that a memory-based approach was the most effective in explaining the 
judgment biases observed. As expected, primacy and recency effects were 
observed for memory for the negative stimuli: when the negative item was 
presented in the first or last position, its recall rate was higher than when it was 
presented in the middle positions. This memory advantage was mirrored in the 
retrospective evaluations of the presented lists: Lists with negative items at the 
start or end were associated with a more negative retrospective evaluation.   
In order to explore this hypothesis further, correlational analyses were 
performed and provided findings which are in accordance with the availability 
heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). List pleasantness ratings were lower for 
the lists where the negative word was recalled compared to the ratings for the 
lists where the negative item was not recalled. This relationship between memory 
and judgment was even clearer when the memory task demands were lowered 
(Experiment 3), hence providing a more naturalistic setting for the global 
summary evaluations task.  
Taken together, the results suggest that participants consulted the 
episodic record they retained from each list in order to assess it in hindsight. All 
of the findings reported in the three experiments are consistent with a memory-
based approach where  participants, prior to performing the pleasantness 
evaluation of each list, “looked back” at the remembered representation of each 
list, and based their retrospective evaluations on the information available.  
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A further finding supported the memory-based approach. When the 
negative information was more easily accessible in memory (as it was recalled 
amongst early responses), the summary evaluations were more affected by it. 
This pattern suggests that participants, when providing retrospective evaluation 
of list pleasantness, overweighed information from the just-presented list that 
was more easily accessible. This would in turn support the notion that 
availability – considered as ease of recall (Schwarz & Vaughn, 2002) – is a 
mediator of the impact that the encoded information will have on summary 
assessments.  
However, it is perhaps important to note that the results suggest that the 
role of on-line impression formation (e.g., Hastie & Park, 1986; Hogarth & 
Einhorn, 1992) cannot be completely ruled out. It is noteworthy that overall 
pleasantness ratings were still affected even if the negative item was not 
produced at the recall phase. Pleasantness ratings for those lists where the 
negative item was not recalled (M = -9.9 and M = -8.5 for Experiment 2 and 3, 
respectively) were still lower than for those lists where no negative item was 
presented at all (the “Control” lists).  
While it is possible that the negative item, accessed at the time of 
judgment production, was not available for recall later on because of situational 
factors (e.g., output interference; Nairne, 1990), it could also be hypothesised 
that the negative item affected the on-line judgment formation, and that its trace 
was not accessible at the time of judgment as such. One interpretation of these 
findings would be that the summary evaluations were the result of on-line 
impression formation – that served as a form of anchor – which was adjusted at 
the point of the actual judgment response depending on the information that was 
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most easily available and accessed. Such an explanation could go some way 
toward clarifying why correlations between memory and judgment have been 
difficult to obtain in previous studies in the social cognition literature (e.g., 
Hastie & Park, 1986). Most studies adopted a ratio as the memory measure (e.g., 
between positive and negative information), which assigns the same weight to 
any piece of information that is retrieved. A ratio measure does not include any 
information about the ease of recall of each piece of evidence, and therefore may 
not be an accurate measure of the representation people are accessing in order to 
evaluate an episode (or at least not powerful enough to detect the underlying 
memory contribution to judgment in hindsight).  
In conclusion, by devising a paradigm that could systematically test for 
primacy, recency and general position effects on retrospective evaluations it was 
shown that distinctive moments of an experience impact summary assessments in 
a way that is predicted by a memory-based approach to biases in retrospective 
evaluations. The reported results provide compelling evidence in favour of a 
viewpoint where remembered episodic information has a biasing effect on 
judgment in hindsight.    
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Chapter 3: 
 
The Effects of Manipulating Accessibility 
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3.1. Introduction  
 How do people provide overall assessments about affective episodes? Do 
they rely on information stored in memory about the event itself? In Chapter 2, 
clear associations between memory and judgment were obtained: primacy and 
recency were observed for both recall and retrospective judgment measures. 
Three further findings provided evidence in favour of the claim that memory and 
judgment processes might be functionally associated. First, evaluations of the 
lists were more unpleasant when the negative item was recalled. Second, when 
the negative information was most likely to be easily accessible – as it was 
recalled as an early response – the retrospective evaluations (hereafter RE) were 
the most unpleasant. Third, memory task demands seemed to moderate the 
relationships between memory and judgment. The association between the two 
processes were clearest when the memory task demands were the lowest. In line 
with previous findings that showed how rarely people retrieve all the information 
about an event in order to evaluate it (e.g., Higgins, 1996), the results from a 
simpler memory task resulted in the strongest correlations between memory and 
judgment.  
 Thus, Chapter 2 provided some evidence in favour of approaches that 
suggest a direct relationship between memory and judgment processes (e.g., 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999). As 
participants were told beforehand about the evaluation task, they could have 
relied on the impression about the lists formed on-line (e.g., Anderson & Hubert, 
1963; Betsch, Plessner, Schwieren, & Gütig, 2001) – and hence, there would be 
no reason to predict associations between memory and judgment measures 
(Hastie & Park, 1986). Some authors have indeed concluded that the only 
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situations in which summary assessments are based on information available in 
memory are those where people cannot form an on-line impression of the to-be-
evaluated event (e.g., Custer & Aarts, 2003; Hastie & Park, 1986; McConnell, 
Sherman, & Hamilton, 1994).  
The aim of the research included in this chapter was to further explore the 
nature of the memory-judgment associations previously observed. After all, 
simple associations between memory and judgment measures do not preclude the 
possibility that these are in attributable to a third factor. For instance, Anderson 
(1989; see also Moser, 1992) puts forward that, even if the memory and 
judgment systems are functionally independent, “…they will generally be 
correlated because both depend on the same given stimuli.” (p. 209). Further, the 
author states that memory-judgment correlations may be predicted by on-line 
judgment models, too: this is “…simply because some stimulus variables affect 
both forms of memory in the same way.” (p. 209).  
In order to provide clearer evidence that accessibility moderates retrospective 
judgment, one strategy would be to manipulate memorability of segments within 
the episodes and predict RE accordingly. Accessibility refers to the ease with 
which information is accessed in memory at the time of judgment (e.g., Schwarz, 
1995; Schwarz, Bless, Wanke, & Winkielman, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973). To our knowledge, few researchers have attempted to manipulate memory 
in order to predict judgment (e.g., Gabrielcick & Fazio, 1984; Hanita, Gavanski, 
& Fazio, 1997; Lewandowsky & Smith, 1983). Also, differences between our 
paradigm and previous methods suggest that such an investigation would be of 
interest. For instance, Lewandowsky and Smith (1983) successfully predicted 
summary assessments depending on the memory manipulation they 
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implemented; however, the evaluation task was frequency estimation rather than 
retrospective evaluation (see also Gabrielcick & Fazio, 1984 – who used priming 
instead of repetition as the way to manipulate the memorability of specific 
items). Frequency estimations are likely to be ruled by processes and dynamics 
different from those usually called upon in qualitative assessments (see Hogarth 
& Einhorn, 1992).  
Hence, in the present chapter we will manipulate memorability through two 
well established memory phenomena – the modality effect (Experiment 4) and 
the Von Restorff effect (Experiment 5). The predictions as to the effect of these 
manipulations on RE are derived from a memory-based approach and contrasted 
with the prediction derived from other views.  
As a final aim, the research presented in this chapter will also address another 
issue that could change the interpretation of the findings reported in Chapter 2. In 
Experiments 2 and 3, participants were told in advance about the subsequent 
memory task. This awareness could have artificially inflated the correlations 
between memory and judgment measures. For example, participants could have 
adopted a strategy where they accessed the list representation in memory at the 
time of judgment in preparation for the upcoming memory task.  
In order to rule out the above mentioned possibility, participants in 
Experiment 6 were asked to perform a surprise memory task: after having 
provided only RE for a number of trials, they were asked to perform a memory 
task after the last presented list. It is argued that, if memory-judgment 
associations are observed in this case as well, they are unlikely to be due to 
participants anticipating the memory task. This would allow us to rule out the 
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idea that the nature of the task called upon in the previous chapter artificially 
inflated the correlations between memory and judgment. 
  
3.2. Experiment 4 
 In this experiment, the objective was to further test the hypothesis that 
retrospective evaluations are biased by retrieving information about the assessed 
episode. This was done by increasing the accessibility (e.g., Schwarz, 1995) of 
negative items within the lists in some trials. If people rely, at least in part, on the 
information retrieved about an event in order to evaluate it in hindsight, then it is 
reasonable to predict that instances where the negative information is more easily 
accessible will be rated as more unpleasant as compared to situations where the 
memorability of the negative information was not enhanced. 
The memory phenomenon that was selected in order to manipulate item 
accessibility was the modality effect (e.g., Corballis, 1966; Murray, 1966). The 
modality effect refers to the better recall of items in the auditory modality 
relative to the same items presented in the visual modality. In effect, this auditory 
advantage is due to the better recall of the recency items – i.e. the items 
presented in the last positions: Lists presented aurally generate a significantly 
larger recency effect Earlier items are recalled at a similar level, regardless of 
modality of presentation. These findings are rather reliable; they have been 
replicated with a variety of stimuli and with different memory tasks (e.g., 
Crowder, 1986; Glenberg, 1984; Neath, 1997) 
As in Experiments 1 to 3, Experiment 4 involved presenting lists of 
words that participants had to assess for pleasantness. The rationale supporting 
this choice of material was again twofold: first, it was possible to match negative 
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(distinctive) and neutral (background) items along features that could be 
affecting memory at the retrieval stage, hence potentially distorting the 
underlying relationships between memory and judgment measures. Secondly, by 
using items as the units of the to-be-assessed events more comprehensive 
memory measures could be investigated (e.g., recall output position as a measure 
of ease of retrieval; see Chapter 2).  
In all the trials, items were presented visually (details below). However, 
for some of these trials, participants were required to read the items out loud as 
they appeared. Reading presented items aloud  has been shown to produce a 
modality effect (e.g., Conrad & Hull, 1968; Crowder, 1970); in other words, 
recency effects are usually enhanced for lists read aloud (as compared to lists 
read silently) in the same manner as for aurally presented lists (as compared to 
visually presented lists).  
By manipulating reading instructions – i.e., either to read out loud or 
silently – our intent was to influence the accessibility of the last portion of the 
lists: Negative items presented in last positions which are read aloud were 
predicted to be better remembered than negative words presented in last position, 
but read silently. If a memory-based approach to RE (e.g., the Availability 
Heuristic; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) is tenable, then it is predicted that lists 
which include negative items presented in last position and that are read aloud 
(experimental condition) will be rated as more unpleasant than lists where the 
negative items presented in last position and read silently (control condition). 
 
3.2.1. Method 
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3.2.1.1. Participants 
A total of thirty-three undergraduate students (30 females) from City 
University, London, took part in the experiment and were granted course credits 
for an introductory course in psychology. Age of participants ranged from 18 to 
25 years (M = 19.4, SD = 2.1). 
 
3.2.1.2. Design and Materials 
A pool of 240 words was selected from the Affective Norms of English 
Words database (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1999). Thirty-six negative items were 
selected along with 204 neutral ones. As in Chapter 2, items were selected on the 
basis of their valence (i.e., their rating along the positive-negative scale) and 
arousal values (i.e., how “activated” the normative sample felt while reading the 
words).  
Negative items were low in valence (less than 3 on a scale of 1-9) and 
high in arousal (greater than 5 on a scale of 1-9); neutral items scored in the 
middle range for valence (between 4.5 and 6.9) and relatively low on the arousal 
scale (less than 6). Selected negative items were overall lower on the valence 
scale (M = 2.2 and M = 5.7, respectively), t(238) = 30.6, d = 6.3; at the same 
time, negative items were significantly higher on arousal ratings (M = 6.3 and M 
= 4.2, respectively), t(238) = 18.8, d = 4.5.  
Through within-list matching between negative and neutral items, forty-
eight 5-word lists were created: Overall there were 12 “P1” lists (i.e., lists were a 
negative item was presented in first position and it was followed by 4 neutral 
items), 12 “P3” lists, 12 “P5” lists and finally 12 “C” lists, which included only 
neutral words. Items were not repeated across trials. 
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In order to equate lists for their length – and for their frequency and 
familiarity ratings – they were assigned to four different groups of 12 lists each. 
The first three groups included “negative” lists (i.e., lists with 4 neutral and 1 
negative items), while the 4th group included only “Control” lists (5 neutral 
items). The groups were equated on familiarity ratings (Coltheart, 1981) – as 
groups averages ranged from 521.4 to 539.8 – number of phonemes (from 4.4 to 
4.8) and the Kucera-Francis frequency index (Kucera & Francis, 1967), with 
groups averages ranging from 36.4 to 51.0. 
Negative items were rotated, so that each of the 36 negative items 
selected from the database (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1999) appeared in each 
possible position (1st, 3rd and 5th) an equal number of times across participants.  
Finally, block rotation across participants allowed each of the 48 lists to 
be read out loud and silently an equal number of times; also, each list was 
presented as often in the first half of the experiment (24 lists) or in the second 
half (24 lists). This is because the reading instructions were counterbalanced 
across participants: Half of the time participants performed silent encoding in the 
first half of the experiment, while the other half of the time participants were told 
to read out loud the first 24 lists of the experiment.  
 
3.2.1.3. Procedure 
Participants were tested individually in a session that lasted 
approximately 50 minutes. The experiment was run on a program developed 
using Authorware 7.0 (Adobe / Macromedia, 1987, 2003). In the first set of 
screens, participants provided demographic data and were given the chance to 
become accustomed to the computer-controlled procedure.   
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Participants were told that the aim of the study was to collect normative 
data about the pleasantness of word lists. They were instructed to attend to the 
lists and to provide an overall pleasantness rating for each list after its 
presentation. The ratings were collected on a 0-100 scale (0 = very unpleasant, 
100 = very pleasant), and participants were encouraged to make use of the whole 
range in their responses when using the slide bar and its marker (see Experiments 
2 and 3).  
A memory task followed the rating task: As in Experiment 3, participants 
were told to type in the first two words that came to mind from the just-attended 
list, and then to click the “Continue” button. In the next screen, participants had 
the opportunity to type in any additional words they might remember, however it 
was stressed that it was not necessary to type in any further word and that it was 
fine to proceed directly to the next trial. Instructions also stressed that the rating 
and the memory task were equally important and instructed participants not to 
neglect the former in order to proceed more quickly to the latter.  
As mentioned above, each experimental session was divided into two 
halves of 24 lists each, separated by a short break which lasted no more than 5 
minutes. The only difference between the 2 halves was the reading condition 
(silent or aloud).  
Finally, three practice trials allowed participants to become familiar with 
the whole procedure. List presentation order was randomised for each participant 
and both the rating and memory tasks were self-paced.  
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3.2.2. Results  
As in Chapter 2, there was a predetermined criterion for a participant’s 
data to be included in the analyses: any participant who produced judgment 
scores with a standard deviation lower than 5 (5% of the scale) was excluded. No 
participants were excluded from the analyses as the lowest standard deviation for 
the judgment scores was 8.8. Alpha was set to .05 for all analyses.   
 
Memory. The memory manipulation was fairly successful and the modality effect 
was observed regardless of item valence (see Figures 3.1a and 3.1b below). 
Overall, items read out loud (M = .72, SD = .12) were better remembered than 
items read silently (M = .67, SD = .10). However, the memory advantage for 
aloud items was only due to the last position (M = .89 and M = .71, respectively). 
For the remaining two positions, memory performance was rather comparable 
between the two modalities.  
 As expected, negative items (M = .79, SD = .13) were better remembered 
than neutral items (M = .67, SD = .12). Finally, overall serial position effects 
were observed, as items presented in first (M = .75, SD = .18) and last positions 
(M = .80, SD = .10) were better remembered than words presented in the middle 
position (M = .64, SD = .14).  
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Figure 3.1 Mean proportion recall as a function of Modality (Silent vs. Aloud) 
and Position (1, 3, and 5) – for negative (Fig.3.1a, left) and neutral (Fig.3.1b, 
right) items. Error bars indicate SEM (Exp.4)  
 
The memory performance results were analysed with a 3-way repeated 
measures ANOVA with Position (positions 1, 3 and 5), Valence (Negative vs. 
Neutral) and Modality (Silent vs. Aloud) as factors. The analyses revealed that 
the only significant interaction was between Position and Modality, F(2, 64) = 
15.9, p < .001, p2 = .33, which confirmed that the recall advantage of aloud 
items compared to silent items was observed only in the last (recency) position (p 
< .001). 
The significant main effect of Valence F(1, 32) = 16.7, p < .001, p2 = 
.34, confirmed that negative items were better remembered than neutral ones – 
and this was true regardless of Position and Modality (both Fs <  1) . The main 
effect of Position F(2, 64) = 18.5, p < .001, p2 = .37 and the contrast analyses 
revealed how items presented in positions 1 and 5 were better remembered than 
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items presented in 3rd position (both ps < .001) – but did not differ between each 
other (p > .11). 
To summarise, the memory manipulation was successful: the modality 
effect was observed together with primacy and recency effects. If participants 
accessed information in memory in order to provide summary assessments, then 
it would be predicted that lists which were read out loud and which included a 
negative item in last position should be rated more unpleasantly than lists where 
the recency negative item was read silently. This is because recency items which 
were read aloud were more accessible in memory – a fact that is confirmed by a 
higher recall rate for those items as compared to recency items read silently. 
Moreover, as overall, negative items in primacy and recency positions 
were better recalled than negative items presented in the middle position, it was 
predicted that primacy and recency effects should be observed in retrospective 
judgment, too. Lists with a negative item in either the first or last position should 
be rated as more unpleasant than lists where the negative item was presented in 
third position – and this should be true regardless of modality.  
 
Judgment. As in Chapter 2, the pleasantness ratings were transformed as follows: 
the average pleasantness ratings for the Control lists for each participant were 
subtracted from the pleasantness ratings for each P1, P3 and P5 lists. These 
corrections were made according to modality: the average ratings of Control lists 
read aloud were subtracted from the ratings of P1, P3 and P5 lists which were 
also read aloud, and the same was done for lists read silently. Therefore, the 
corrected judgment scores (J’) indicated how much more unpleasant each list 
was rated as compared to the Control lists. The correction was performed in 
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order to reduce the extent of anchoring affects (e.g., Chapman & Johnson, 2002) 
and the inter-individual differences in the use of the rating scale. The following 
analyses were run on the J’ scores9. 
Overall, neither the presentation position of the negative items nor 
modality affected pleasantness ratings (see Table 3.1 below). Pleasantness 
ratings was relatively equivalent across the board – despite an overall tendency 
for lists read aloud  (M = -13.0, SD = 9.9) to be rated as more unpleasant than 
lists read silently (M = -11.2, SD = 9.7). Also, lists P3 lists were rated as slightly 
more pleasant (M = -11.1, SD = 10.3) than P5 (M = -12.2, SD = 9.3) and P1 lists 
(M = -13.1, SD = 9.5). 
 
Table 3.1 Mean corrected pleasantness ratings (J') as a function of list type and 
modality (Exp.4) 
  List type 
  P1 P3 P5 
Modality     
Silent M -12.5 -9.6 -11.6 
 SD (13.1) (11.7) (12.1) 
Aloud M -13.7 -12.6 -12.8 
 SD (10.6) (12.8) (12.8) 
 
A 2 × 3 repeated-measures ANOVA was run with List type (P1, P3 and 
P5) and Modality (Silent vs. Aloud) as the independent variables. None of the 
                                                
9
 The same analyses were performed also on the raw scores, which revealed that 1) the Control 
lists were rated as significantly more pleasant than all the other lists types (all ps < .001) and 2) 
the retrospective judgment pattern as a function of  list type ratings was virtually the same as for 
the J’ scores. 
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effects were significant (all ps > .31) – confirming that pleasantness ratings were 
low regardless of modality and of the presentation position of the negative item.   
 
3.2.3. Discussion 
The results of the present experiment seem to contradict the hypothesis that 
memory moderates RE: manipulating memory availability for distinctive items 
within the lists did not lead to the predicted changes in pleasantness evaluations. 
The modality effect (e.g., Corballis, 1966; Murray, 1966) was observed for the 
lists recall: negative items presented in last position and read out loud were better 
remembered than the corresponding negative items read silently. If participants 
relied on the items accessible in memory in order to assess the lists pleasantness, 
then it seems reasonable to expect that lists where the negative item in the last 
position was read out loud should have been rated as more unpleasant than 
corresponding lists which were encoded silently. Instead, virtually no difference 
was observed in the retrospective judgment scores for these two list types.  
More strikingly, compared to Experiments 1, 2, and 3, neither primacy nor 
recency effects were observed in RE: that is, contrary to previously replicated 
findings (see Chapter 2), the presentation position of a negative item inserted in a 
list of neutral items did not differentially affect the pleasantness ratings for the 
list as a whole.  
On the basis of these results it could be argued that there is no functional 
relationship between memory and judgment processes – any possible association 
between the two cognitive functions arising as “spurious” effects (e.g., due to 
some stimuli dimensions affecting both in the same way; Anderson, 1989). 
Along the same line of reasoning, it could be argued that primacy and recency 
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effects observed in memory and judgment in Experiments 2 and 3 (see Chapter 
2) might have been due to separate causal dynamics (see Hogarth & Einhorn, 
1992; Tan & Ward, 2000). This however, can be seen as giving a null finding 
significant theoretical weight.  
One hypothesis about the findings of Experiment 4 is related to modality 
related interference effects (e.g., Glenberg, 1984). Perhaps performing a visual 
evaluation task interfered with the recall for the recency items more when the 
said items were presented in the visual modality – as compared to when they 
were read aloud. In other words, the visual distractor task (pleasantness ratings) 
would involve more item overwriting with visual recency items (read silently) 
than with auditory recency items (read out loud). According to this hypothesis, 
when participants attended silently to the lists, the negative item presented in last 
position affected their judgment; however, providing the overall assessment 
would have interfered with the same modality list representation, reducing 
memory for the recency items. The extent of this judgment-driven interference 
effect on recall for recency items would have been lower for items which were 
read aloud –because the modality of their presentation was different from the 
modality in which the evaluation task was performed (e.g., Nairne, 1990). It 
could be argued that the observed memory advantage for recency aloud items 
over the recency silent items was probably much smaller at the time of judgment, 
as it was artificially inflated by the differential distractor effects of the RE task 
over silent and aloud lists. This could explain why pleasantness ratings for “P5” 
lists were comparable regardless of the modality of presentation.    
In order to assess the reliability of these findings, an additional experiment 
was run. The general objectives remained the same; namely, to significantly 
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affect pleasantness ratings of lists by manipulating the memorability of the 
distinctive items within the lists. At the same time though, significant 
methodological changes were implemented. In order to limit any potential 
confounding effects of recency overwriting, the memory manipulation involved 
items presented in the middle positions of the lists.  
Secondly, in order to reduce the accuracy of the list representation accessed 
in memory, list length was increased to 7 items. This modification will be 
coupled by manipulating memorability of items in more than one presentation 
position – which will also allow us to increase the number of critical trials which 
will be analysed.   
Lastly, the memory manipulation which will be implemented will allow us to 
be more confident that the representation of the lists accessed in memory at the 
time of judgment will be closer to that accessed at the time the memory task is 
prompted.  
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Introductory note 
The two following experiments have been submitted as a paper for 
publication, which is currently awaiting the editor’s decision.  
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3.3. Abstract  
The nature of the memory processes involved in retrospective evaluations 
remains an object of debate in the literature. Some theoretical approaches (e.g., 
“two-memory” hypothesis; Anderson, 1996) propose functional independence 
between memory for and judgment of verbal stimuli: summary evaluations are 
based upon the on-line integration of moment-by-moment evaluations made 
during the actual event. On the other hand, several empirical findings suggest 
that judgment depends on how easily information can be retrieved from memory 
(e.g., Schwarz, 1995). In the present study, the nature of the relationships 
between memory and judgment was investigated. In Experiment 5, participants 
recalled word lists after rating each list for pleasantness. The effect of a negative 
item on retrospective evaluations was moderated by its accessibility, which was 
manipulated. The possibility that these results were due to the dual nature of the 
task was ruled out in Experiment 6 – where participants were presented with a 
surprise memory task. The memory-judgment relationship was maintained with 
this incidental learning paradigm. The results support a memory-based approach 
to retrospective judgment and suggest that people retrieve episodic information 
about events in order to evaluate them in hindsight. 
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3.4. Introduction 
In everyday life, it is a regular experience to evaluate events once they 
have unfolded. Retrospective evaluations (hereafter RE) are coherent evaluations 
which involve the integration of information from hedonic states into a unitary 
judgment. Summary assessments can be provided about episodes which may 
have varied in quality and intensity over time (Fredrickson, 2000) and about 
target stimuli which have been presented in a sequential manner (e.g., 
Lichtenstein & Srull, 1987). Examples of the type of experiences which have 
been considered in the literature range from continuous annoying sounds 
(Schreiber & Kahneman, 2000) to the enjoyment experienced during a recent 
vacation (Kemp, Christopher, & Furneaux, 2008). Evaluations of sequential 
information include personality impression formation from lists of attributes 
(e.g., Anderson & Hubert, 1963) and Eurovision contestant evaluations (Bruine 
de Bruin, 2005).  
An important question concerns the nature of the memory processes 
involved in RE: Do people retrieve episodic information about experiences in 
order to evaluate them in hindsight?  In the literature, there are two contrasting 
approaches to this issue that are more widely documented. On one hand, some 
theoretical accounts (e.g. “the two-memory” hypothesis; Anderson, 1996; 
Anderson & Hubert, 1963; the “value-account”; Betsch, Plessner, Schwieren, & 
Gütig, 2001) propose functional autonomy between memory and judgment 
processes. According to these accounts, impressions of episodes are formed “on-
line” (i.e., while they are being experienced) and RE are constructed (cf. 
Fredrickson, 2000) from the product of this on-line judgment. Retrieving 
episodic information from the event itself is viewed as a cognitively costly 
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operation – which is called upon if, and only if, the on-line judgment is 
prevented (for example, by not forewarning participants about the subsequent 
judgment task; Hastie & Park, 1986). These approaches propose that people do 
not rely in any significant manner on episodic information about an event when 
they evaluate it in hindsight.  
On the other hand, several theoretical views suggest that – to some degree 
or another – retrieved information influences judgment often leading to biases in 
RE (e.g., Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; see 
also Schwarz, 1995). For these approaches, the moments within an episode that 
are most available in memory (“accessible”, cf. Schwarz, 1995) 
disproportionately affect retrospective judgment. In support of the role of 
retrieval in summary assessments, many studies have found significant 
correlations between memory and judgment measures, suggesting that memory 
and judgment may be functionally related (e.g., Aldrovandi, Poirier, & Ayton 
2008; Moser, 1992; Reyes, Thompson & Bower, 1980; Schwarz, 1995; Tversky 
& Kahneman, 1973). 
However, correlations between memory and judgment do not preclude 
the possibility that such correlations are attributable to other factors (e.g., 
vividness; Shedler & Manis, 1986); it remains possible then that retrospective 
judgment is not causally related to retrieval processes. For instance, Anderson 
(1989) suggested that impression memory (i.e., on-line judgment) and verbal 
memory (i.e., episodic memory) may be “distinct functionally” (p. 209) but the 
output from the two systems may correlate since they operate on the same 
attended stimuli (see also Moser, 1992). To re-iterate, the suggestions is that 
even if ‘memory for' and 'judgment of' verbal stimuli are significantly related this 
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does not necessarily imply that people base their retrospective judgments on the 
episodic information they retrieve from memory.  
The aim of the present investigation was to implement a stricter test of 
the hypothesis that people access information about a specific event in order to 
evaluate it. Somewhat stronger evidence in support of the role of memory in RE 
would be produced if manipulating the memorability of certain moments within 
the to-be-assessed episodes influences retrospective judgment. If RE do not 
depend on the information retrieved from memory, then manipulating the 
accessibility of some segments within the events should not affect judgment in 
hindsight. On the other hand, if retrieval and judgment processes are functionally 
dependent, then the easier it is to access specific information, the larger its 
impact on RE.  
To our knowledge, few studies so far have attempted to predict judgment 
as a consequence of experimental memory manipulations (e.g., Gabrielcick & 
Fazio, 1984; Hanita, Gavanski, & Fazio, 1997; Lewandowsky & Smith, 1983). 
Lewandowsky and Smith (1983) increased the memorability of non-famous 
instances within a set through repetition, which in turn increased the 
corresponding frequency estimates participants provided. The authors concluded 
that the successful memory manipulation affected the participants’ judgment 
responses (see also Gabrielcick & Fazio, 1984).  
However, participants in the above mentioned study were asked to 
complete an evaluation task that involved frequency estimation of specific 
instances within a search set – a typical example of frequency judgment (e.g., 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). There is very little evidence that bears upon the 
role of memory in retrospective evaluations which in all likelihood do not rely on 
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the same cognitive processes as frequency estimation (see Hogarth and Einhorn, 
1992, for a discussion of this issue).   
Aldrovandi et al. (2008) showed that inserting a negative item within a 
list of neutral words significantly reduced the judged pleasantness of the list – 
relative to lists that did not contain a negative item. In the present paper, we 
called upon the same judgment task and manipulated the memorability of these 
negative items. The rationale was that if a negative item’s accessibility in 
memory is heightened, then its impact on the summary assessment of the list as a 
whole should be larger than if the negative item’s accessibility is not increased.  
 
3.5. Experiment 5 
 
In order to further investigate the role of memory in RE, word-lists were 
used as the to-be-assessed events. The major reasons behind this choice were that 
1) mnemonic behaviour for this type of material is well documented and 2) it 
was possible to control the characteristics of the material that are thought to 
affect memory and judgment. For example, we could control for familiarity, 
frequency, stimuli length, valence, and arousal value of the items called upon. 
These factors are known to affect retrieval from memory and as such –if they are 
not controlled— may also influence the memory judgment relationship in a 
number of spurious, undesirable ways. Moreover, using words allowed us to use 
more comprehensive memory measures, including item accessibility which was 
measured through recall output position (see Aldrovandi et al., 2008). Briefly, we 
assumed that items recalled first were more accessible in memory than items 
recalled later or not at all.  
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The experimental manipulation involved increasing the accessibility of a 
negative item within some of the lists – and partially hindering it within others. 
Item accessibility was boosted by increasing both temporal (e.g., Brown, Neath 
& Chater, 2007) and perceptual isolation (e.g., Hunt, 1995; Rabinowitz & 
Andrews, 1973). The latter was achieved by presenting target negative items in a 
red font – while all the other items were presented in a regular black font. At the 
same time, the isolated items were also preceded and followed by a temporal 
gap, contrary to the other items. These manipulations were chosen as it can be 
argued that they would directly impact memory without affecting the 
pleasantness of the words themselves.  
It was predicted that isolated negative items would be better remembered 
than non-isolated negative words. If episodic memory is accessed when people 
provide summary assessments about an episode, then the lists where the negative 
item was isolated should be rated as more unpleasant than the lists where the 
negative item was not isolated.  
 
3.5.1. Method 
 
3.5.1.1. Participants 
A sample of thirty-two undergraduate and postgraduate students and staff 
members (23 females) from City University London took part in this study. Age 
ranged from 18 to 54 (M = 27.3, SD = 8.1). Participants were recruited through 
e-mail advertising and were either granted course credits for an introductory 
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course in psychology or were awarded with £8 in exchange for their 
participation. 
 
3.5.1.2. Design and Materials  
A total of 294 words were selected from the Affective Norms of English 
Words database (ANEW; Bradley & Lang, 1999). Thirty-two items were 
selected as negative items and 262 were chosen as the neutral items. Words were 
selected depending on their scores along the database dimensions of valence 
(how positive or negative they are) and arousal (how much self-appraised 
activation the normative sample reported while reading the word; Bradley & 
Lang, 1999). Negative items were low valence (less than 3 on a scale of 1-9, 1 
being the most negative) and relatively high in arousal (higher than 5, on a scale 
of 1-9). Neutral items scored in the middle range for valence (between 4 and 7) 
and relatively low on the arousal scale (lower than 5). The selected negative 
items were significantly lower than neutrals on valence scores (M = 2.2 and M = 
5.8, respectively; t(292) = 27.1, d = 3.2) and higher on arousal scores (M = 6.3 
and M = 4.3, respectively; t(292) = 16.3, d = 2.1). 
Forty-two seven-item lists were created in the following manner: 32 
“Negative” lists included six neutral and 1 negative item, while the remaining 10 
lists were “Neutral” lists, as they contained only neutral words. The negative lists 
differed depending on the position of the negative item: Overall there were two 
P1 (i.e. lists where the negative item was presented in first position), P2, P6 and 
P7 lists and eight P3, P4 and P5 lists. It was decided to consider the P1-P2 and 
P6-P7 list types as “fillers” in order not to rely on data gained from primacy and 
recency positions as these are more prone to ceiling effects; given our main 
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manipulation involves increasing the memorability of items that are already 
relatively distinct, primacy and recency positions were not adequate for our 
purposes. 
Within-list matching between the negative and the neutral items was 
implemented in order to ensure that negative and neutral words were equated on 
familiarity ratings (Coltheart, 1981), number of phonemes, and the Kucera-
Francis frequency index (Kucera & Francis, 1967).  Items were not repeated 
across trials. 
In order to manipulate memory accessibility, two well established and 
reliable memory effects were called upon and implemented simultaneously. First, 
item accessibility was increased by temporal isolation (e.g., Brown et al., 2007). 
Despite the debate about the role of time in short time memory (e.g., 
Lewandowsky, Duncan, & Brown, 2004), there is clear agreement regarding the 
empirical effect that is obtained when an item is preceded and followed by a 0.5-
sec interval;  it will be better recalled than a corresponding non-isolated item. 
The second manipulation involved making the temporally isolated item 
physically more distinctive (e.g., Rabinowitz & Andrews, 1973) – by presenting 
it in red while all the other items were presented in black.  
To sum up, in every list, there was a temporally isolated, red, item. 
Within each experimental list containing a negative item, the said item was 
presented in red and it was temporally isolated. On the other hand, there were an 
equal number of control lists where the negative item was neither temporally nor 
physically isolated – but a neutral item was. The isolated neutral item was 
presented 1 or 2 positions away from the non-isolated negative item – an equal 
number of times in each direction. For instance, for each participant, one P3 
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control list had a neutral isolated item in position 1, one in position 2, one in 
position 4 and the last in position 5. Please see Table 3.2 below for a summary of 
the list types utilised in the present experiment. 
 
Table 3.2 Lists utilised in Exp.5 (number of lists in brackets) 
List Valence  List Manipulation  List Type 
     
    Fillers (4) 
 
 
 Experimental (16) 
Negative item isolated 
 P3 (4) 
Negative item in 3rd position 
P4 (4) 
Negative item in 4th position 
P5 (4) 
Negative item in 5th position 
Negative (32) 
included a negative 
item  
  
 
  
 
    Fillers (4) 
   
Control (16) 
Negative item not isolated 
(1 neutral item isolated) 
 P3 (4) 
Negative item in 3rd position 
P4 (4) 
Negative item in 4th position 
P5 (4) 
Negative item in 5th position 
   
 
  
 
Neutral (10) 
included only neutral 
items – one of which 
was isolated 
 
  
 
  
 
 
The decision to implement two memory manipulations simultaneously 
originated from a pilot study (n = 7), where it was ascertained that manipulating 
the physical distinctiveness of the items alone did not produce a sizeable memory 
advantage. In order to achieve greater confidence in any results, it is argued that 
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a medium to large memory advantage is necessary; such a change in 
memorability should involve a corresponding change in RE. In this context it is 
important to bear in mind that the RE concerns the list as a whole, while the 
memory manipulation only touches upon a single item.   
Neutral lists also had 1 of the neutral words presented in red and 
temporally isolated. Overall, the number of times a red item – irrespective of its 
valence – appeared in each of the positions was equated as much as possible 
across list types; a red item appeared in each of the 7 positions with a frequency 
ranging from 5 to 7.  
Finally, the 32 negative lists were divided in 16 pairs of matched lists 
(along the dimensions of familiarity, number of phonemes and frequency). 
Rotation across participants allowed each of the lists to be presented the same 
number of times as experimental and as a control lists – and the same number of 
times as a P3, P4, P5 or filler list. 
 
3.5.1.3. Procedure 
All participants were tested in an individual session that lasted 
approximately 45 minutes. The whole experimental procedure was controlled by 
a computer program that was developed using Authorware 7.0 (Macromedia; 
1987, 2003).  
A series of screens gathered demographic data and allowed the 
participants to familiarise themselves with the computer-controlled procedure.  
Participants were told to attend to the word lists, presented on the screen, 
one at a time. They were told that a randomly selected item within each list was 
going to be presented in red – and were also instructed not to pay particular 
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attention to it. After the last presented word disappeared, a series of asterisks 
were displayed for 3 seconds, indicating the end of the list; participants were 
then to complete the rating task, by providing an overall pleasantness rating for 
the list they had just attended to. Ratings were collected on a 0-100 scale (0 = 
very unpleasant, 100 = very pleasant), and participants were encouraged to use 
the whole range of scores. In order to provide the ratings, participants used the 
mouse to click along a slide bar (with extremes of 0 and 100) on the position 
they felt best reflected their impression of the list. In order to reduce the possible 
influence of anchoring effects (e.g., Chapman & Johnson, 2002) a slider marker 
appeared on the bar only after participants clicked on the slide bar for the first 
time. Participants could then adjust the initial rating and confirm their final 
assessment by clicking on a “Continue” button.  
Immediately after having provided the assessment, participants were 
required to perform an easy memory task. Participants had to type in the first two 
items that came to mind from the just-attended list. It was stressed how spelling 
mistakes would not affect scoring. Participants then clicked on the “Continue” 
button to access the following screen, where they had the chance to type in any 
other word they might remember. However, it was stressed in the instructions 
how not remembering any other item apart from the initial 2 was fine. The 
present memory task was utilised so as to not distract participants from the 
judgment task (see Aldrovandi et al., 2008). Moreover, the instructions stressed 
how both the rating and recall tasks were equally important and encouraged 
participants not to overlook the former in order to proceed more quickly to the 
latter. 
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Both the rating and recall tasks were self-paced and list presentation was 
randomised independently for each participant. Also, participants had the chance 
to become familiar with the task, through 3 practice trials. A post-experimental 
questionnaire was used at the end of the session in order to gather information 
about how participants completed both the judgment and recall tasks. 
As a check on the effectiveness of the memory manipulation, 14 
participants were also asked to perform a further task, during which they had to 
perform only a memory task after each list was presented. The 21 lists used for 
this second half of the experiment were a random sub-sample of the 42 lists used 
for the experiment. Participants were told to recall the first two words that came 
to mind, and to type in any other word they might remember once the first two 
answers were provided. Results showed that the negative items (M = .67, SD = 
.17) were better remembered than neutral items (M = .55, SD = .17), t(13) = 2.9, 
p < .05, d = .78. Overall, isolated items (M = .68, SD = .16) were better 
remembered than non-isolated items (M = .54, SD = .18), t(13) = 2.6, p < .05, d = 
.69, hence suggesting that the memory manipulation was effective.  
Importantly, as Valence and Isolation increased memory performance 
when participants only had to perform a memory task, any memory advantage 
observed in Experiment 5 cannot be due simply to on-line judgment increasing 
items memorability (e.g., Alba & Hasher, 1983; Hastie, 1981).  
 
3.5.2. Results  
Lists with a Peak either in 1st, 2nd, 6th or 7th were excluded from the 
analyses – as they were fillers.  Alpha was set to .05 for all analyses. 
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Memory.  Overall, the memory manipulation appeared successful: Isolated 
negative items (M = .70, SD = .26) were better remembered than non-isolated 
negative items (M = .53, SD = .29) – and this was true across positions. A 
slightly less sizeable but still consistent memory advantage was also observed for 
the isolated neutrals (M = .53, SD = .31) when compared to non-isolated neutrals 
(M = .43, SD = .19). Regardless of Isolation, negative items (M = .62, SD = .16) 
were overall better remembered than neutral items (M = .48, SD = .15), and this 
pattern again seemed true across positions. Finally, memory for the items in 5th 
position (M = .64, SD = .27) was slightly better than memory for the items 
presented in 3rd and 4th positions (M = .56, SD = .27 and M = .57, SD = .25, 
respectively). See Figure 3.2 below.  
 
Figure 3.2 Mean recall proportion as a function of word position and isolation for 
negative (Fig.3.2a, left) and neutral (Fig.3.2b, left) items. Error bars indicate 
SEM (Exp.5) 
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A 3-way repeated measures ANOVA was run, with Position (positions 3, 
4 and 5), Valence (Negative vs. Neutral) and Isolation (Isolated vs. Not-isolated) 
as factors. The analyses revealed that none of the interactions were significant. 
The significant main effect of Valence, F(1, 31) = 22.1, p < .001, p2 = .42, 
confirmed that overall negative items were better recalled than neutrals. The lack 
of a significant interaction between Valence and Position, F(2, 62) = 1.1, p > .32, 
indicated that the memory advantage was constant across positions. The 
significant main effect of Isolation, F(1, 31) = 13.4, p < .001, p2 = .30, 
confirmed that isolated items were better remembered than not-isolated ones – 
and this was again true regardless of Position (F <  1) and Valence (F(1, 31) = 
2.9, p > .09).  Finally, the main effect of Position, F(2, 62) = 4.1, p < .05, p2 = 
.12, together with the post-hoc analyses revealed how items presented in 5th 
position were better recalled than items in 3rd and 4th positions.  It can be 
concluded that the memory manipulation was successful, as isolated negative 
items were better remembered than non-isolated negative words. Moreover, the 
isolation effect applied to neutral items as well.  
If a memory-based approach to RE is tenable, then it would be predicted 
that the experimental lists (i.e. those lists where the negative item was isolated) 
should be rated as more unpleasant than control lists.  
 
Judgment.  In order to limit the extent of possible anchoring effects (e.g., 
Chapman & Johnson, 2002) and to reduce the influence of inter-individual 
differences in the use of the 0-100 scale, judgment scores were transformed as 
follows (see Aldrovandi et al., 2008). The average pleasantness rating for the 
Neutral lists for each participant was subtracted from the pleasantness ratings for 
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each P3, P4, and P5 lists10. The new corrected judgment scores (J’) therefore 
represented how much more unpleasant each P3, P4 and P5 list were in 
comparison to the average Neutral list for each participant (see Table 3.3).  
 
Table 3.3 Mean corrected pleasantness ratings (and SD) as a function of isolation 
and list type (Exp.5) 
Isolation/List Type P3 P4 P5 Total 
 
Negative item 
isolated 
-16.5 
(15.0) 
-19.9 
(16.6) 
-22.1 
(15.7) 
-19.5 
(15.7) 
 
Negative item 
 not isolated 
-11.2 
(10.9) 
-10.8 
(8.4) 
-14.7 
(13.6) 
-12.2 
(10.7) 
 
Total -13.9 
(12.7) 
-15.3 
(12.4) 
-18.4 
(14.7) 
 
 
 
 
It is immediately apparent that, overall, lists with an isolated negative 
word (M = -19.5, SD = 15.7) were rated as more unpleasant than lists with a non-
isolated negative word (M = -12.2, SD = 10.7). Also, this pattern is true 
irrespective of presentation position. Finally, ratings for lists with a negative item 
in 5th position (P5; M = -18.4, SD = 14.7) were slightly lower than the 
pleasantness ratings for P3 and P4 lists (M = -13.9, SD = 12.7 and M = -15.3, SD 
= 12.4, respectively). 
A 2-way repeated measure ANOVA was run with List Type (P3, P4 and 
P5) and Isolation (Isolated vs. Not-isolated) as factors. The analyses yielded 
main effects of Isolation, F(1, 31) = 24.2, p < .001, p2 = .44, and of List type, 
F(2, 62) = 3.4, p < .05, p2 = .10. Post-hoc analyses revealed how pleasantness 
                                                
10
 Analyses performed on the raw data revealed the main effect of List type (P3, P4, P5 and 
Neutral) was highly significant, F(3, 93) = 35.9, p < .001. Post-hoc testing confirmed that the 
Neutral lists were rated on average as more pleasant than any list containing a negative item (all 
ps < .001) 
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ratings for P5 lists were lower than for P3 lists (p < .05), but no differences were 
noted between P4 lists and the remaining two list types (ps > .10). The 
interaction between List type and Isolation was not significant (F < 1), indicating 
that lists with an isolated negative item were rated as more unpleasant than lists 
with a corresponding non-isolated item, regardless of presentation position.  
The pattern of pleasantness ratings described above is completely 
compatible with the predictions based on the memory results: negative items 
presented in red and temporally isolated were better remembered, so lists 
including this type of word were rated as more unpleasant. This pattern was 
observed across presentation positions. Moreover, it can also be noticed that the 
memory advantage for the Peak in 5th position was reflected in more unpleasant 
judgments for the lists with a Peak in 5th position. 
 
Memory-Judgment relationships. As for the analyses on Judgment only, the 
analyses of the relationship between memory and judgment were performed on 
corrected judgment scores.  
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Figure 3.3 Mean corrected judgment (J') as function of isolation (Yes vs. No) and 
list type (P3, P4, and P5) – when the "Peak" was not recalled (Fig.3.3a, left) and 
when it was recalled. Error bars indicate SEM (Fig.3.3b, right; Exp.5) 
 
Figures 3.3a and 3.3b illustrate how memory and judgment were clearly 
associated. As can be seen, overall, ratings in Figures 3.3a are higher than ratings 
in Figure 3.3b.  The lists for which the negative item was not recalled shown in 
Figure 3.3a  (M = -7.5, SD = 12.0) were rated as considerably more pleasant than 
the lists for which the negative item was recalled (M = -18.5, SD = 16.1) – which 
are summarised in Figure 3.3b.  
Furthermore, it seems that Isolation had an adverse effect on judgment 
only for those lists where the negative word was recalled (see Figure 3.3b): In 
this case, Isolated lists (M = -21.5, SD = 13.1) were rated as more unpleasant 
than not-isolated lists (M = -15.4, SD = 12.4). However, when the negative item 
was not recalled (see Figure 3.3a), Isolated lists (M = -8.2, SD = 8.3) were rated 
similarly to non-Isolated lists (M = -7.4, SD = 5.4).  
A 2 (Isolation: Yes Vs. No) × 2 (Memory: negative item recalled Vs. not 
recalled) × 3 (List type: P3, P4 and P5) repeated measures ANOVA was run on 
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the data summarised in Figures 3.3a and 3.3b11.  The analyses revealed a main 
effect of Memory, F(1, 31) = 28.8, p < .001, p2 = .48 – confirming that, overall, 
lists where the negative word was recalled were rated significantly lower than 
lists where it was not recalled. The main effect of Isolation was also significant, 
F(1, 31) = 8.5, p < .01, p2 = .21. Overall, lists with the isolated negative word 
(M = -14.9, SD = 14.2) were rated as more unpleasant than lists where it was not 
isolated (M = -11.1, SD = 13.9).  
The only significant interaction was between Memory and Isolation, F(1, 
31) = 6.6, p < .05, p2 = .18, which revealed how Isolation affected judgment 
only when the isolated negative item was recalled. On the one hand, lists whose 
isolated negative item was recalled were rated as more unpleasant than lists 
whose non isolated negative item was recalled, t(31) = 4.0, p < .001, d = .71. On 
the other hand, judgments were not significantly different between control and 
experimental lists when the negative item was not recalled, t(31) = 0.9, p > .38. 
An important point to discuss in the above findings relates to one of the 
general patterns of data: lists with isolated negative items were associated with 
more unpleasant ratings only when the negative item was recalled.  One 
interpretation of this finding invokes accessibility (e.g., Schwarz, 1995) – i.e. the 
ease with which the target negative item was retrieved from memory. A memory-
based approach to judgment suggests that item accessibility moderates summary 
assessments, as information that is brought to mind most easily affect judgment 
most heavily.   
                                                
11
 This analysis yielded 12.8% of missing data, which were missing completely at random as the 
MCR Little’s test was not significant, 2 (156) = 159.5,  p > .40. Missing data were replaced via 
mean by subject substitution. 
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In order to test this idea, recall or output position was used as a measure 
of accessibility. The pleasantness ratings were averaged according to the position 
in which the negative item was recalled by the participants. The underlying 
rationale was that items that are more easily accessible in memory are more 
likely to be recalled as earlier responses. Thus, if the negative item is more 
accessible and it is recalled early, it is argued that its impact on judgment would 
be higher than when it is less easily accessible.  
 
Table 3.4 Mean corrected judgment (and SD) as a function of "Peak" recall 
output position (Exp.5) 
  Negative item recall output position 
 
  Recalled in pos 1 Recalled in pos 2 
 
Recalled in pos 3-7 
Pleasantness 
ratings 
M 
SD 
-25.3 
(15.7) 
-18.4 
(18.0) 
  -13.4 
(9.0) 
 
 
Overall, it seems clear that the pleasantness ratings were related to the 
output position of the negative item: They were lowest when the participants 
recalled it as the first response (M = -25.3, SD = 15.7) and they were highest 
when it was recalled amongst the last 5 outputs (M = -13.4, SD = 9.0). When the 
negative item was recalled as the second response (M = -18.4, SD = 18.0), the 
pleasantness ratings were at an intermediate level (see Table 3.4). 
A significant one-way ANOVA12, with negative item output position as 
the factor (position 1, position 2 and positions 3 to 7), confirmed these 
observations, F(2, 62) = 12.8, p < .001, p2 = .29. Post-hoc analyses showed that 
                                                
12
 This analysis had 2.1% of missing data, which were missing completely at random as the MCR 
Little’s test was not significant, 2 (1) = 2.1,  p > .15. Missing data were  imputed via mean by 
subject substitution. 
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when the negative word was recalled as the first response, pleasantness ratings 
were lower than when it was recalled as the second response, t(31) = 3.0, p < .01, 
d = .53. Also, the difference in judgments between lists whose negative item was 
recalled as second response and lists where it was recalled among the last five 
outputs was significant, t(31) = 2.1, p < .05, d = .37. These analyses clearly 
suggest that an item’s accessibility moderates its impact on retrospective 
judgment.  
Next, we asked whether the memory manipulation increased accessibility 
of a negative item (e.g., the ease with which it was retrieved from memory) – 
beyond its availability (e.g., its recall rate). This could explain why, in those 
situations where the negative item was recalled, experimental lists were rated as 
more unpleasant than control lists (see Figure 3.3b). If the isolated negative items 
were more easily accessible in memory, their effect on pleasantness ratings 
should be larger than non-isolated negative words.  Obviously, when the negative 
item was not recalled, accessibility did not moderate RE (see Figure 3.3a); it 
follows that when the negative item was not reported as a response during the 
memory task it was less likely to be accessed in memory at all.  
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 For each participant we computed the proportion of trials where the 
negative item, when recalled, was either the 1st, 2nd or 3rd to 7th response.  Table 
3.5 below summarises the findings.  
 
Table 3.5 Mean proportion recall (and SD) for negative items, depending on their 
isolation and recall output position (Exp.5) 
 Negative item recall output position 
 
Negative item 
Isolation 
 
Recalled in pos 1 
 
Recalled in pos 2 
 
Recalled in pos 3-7 
 
Isolated .42 (.24) 
.21 
(.16) 
 
.37 
(.27) 
 
Not Isolated .31 (.29) 
.19 
(.16) 
 
.50 
(.32) 
 
 
 
Table 3.5 suggests that when a negative word was isolated it was more 
readily retrieved from memory, as it tended to be recalled as an early response 
more often than non isolated negative items. When isolated negative items were 
recalled, they were more likely to be recalled as the first response (on average 
42% of the times) than the non isolated ones (31%); at the same time, non 
isolated negative items (50%) were more likely to be recalled amongst the last 
five responses than isolated ones (37%).  
An ANOVA was run, with the proportion as the dependent variable and 
Isolation (yes vs. no) and Recall output position (1st vs. 3rd to 7th)13 as the factors. 
The analyses revealed no main effects of Isolation and Recall output position 
                                                
13
 The 2nd recall output position was excluded from the analyses in order to avoid violating the 
independence assumption of ANOVA. 
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(both Fs < 1). More interestingly, the interaction between Isolation and Recall 
output position was significant, F(1, 31) = 9.9, p < .01, p2 = .24. Follow-up 
analyses confirmed that isolated negative items were recalled more often as first 
response than non isolated negative items, t(31) = 2.7, p < .05, d = .48 – while 
the opposite was true for the 5 last output positions, t(31) = 2.8, p < .01, d = .55. 
These results suggest that isolated negative items, when recalled, were 
more easily accessible than non isolated ones. This in turn can explain why, 
when the negative item was recalled, those lists including an isolated negative 
word were rated as more unpleasant than lists where the negative item was not 
isolated. 
To summarise, detailed patterns of pleasantness ratings were successfully 
predicted by the memory performance participants exhibited. Negative items 
were better remembered when isolated than when non-isolated. As expected if 
RE are based, at least in part, on the information available in memory, 
pleasantness ratings including the former type of negative items were lower than 
for lists which contained the latter type.  
Furthermore, the accessibility of negative items was increased by the 
experimental manipulation, too. When recalled, the isolated negative words were 
more easily accessible in memory than non-isolated negative items – as they 
tended to be recalled more often as early outputs. Increased negative item 
accessibility was associated with a larger impact on RE.  
We would submit that the pattern of results described above provides 
compelling evidence in support of a memory-based approach to RE. However, 
one argument that has recurred when discussing this work needs to be addressed: 
the effect of the dual nature of the task. When performing the evaluation task, 
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participants knew that they had to perform a memory task subsequently. It could 
be argued that the nature of the experimental task artificially induced participants 
to rehearse the degraded representation of the list at the time of judgment – when 
otherwise they would not do so (e.g., Anderson, 1989). In other words, a general 
alternative explanation for our findings is that having to do both judgment and 
memory tasks on the same lists artificially created the patterns obtained in 
Experiment 5. Experiment 6 addressed this issue.  
 
3.6. Experiment 6 
 
In order to test our interpretation of the results of Experiment 5, an 
additional experiment was run. Participants were presented with a surprise 
memory task. As the participants could not anticipate this memory task, there is 
no reason for the memory component of the procedure to have any impact on 1) 
the retrospective judgements and 2) the association between what is recalled and 
the pleasantness ratings.  
In the present experiment, participants were presented with an evaluation 
task for a number of trials – only to be asked to perform a surprise memory task 
after the very last pleasantness rating was provided. If the findings of the 
previous experiment are reproduced when participants are not aware of the 
memory task, then the suggestion that the paradigm used in Experiment 5 
artificially increased the associations between memory and judgment can be 
ruled out. 
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3.6.1. Method 
 
3.6.1.1. Participants 
A total of 113 participants (66 males) took part in an internet-based 
experiment, advertised through ipoints®. Participants’ age ranged from 20 to 63 
years (M = 41.6, SD = 12.7) and they were granted ipoints in exchange for their 
participation.  
 
3.6.1.2. Design and Materials 
A sub-sample of 20 lists was selected from those used for Experiment 5, 
15 of which included a negative item and six neutral items (Negative lists) and 
five which were “Neutral” lists, as they contained 7 neutral items.  The negative 
item lists were divided into three blocks of five lists each. The blocks were 
closely matched on familiarity ratings (blocks averages ranging from 521.6 to 
534.4), number of phonemes (from 4.0 to 4.8) and the Kucera-Francis frequency 
index (59.2 to 68.5).  
The five negative items within each block were matched with the 
negative item within the other two blocks, still on the dimension of familiarity 
(517.2 to 533.4) number of phonemes (4.6 to 5.2) and frequency (36.6 to 56.4). 
Negative items were rotated, so that each of the 15 negative items appeared in 
each possible position (1st, 4th and 7th) an equal number of times across 
participants.  
Each participant was presented with four trials in total; in the first trial 
they were always presented with an all-neutral item list randomly selected from 
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the block of Neutral lists. The remaining three trials included one each of the 
three negative list types, i.e. “P1” (where the negative item was presented in first 
position), “P4” and “P7”. A Latin Square design allowed us to present the 
different list types the same number of times as the last trial across participants – 
the last trial was the critical trial as it was followed by the surprise memory task.  
 
3.6.1.3. Procedure 
The present experiment was presented after another task, during which 
participants had to assess short slideshows – there was no memory component in 
this other task. Prior to any testing, participants were presented with a series of 
introductory screens which provided general information about the study and 
gathered demographic data.  
Participants were told that they were to assess the pleasantness of word 
lists. When participants had rated the 4th and last list, a screen instructed them to 
recall the first two words that came to mind from the just-presented list; if they 
could not remember any word they just had to press the “Continue” button twice. 
After participants entered their responses, they had a chance to enter any other 
word they might have remembered from the list in a following screen. 
 
3.6.2. Results  
 Information about the  IP address and the time participants took to 
complete the whole experimental procedure was collected. No data were 
gathered from the same IP address, so no data were excluded on the basis of this 
criterion. Six participants (i.e., 5.3% of the total sample) were excluded from the 
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analysis because of excessive task duration, as it took them from 51 to 203 
minutes to complete the whole experiment (while the average duration was 17 
minutes and the maximum duration allowed was 30 minutes.)  
 
Availability. As for Experiment 5, the analyses were run on corrected judgment 
scores (J’): these scores represented how more unpleasant the negative list 
presented in the last trial was rated as compared to the Neutral list14.  
An independent samples t-test was run, with J’ as the dependent variable 
and Memory (negative item recalled vs. not recalled) as the between-subjects 
factor. The t-test was significant, t(105) = 10.6, p < .05, d = .52, and revealed that 
the pleasantness ratings for those lists where the negative item was not recalled 
(M = 0.3, SD = 20.7) were significantly higher than for those lists where the 
negative item was recalled (M = -10.3, SD = 19.9).  
 
Accessibility. Next, the influence of negative item accessibility on pleasantness 
ratings was analysed. Pleasantness ratings were averaged as a function of 
negative item output position (see Table 3.6 below).  
The pleasantness ratings were highest when the negative item was not 
recalled (M = 0.3, SD = 20.7) and lowest when it was recalled as the first 
response (M = -13.0, SD = 21.3). When the negative item was recalled as either 
2nd, 3rd, or 4th item, the pleasantness ratings were at an intermediate level (M = -
3.7, SD = 14.7).  
 
                                                
14
 Analyses performed on the raw data revealed that the main effect of List Type (P1, P4, P7, and 
Neutral) on pleasantness ratings was significant, F(3, 318) = 12.6, p < .001. Post-hoc analyses 
confirmed that the Neutral lists were rated as significantly more pleasant than all the list types 
which included a negative item (all ps < .05).  
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Table 3.6 Mean corrected judgment (and SD) as a function of recall output 
position (Exp.6) 
  Negative item recall output position 
 
  Not recalled 
(n = 38) 
Recalled in pos1 
(n = 49) 
Recalled in pos 2-4 
(n = 20) 
 
Pleasantness 
ratings 
 
M 
SD 
 
0.3 
(20.7) 
 
-13.0 
(21.3) 
 
-3.7 
(14.7) 
 
 
 
 A one-way between-subjects ANOVA was run, with negative item recall 
position (not recalled; recalled as 1st response; recalled as 2nd to 4th response) as 
the factor. The analysis yielded a significant main effect, F(2, 104) = 4.9, p < .01, 
p
2 
= .09. Planned contrasts revealed that when the negative item was recalled as 
the 1st response, pleasantness ratings were significantly lower than when it was 
either not recalled or recalled as a later response (p < .05)15. At the same time, 
lists  pleasantness when the negative item was recalled as 2nd to 4th response did 
not differ from when it was not recalled at all (p > .47).  
 Overall, the correspondence between memory and judgment was clear: 
pleasantness ratings were lower when the negative item was recalled and they 
were the lowest when it was most easily accessible in memory.  
As this pattern was observed even if participants did not expect a memory 
task, it can be concluded that the paradigm called upon in Experiment 5 cannot 
be the source of memory-related judgment effects.  
 
                                                
15
 For the latter comparison it was a 1-tailed test. 
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3.6.3. Discussion 
The results of the two experiments reported here provide evidence 
supporting the hypothesis that memory plays a significant role in summary 
assessments. Retrospective judgment was successfully predicted on the basis of 
the memory pattern observed for the negative item (i.e., a distinctive episode 
within the event).  
First, increasing the distinctiveness – and consequently the recall rate – of 
a negative item within a list of words led to the whole list being rated as more 
unpleasant, relative to situations where memorability was not enhanced.  
Secondly, results suggest that the ease of recall (i.e., accessibility; 
Schwarz & Vaughn, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) also moderates RE: the 
easier it was to access a negative item in memory, the larger its impact on 
summary assessments. When recalled, isolated negative items were more easily 
accessible than non-isolated negative items – as they were recalled more often 
amongst early responses. This resulted in pleasantness ratings for experimental 
lists (which included an isolated negative item) being lower than for control lists 
– obviously only when the negative information was more likely to be accessed 
in memory at the time of judgment (as it was recalled at the memory stage).   
To summarise, the manipulations enhanced memory performance for the 
negative items by making them more often present in memory and, at the same 
time, by increasing the ease with which they were retrieved from the degraded 
trace of the just-seen list (see also Aldrovandi et al., 2008).  
These results were not just a spurious effect of the isolation manipulation; 
neutral items were also better remembered when they were isolated, but this had 
no effect on judgment – something to be expected as neutral items would not 
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push RE in any specific direction. Also, the results were not due to the nature of 
the paradigm, which, it could be argued, might lead participants to access 
information in memory at the time of judgment simply because they knew they 
had to perform a recall task subsequently. The results of Experiment 6 clearly 
showed that memory-judgment correspondence was observed even when 
participants could not anticipate the memory task.   
In summary, a memory-based approach to RE can account for the overall 
pattern of judgments and the details of the judgment behaviour participants 
exhibited. Other approaches (e.g., Anderson, 1989) do not fair as well, and could 
not have led to the predictions corroborated here. It can be argued that isolating 
the negative item did not directly affect the pleasantness of the lists – as the latter 
was unaffected by the experimental manipulation when the negative items were 
not recalled. Indeed, experimental and control lists were rated as equally 
unpleasant on the occasions in which the negative item was not recalled. This 
finding also ruled out the possibility that participants’ overt strategies to comply 
with the experimental manipulation significantly affected the results. Indeed, it 
could have been argued that manipulating memorability in such an evident way 
(isolated items were both physically and temporally isolated) could have induced 
participants to guess the aim of the study and to engage in artificial overt 
strategies. 
Finally, approaches that contend that it is instead judgment that causes 
memory – by biasing it at either the encoding or retrieval stages (Alba & Hasher, 
1983; Hastie, 1981) – struggle to account for the present findings. These theories 
hold that the relationships between memory and judgment are a consequence of 
the direct influence of on-line evaluative processes on memory; to frame it in the 
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present paradigm, the argument would be that the increased memorability of 
isolated items was due to the decreased pleasantness of lists of words. However, 
this view does not seem tenable for at least two reasons. First, as previously 
mentioned, negative item isolation was associated with lower pleasantness 
ratings only when the negative item was recalled. Secondly, in the second part of 
the Experiment 5 (n = 14) it was shown that the memory advantage for isolated 
negative words was evident in the absence of a judgment task – hence without 
participants being prompted to form an on-line evaluation of the lists of words.  
In conclusion, by implementing a strict test of the role of memory 
processes in the impression formation of events, it is argued that a stronger case 
can be put forward for the role of memory processes in RE. Summary 
assessments were significantly influenced by retrieval processes in the 
experiments reported here and accessibility moderated the impact of information 
on retrospective judgment.  
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Chapter 4: 
 
Retrospective Evaluations of Stories 
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4.1. Introduction 
The results of the previous two studies verified some claims concerning 
the role memory may play in biasing hindsight judgment. Chapter 2 consistently 
showed primacy and recency effects for summary assessments of word lists: a 
distinctive and valenced item inserted in a list of neutral words affected 
retrospective judgment to a larger extent if presented either at the beginning or at 
the end of the list (Experiments 1, 2 and 3). This finding was coupled with 
primacy and recency effects for memory;  negative items presented either in first 
or last positions were better remembered than those presented in the middle of 
the lists (Experiments 2 and 3). Contrary to the predictions of “Independence” 
models (cf. Hastie & Park, 1986; p. 259), which postulate functional 
independence between memory and judgment processes (e.g. Anderson, 1989; 
Betsch, Plessner, Schwieren, & Gütig, 2001), correlational analyses revealed 
clearly that the two functions may be associated. First, availability as content of 
recall (hereafter “availability”; cf. Schwarz & Vaughn, 2002) moderated 
judgment – recalling a negative item was associated with lower pleasantness 
ratings. Second, availability as ease of recall (hereafter “accessibility”; Schwarz, 
1995; Schwarz & Vaughn, 2002; Schwarz, Bless, Wanke, & Winkielman, 2003; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) played a role, too: the easier it was to access in 
memory a negative item, the larger its effect on retrospective evaluations 
(Experiments 2 and 3).  
 Chapter 3 investigated further the associations between memory and 
judgment; the former was manipulated and the latter was successfully predicted. 
Enhancing memorability of a negative item resulted in decreased pleasantness 
ratings for those lists which contained it (Experiment 5). Moreover, participants’ 
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awareness of the upcoming memory task did not bias the results: memory–
judgment correlations were observed even when participants were asked to 
perform a surprise memory task (Experiment 6).  
 The aim of the experiments included in the present Chapter was to test 
the reliability of the above findings with to-be-assessed events other than lists of 
words. Can a memory-based approach predict retrospective judgments even 
when different types of stimuli (e.g., more ecologically valid) have to be 
evaluated? The question becomes most relevant as it could be argued that 
evaluating pleasantness of lists of words is a relatively abstract task, arguably 
seldom encountered in “everyday life”.  
More importantly, lists of semantically unrelated words represent discrete 
and rather non-cohesive events. It follows that, when assessing lists of words, it 
is unlikely that participants formed a ‘gist’ around the to-be-assessed and to-be-
remembered events (Brainerd & Reyna, 1992). As it was difficult for participants 
to form a whole with the lists of words (they were semantically unrelated), it 
could be argued that they were “forced” to rely on the verbatim form of the 
inputs in order to perform both tasks – hence inflating the relationship between 
recall and judgment measures. In the literature, it has been shown that memory 
for the gist and for the verbatim materials show differential forgetting patterns, 
which argues for functional independence between the two types of 
representations (Brainerd & Reyna, 1992; Kintsch, Welsch, Schmalhofer, & 
Zimmy, 1990; Reyna & Kiernan, 1994). Further evidence from social cognition 
suggests that the degree of coherence of the to-be-assessed stimuli can moderate 
the relationship between memory and judgment (McConnell, Sherman, & 
Hamilton, 1994; 1997). McConnell and colleagues have argued that when 
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participants process stimuli which are expected to be low in entitativity (i.e., 
unity and coherence; cf. Campbell, 1958, cited in McConnell et al., 1997), they 
do not integrate information about the stimuli – which results in associations 
between memory and judgment. On the other hand, according to these authors, 
when stimuli are high in entitativity (e.g., “a person whose behaviour is quite 
predictable”; McConnell et al., 1997, p. 750), participants form an integrated 
evaluation of the stimuli, which leads to on-line judgment (see also Hastie & 
Park, 1986) and to independence between retrospective judgment and retrieval 
processes.   
 The main question that naturally arises is the following: “Will memory–
judgment relationships be observed even if participants have the possibility of 
forming a more integrated representation of the to-be-assessed experiences?” 
Results from Moser (1992) suggest that different relationships between summary 
assessments and memory arise depending on the memory representations that are 
being tested (see also Experiment 2). More specifically, Moser (1992) found that 
memory and judgment did correlate when “self-generated” memory measures 
were used (i.e., participants were asked to describe the reasons behind a specific 
evaluation) – but no correlations were observed when standard recall measures 
were used (i.e., participants had to enumerate the information presented to them 
about a specific to-be-assessed scenario.)  
 In the present series of experiments, short stories told both through 
slideshows and spoken narratives will be used as the to-be-assessed events. It is 
argued that this choice of stimuli will increase the generalisability of the results 
described in the previous Chapters, which referred to lists of semantically 
unrelated words.  
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First, slideshow stories are, despite still being discrete in nature (as the slides 
will be presented sequentially), more cohesive and unitary events (i.e., higher in 
“integrity”; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1993; p. 93).  
Second, they are arguably more ecologically valid stimuli. Evaluating short 
stories that are being told to us is a more frequent activity than rating the 
pleasantness of lists of words which are semantically unrelated. 
Third, short stories told through slideshows should induce participants to 
form a gist of the to-be-assessed stimuli. This last point is possibly connected to 
the previous one, as it has been argued that with naturalistic stimuli (Weber, 
Goldstein, & Barlas, 1995; p. 54) participants are more prone to encode the gist 
of the stories in order to facilitate further decision-making (Brainerd & Reyna, 
1992). Would this in turn lead participants not to retrieve specific information 
from memory in order to provide summary assessments (Brainerd & Reyna, 
1990; 1993; Reyna & Brainerd, 1992)? Short slideshow stories, which in the 
present series of experiments typically involved the activities of a hypothetical 
character, should facilitate the creation of a more integrated or related 
representation of  the to-be-assessed event (e.g., increasing their 
“schematization”; cf. Heuer & Reisberg, 1990; see also Bartlett, 1932;  Minsky, 
1975; Rubin, 1986). 
In relation to the studies described in Chapters 2 and 3, this chapter 
investigates whether a relationship between memory and judgment can be 
obtained in situations where there are compelling reasons to expect an on-line 
judgment formation (Hastie & Park, 1986). Indeed, participants were told in 
advance about the evaluation task and the to-be-assessed stimuli should allow 
participants to integrate the information easily (as previously argued). If the 
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approaches which postulate independence between memory and judgment 
processes (e.g., Anderson, 1989; Betsch et al., 2001) are correct, then little or no 
associations between memory and judgment measures should be observed. On 
the other hand, if judgment depends, at least in part, on retrieving of information 
from memory (e.g., Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999; Schwarz et al., 2003; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), then correlations between memory and judgment 
measures should arise.  
 
4.2. Experiment 7 
 
 The aim of the first experiment was to investigate whether summary 
assessments for slideshow stories produced a pattern similar to that observed for 
word lists. No memory task was used (see also Experiment 1, Chapter 2). 
However, in the second experiment of this series memory for the stories is 
assessed also; in this way, it will be possible to indirectly determine whether 
performing a memory task alters the retrospective judgment pattern.  
 The to-be-assessed events were short stories, told through a 6-slide 
presentation and spoken descriptions – the latter somewhat like a story being 
told.  The choice of stimuli allowed us to both control variables that may affect 
judgment (i.e., valence and arousal) and to partial out the effects of factors that 
may influence memory processes (i.e., picture distinctiveness and familiarity, 
spoken descriptions length and grammatical structure).  
 Importantly, as for word lists, it was possible to manipulate within-
subjects the point at which a negative event happened within the story. For 
instance, a story may have started with something negative happening, only to be 
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followed by relative neutral events and actions; or, the negative event might have 
happened in the middle of the story, or at the end.  In this way, it was possible to 
investigate position effects on the summary assessments, i.e. primacy and 
recency effects.  
 
4.2.1. Method 
 
4.2.1.1. Participants 
A total of 113 participants (66 males) took part in an internet-based 
experiment, advertised through ipoints®. Participants’ age ranged from 20 to 63 
years (M = 41.6, SD = 12.7) and they were granted ipoints in exchange for their 
participation.  
 
4.2.1.2. Design and Materials  
A pool of 96 pictures was selected from the International Affective Pictures 
System (IAPS; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999). Twelve pictures were selected 
as negative slides, while 84 were chosen as neutral slides. Negative slides were 
low in valence (less than 3, on a scale ranging from 1 to 9, 9 being the most 
positive) while neutral slides scored in the middle range for valence (from 3.8 to 
5.9 on the same scale). As a result, the former type of slides (M = 2.1, SD = 0.5) 
were significantly lower in valence than the latter (M = 4.5, SD = 0.7),  t(94) = 
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12.3, d = 4.0. The negative slides (M = 4.0, SD = 0.7) were also higher in arousal 
ratings than neutral slides (M = 2.4, SD = 0.6), t(94) = 8.5, d = 2.5.16  
From the resulting slide pool, 16 six-slide stories were created, as follows. 
Four stories included a negative slide in the first position followed by five neutral 
slides – hereafter identified as “Start” (or “S”) stories. Four “Middle” stories 
(“M”) had a negative slide either in third or fourth position17. Four “End” stories 
(“E”) encompassed five neutral slides and a negative one in last position. Finally, 
four “Control” (“C”) stories contained only neutral slides. Slides were not 
repeated across trials. 
Negative slides (M = 4.2, SD = 0.8) were generally lower in familiarity 
ratings (Libkuman, Otani, Kern, Viger, & Novak, 2007) than neutral slides (M = 
5.8, SD = 1.1). Hence, it was decided to include a neutral picture within each 
story that included a negative picture so that the two were closely matched for 
familiarity. For example, within story 3, the negative slide depicted two elderly 
people and was characterised by a familiarity rating of 4.0 – while the matching 
neutral item showed a boy playing chess and had a familiarity rating of 4.1. 
Overall, the negative slides and the 12 matched neutral slides were very 
comparable in regard to familiarity ratings (both M = 4.2). Also, the presentation 
positions of the matched neutral slides mirrored those of the negative pictures, as 
follows: For the Start stories, the neutral slide was presented in last position, for 
the Middle stories it was presented in the middle position adjacent to the negative 
slide and for the End stories it was presented in first position. As negative and 
                                                
16
 For arousal ratings there was overlap between negative and neutral slides: The former ranged 
from 3.2 to 5.5 (on the same scale from 1 to 9), while the latter ranged from 1.2 to 3.9. This could 
not be avoided as negative pictures which were very high in arousal usually involved scenes of 
revolting (e.g., a mutilated body) or threatening nature (e.g., an attacking snake)  
17
 Contrary to the studies reported in Chapters 2 and 3, no distinctions will be made between P3 
lists and P4 lists; this is because participants were only presented with two trials for each of these 
two list type 
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matched neutral slides were rotated across participants, any potential bias arising 
from serial position effects should be minimised18.  
A few further controls were implemented. The 16 stories were then 
assigned to four different groups of four stories each, with groups A, B and C as 
“negative” stories (which included five neutral and one negative slide) and group 
D consisting of  the “Control” stories (six neutral slides). The four groups were 
closely matched on distinctiveness ratings (Lang et al., 1999), with group 
averages ranging from 3.0 to 3.6 (on a scale from 1 to 9), memorability (Lang et 
al., 1999; from 2.6 to 3.1), number of words (7.6 to 8.0) and phonemes (31.6 to 
34.7) used for the narratives accompanying each slide.  
As previously mentioned, negative items were rotated, so that each of the 
12 negative words selected from the database appeared in each possible position 
(Start, Middle, and End) an equal number of times across participants. This 
allowed for each story to be presented in three different versions, across 
participants – without having the overall gist changed (see Appendix). For 
instance, story 8 described a part of a day in the life of Sophie, who works as a 
legal secretary. In the Start version of the story, Sophie thinks of her sister who 
committed suicide (the negative slide, depicting a cemetery), then goes to the 
office downtown, on her way she sees a man playing music; at home, she looks 
out on the lake, then she takes a stool back to the kitchen. In the Middle version 
of the story, we learn that Sophie is thinking of her sister after we find out she is 
a legal secretary, that she is in the office downtown and that she saw a man 
playing music – but before the two slides referring to the home environment (i.e., 
she is looking at the lake and she moves the stool). In the End version of the 
                                                
18
 Also, the memory analyses will compare the negative slides to the matched neutral pictures 
only. In this way it was possible to limit the potential confounding effects of familiarity at the 
(later) retrieval stage  
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story, we hear about who she is and her actions both at the office and in the 
house – only to learn at the end that she thinks of her sister. Three different 
versions were created for each of the four Control stories, too; this will allow us 
to check whether re-ordering the slides within a story (still without changing its 
overall gist) will affect retrospective judgments even if no negative event was 
included. Importantly, the wording which accompanied each slide did not change 
between the three different versions, so that no difference in either memory 
and/or judgment outputs could be attributed to the wording of narratives.  
Each story was accompanied by a recorded narrative. Every effort was 
made to equate these recordings across stories. The same female voice was used 
for all the narratives. Also, the tone of the voice used was regular and did not 
express emotion.  As mentioned before, within-story matching ensured that the 
number of phonemes and words used for each slide was comparable between 
negative and neutral slides. Moreover, the grammatical structure of all the 
sentences was comparable – they usually involved only a subject and a predicate. 
The recording that accompanied each slide did not exceed 3.1 seconds, so that 
some silent time preceded and followed each sentence (each slide was on the 
screen for a duration of 4 seconds.) 
Two pilot studies were conducted: The first was run on the Web (n = 10) 
and the second one was run at the start of a lecture (n = 18). The following 
measures were taken based on participant feedback. First, some slide 
descriptions were changed so as to increase the correspondence between the 
pictorial information and the narrative – and to avoid “bizarreness” about the 
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unfolding of the events described19. Second, adverbs (e.g., “then”) and 
conjunctions (e.g., “while”) were dropped from the narratives – which made it 
possible to re-order the events of the stories without changing the wording. 
Lastly, the present tense only was used, in order to limit as much as possible 
inter-story differences.  
 
4.2.1.3. Procedure 
A series of screens gathered demographic data and allowed the 
participants to 1) familiarise themselves with the computer-controlled procedure 
2) adjust the volume of their speakers/headsets and 3) accept the conditions 
described in the consent form.  Participants were told the study was about their 
opinion of short stories told through slideshows – of how pleasant or unpleasant 
they were. They were instructed to attend to short slideshows, presented on the 
screen, one at the time. Each slide of the six-slide stories was displayed on the 
screen for a total duration of 4000ms, during which the corresponding narrative 
was played. No inter-stimuli interval was used – as the narratives themselves 
never lasted the whole 4 seconds (as previously mentioned, the longest one lasted 
for 3.1 seconds), hence allowing for some silent time at the beginning and at the 
end of each slide presentation.  
After the last slide disappeared, a blank screen displayed for 500ms was 
followed by a series of asterisks displayed for 1000ms and another blank screen 
for 500ms. Participants then had to complete a rating task, by providing an 
overall pleasantness rating for the story they just attended to, as a whole. Ratings 
                                                
19
 One picture (no. 2751) was also slightly altered during the process. A small portion of the 
picture was removed as it showed the profile of a man with a white beard – while the main 
character in the story so far was presented as a relatively young man.  
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were collected on a 0-100 scale (0 = very unpleasant, 100 = very pleasant), and 
participants were encouraged to use the whole range of scores. In order to 
provide the ratings, participants used the mouse to click along a slide bar (with 
extremes of 0 and 100) on the position they felt best reflected their impression of 
the story. In order to reduce the possible influence of anchoring effects (e.g., 
Chapman & Johnson, 2002) a slider marker appeared on the bar only after 
participants clicked on the slide bar for the first time. Participants could then 
adjust the initial rating and confirm their final assessment by clicking on a 
“Continue” button.  
Two practice trials were provided and included stories which were the 
same for all the participants and did not include any particularly negative event 
and/or picture (see Appendix). Story presentation order was randomised 
independently for each participant and no time limits were set for the rating task. 
 
4.2.2. Results and Discussion 
Information about the  IP address and the time participants took to 
complete the whole experimental procedure was collected. No data was gathered 
from the same IP address, so no data was excluded on the basis of this criterion. 
Six participants were excluded from the analysis because of excessive task 
duration, as it took them from 51 to 203 minutes to complete the whole 
experiment (while the average duration was 17 minutes and the maximum 
duration allowed was 30 minutes.) Three more participants were excluded as the 
standard deviation in their judgments was lower than 5 (i.e. 5% of the scale). 
This resulted in the total sample size being 104 (i.e. overall, 8% of participants 
were excluded.) Alpha was set to .05 for all analyses.  
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Figure 4.1 presents the mean pleasantness ratings as a function of story 
type. As expected, the Control stories (M = 65.9, SD = 18.2), with no negative 
slides/events, were rated as the most pleasant stories. Moreover, there is some 
evidence of recency effects in the ratings: End stories (M = 42.1, SD = 15.8)—
which had a negative slide/event in the last position—received more negative 
ratings than the stories with a negative slide either in the first (M = 44.3, SD = 
14.7) or in the middle positions (M = 44.7, SD = 14.3).   
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Figure 4.1 Mean pleasantness ratings as a function of story type. Error bars 
indicate SEM  (Exp.7) 
 
The inferential statistics confirmed these observations. A one-way 
ANOVA was run, with story type (Start, Middle, End, and Control) as the 
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within-subject factor. There was a significant main effect of story type, F(3, 309) 
= 119.2, p < .001, p2 = .54. Planned comparisons revealed that pleasantness 
ratings for Control stories were significantly higher than for all the other story 
types (all ps < .00120). Judgments for End stories were lower than those for 
Middle (t(103) = 2.2, p < .05, d = .22) and Start stories (t(103) = 2.0, p < .05, d = 
.19); the ratings between the two latter story types did not differ between each 
other (t(103) = 0.4, ns). 
Finally, a control analysis was run to check whether changing the order of 
the slides affected pleasantness ratings even for stories which did not include any 
negative slide/event (Control stories). A one-way ANOVA was run, with 
Version (1, 2, and 3) as the between-subjects factor, and confirmed that there 
was no difference between the three different versions of the Control stories, F(2, 
101) <  1. 
In sum, it can be concluded that the inclusion of a negative slide– 
accompanied by a narrative which describes a negative event–affected the 
perceived pleasantness for the story as a whole. Also, the negative effect of the 
negative slide was moderated by its presentation position: recency effects were 
observed for summary assessments as the negative event exerted a larger impact 
on pleasantness ratings when presented last – compared to when it was presented 
in comparison positions elsewhere in the stories.   
When considering the judgment pattern, its differences with the 
judgments obtained for lists of words (e.g., Experiments 1, 2, and 3, Chapter 2) 
are immediately noticeable. Recency and primacy effects in retrospective 
judgment were obtained for lists of words, compared to only recency effects for 
                                                
20
 For planned comparisons, significance levels will always refer to 1-tailed tests  
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slideshow stories; for the latter, it was noticed that End stories were rated as 
more unpleasant than Start stories.  
It is not immediately clear why the judgment pattern differed depending 
on the to-be-assessed stimuli; however, addressing the following question may 
shed some light on the above discrepancy: “Can a memory-based approach 
explain the present findings?” If participants are accessing the representation of 
the just-seen story in order to evaluate it, then the results above suggest that the 
last events in the story weigh more heavily in the RE than the previous events. 
This would lead to the prediction that memory for the same events would be 
enhanced if a memory component was added to the task. Therefore, one 
interpretation of the reported results is that the recency effects in retrospective 
evaluations observed in the present Experiment are linked to a memory 
advantage for the negative slides which were presented in last positions. 
Experiment 8 examined this hypothesis.  
 
4.3. Experiment 8 
 
The main objective of Experiment 8 was to introduce a memory measure 
into the retrospective evaluation task in order to more directly investigate the 
relationship between retrospective judgment and memory for each story. As in 
Experiment 7, recency effects in retrospective judgment are predicted: stories 
that finish with a negative slide are expected to be more negatively assessed than 
the other stories – where the negative slide is presented either at the beginning or 
in the middle of the story. At the same time, it is expected that negative slides 
presented at the end of the stories will be characterised by a memory advantage 
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compared to negative (and distinctive) slides presented in the first and middle 
positions. Simply put, the prediction is that memory results will mirror the RE 
findings.   
 
4.3.1. Method 
 
4.3.1.1. Participants 
A sample of 88 participants (55 males) took part in an internet-based 
experiment, advertised once again through ipoints®. Age ranged from 18 to 61 
years (M = 42.3, SD = 10.2). Participants were granted ipoints in exchange for 
their participation.  
 
4.3.1.2. Design and Materials  
The materials employed were the same as in Experiment 7.  
 
4.3.1.3. Procedure 
As in Experiment 7, a series of screens gathered demographic data and 
allowed the participants to both familiarise themselves with the computer-
controlled procedure and to adjust the volume of their speakers/headsets.  
Participants were again told that the aim of the experiment was to gather their 
opinion about the pleasantness of 16 short stories told through slideshows. After 
attending to a short slideshow and rating its overall pleasantness (on the same 0–
100 scale), participants were asked to complete a memory task which involved 
two phases. During the first, participants were asked to type in a brief description 
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of the two pictures that came to mind most easily; participants were told that a 
simple description would suffice, and that spelling errors would not affect 
scoring. After participants entered the two descriptions, a new screen presented 
thumbnails of the six slides from the just-presented story, in random order. The 
participants’ task was to select the two pictures that corresponded to the two 
descriptions they had just typed in – that is, they had to select the two pictures 
that came more readily to mind when thinking back at the last-presented story. 
The aim of the second part of this memory task was simply to validate 
participants’ descriptions, and their selections will be used only to resolve any 
potential ambiguity that may have arisen from participants’ descriptions entered 
in the first phase of the memory task.  
As in Experiment 7, each slide was displayed for 4000ms – once again, 
with no inter-stimuli interval. Again, the last slide was followed by a blank 
screen for 500ms, a series of asterisks for 1000ms and another blank screen for 
500ms. Then, the slider track appeared and participants performed the rating 
task, in a self-paced manner. The two memory tasks – both self-paced – followed 
the rating task, with no delay between them. 
Participants were told that both the assessment and the memory tasks 
were equally important – they were asked not to overlook the rating task in order 
to proceed more quickly to the recall task. After participants had completed the 
recall task, the following list was presented, and so on.  
Two practice trials were provided and included the same two stories used 
for the practice trials in Experiment 7. List presentation order was randomised 
independently for each participant.   
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4.3.2. Results and Discussion 
No data were gathered from the same IP address, so this did not lead to 
any data exclusion. Two participants were excluded from the analyses as it took 
them 70 and 144 minutes to complete the experiment; the average duration was 
24 minutes and the pre-determined maximum duration allowed was 45 minutes. 
Four participants were excluded because of the low standard deviation in their 
judgments (smaller than the pre-determined cut-off point of 5). Lastly, one 
participant was excluded from the analyses as s/he did not type the descriptions 
in the first phase of the memory test. The final number of participants was 81– 
that is, 8% of participants were excluded from the analyses. Alpha was set to .05 
for all analyses.  
 
Judgment. As in Experiment 7, recency effects only were observed for the 
pleasantness ratings. The Control stories (M = 64.6, SD = 17.6) were once again 
the most pleasant lists – as they included only relatively neutral slides/events. 
More importantly, End stories (M = 44.9, SD = 18.4) were rated as more 
unpleasant than Start (M = 48.1, SD = 17.4) and Middle stories (M = 47.4, SD = 
17.5). Figure 4.2 below summarises these findings.  
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Figure 4.2 Mean pleasantness ratings as a function of story type. Error bars 
indicate SEM (Exp.8) 
 
The significant one-way ANOVA – with story type (Start, Middle, End, 
and Control) as the within-subject factor – confirmed these findings, F(3, 240) = 
69.3, p < .001, p2 = .46. Control lists were again the most pleasant story type (all 
ps < .001). End stories were rated as more unpleasant than Middle (t(80) = 2.1, p 
< .05, d = .23) and Start stories (t(80) = 2.9, p < .01, d = .32). Start and Middle 
stories were rather comparable in regard to pleasantness ratings, t(80) = 0.8, ns. 
As in Experiment 7, changing the order of the slides in the Control stories 
did not matter, F(2, 78) < 1. 
 
Memory. As previously mentioned, recall for neutral slides will refer to the 
matched neutral items – equated for familiarity with the negative slides. Figure 
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4.3 represents the mean recall proportion as a function of slide position and 
valence. Overall there was a memory advantage for the negative slides as 
compared to the neutral ones presented in the same position; participants 
exhibited higher recall rates for the negative than for the neutral slides, across 
presentation positions. However, contrary to our predictions, both primacy and 
recency effects can be observed: Negative slides presented in either first (Start; 
M = .63, SD = .29) or last position (End; M = .57, SD = .33) were better recalled 
than negative slides presented in either 3rd or 4th positions (Middle; M = .50, SD 
= .34).  
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Figure 4.3 Mean recall proportion as a function of slide position and valence. 
Error bars indicate SEM (Exp.8) 
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The data were analysed using a 2 (valence: negative vs. neutral) × 3 
(position: Start, Middle, and End) repeated measures ANOVA. Main effects of 
position (F(2, 160) = 9.7, p < .001, p2 = .11) and valence (F(1, 80) = 60.4, p < 
.001, p2 = .43) were noted.  The slide valence by position interaction was 
significant, too (F (2, 160) = 3.1, p < .05, p2 = .04); however, when correcting 
for the breached assumption of sphericity, the interaction became non-significant 
(p > .09). 
Planned comparisons confirmed primacy and recency effects for the 
recall of the negative slides, as the recall for slides presented either in first and 
last positions was higher than recall for the slides presented in the middle 
positions (t(80) = 2.8, p < .01, d = .33; t(80) = 1.9, p < .05, d = .22, respectively). 
Recall for Start and End slides did not differ significantly, t(80) = 1.3, p > .08.  
An overview of the results on pleasantness ratings indicates that they 
confirm the pattern observed in Experiment 7. Once again, a negative slide 
presented at the end of the story exerted the largest impact on summary 
assessments. However, the recall results did not support an approach where 
memory plays a central role in biasing retrospective judgments. Both recency 
and primacy effects were observed for the recall of the negative slides; slides 
presented in first or last positions were better remembered than slides presented 
in the middle of the story.  
The discrepancy between memory and judgment patterns would suggest 
that the evaluations of the stories were independent of the memory representation 
that participants held about them. If participants relied at least in part on episodic 
information stored in memory when providing summary assessments, then it is 
reasonable to argue that Start lists, whose negative slide in first positions was 
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recalled to a higher extent, should have been rated as more unpleasant than 
Middle lists, where the negative slide was at a recall disadvantage.  
A further finding goes against the predictions of a memory-based 
approach. If participants based their evaluations on the representations they 
stored in memory, accessibility (i.e., the ease with information is accessed in 
memory; e.g. Schwarz & Vaughn, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) would 
have moderated retrospective judgment; in the present paradigm, it can be argued 
that situations where the negative slide was recalled as the first response (as 
opposed to second) should have been associated with the most unpleasant 
judgments. It also follows that negative slides presented in the last position 
should have been recalled most of the times as the first output, since the lists 
which encompassed them (the End stories) were rated as the most unpleasant. 
However, the recall output positions of the negative slides provided us with a 
rather different picture: Negative slides presented in last positions (End slides), 
when recalled, represented participants’ first response only 42% of the times – 
compared to 63% for the Middle slides and 86% for the Start slides21. The earlier 
a negative slide was presented, the more likely it was recalled as first as 
compared to second response.  
A compelling reason as to why the observed memory and judgment 
pattern were different may concern the nature of the representations accessed 
during both tasks – and the perhaps less than perfect correspondence between the 
two. The representation of the story accessed when evaluating it in hindsight 
might have been mostly auditory and semantic, as it concerned the gist of the 
                                                
21
 Nevertheless, we are aware that participants were allowed to output two responses only and 
that this may have reduced the power of the recall output position as a measure of accessibility; 
after all, participants may have had vividly in mind more than two responses and simply chose 
two of them 
- 164 - 
story – its narrative and the events that shaped it. However, in the memory task 
participants were asked to recall the two pictures that came to mind most easily; 
hence the visual representation of the story elements was highlighted in the 
memory task. The two task instructions may have primed participants to access 
different information in memory about the same stimuli. After all, it can be 
reasonably assumed that the series of stimuli (the stories) was encoded in its 
multiple aspects, including 1) the pictorial information associated with the 
pictures 2) the gist, i.e. the result of integrative processes which combined into a 
unitary representation the different events and 3) the auditory information 
included in each slide description (the narratives were both played trough 
headphones/speakers and written below each slide). The two tasks may well have 
cued different information, which resulted in the dissociation between their 
outcomes.  
In order to address the above mentioned issue, some changes were made 
in the procedure to reduce the discrepancy between what the summary 
assessments are based upon and what participants “use” when performing the 
memory task. These changes attempted to increase the correspondence between 
the nature of the information that is utilised when performing the pleasantness 
ratings and the trace of the just-experienced stimuli that is accessed in memory in 
order to comply with the recall instructions. Two parallel Experiments were run 
in order to achieve this goal in two different ways. In Experiment 9, the stimuli 
will be presented to participants in one modality only (visual) – to reduce the 
potential altering effects on the memory–judgment relationships due to different 
stimuli encoding modality. Participants in Experiment 10 will be presented with 
the exact same stimuli as in Experiment 8. However, instead of being asked to 
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recall the two pictures that come to mind most easily from the just-seen stories, 
they were asked to recall the two moments that were more readily available; this 
should allow for a better alignment between the memory and judgment tasks.    
 
4.4. Experiment 9 
 
 In this Experiment, the effects of stimulus encoding modality on the 
correlations between memory and judgment will be investigated. In the previous 
Experiment, the stimuli were presented simultaneously in multiple modalities. 
First of all, the taped narratives were played through speakers/headphones 
(auditory). Second, a picture was presented on each slide (visual-pictorial). 
Lastly, the text of the narrative was displayed underneath the picture (visual-
verbal). As previously argued, the rating and the recall in Experiment 8 may have 
rested on different dimensions of the encoded stimuli producing different 
patterns for retrospective judgment (recency effects only were observed) and 
memory performance (both primacy and recency effects took place.) 
 Therefore, it was decided to utilise only visual stimuli; a short narrative 
was displayed on each slide as printed text – neither taped descriptions nor 
pictures were presented to participants. It is argued that this measure should help 
to align the information accessed to complete both the RE and memory tasks. As 
a consequence, clearer associations between memory and judgment measures 
should be observed.   
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4.4.1. Method 
 
4.4.1.1. Participants 
A total of 81 participants (48 males) took part in an internet-based 
experiment, advertised through ipoints®. Participants’ age ranged from 25 to 67 
years (M = 44.1, SD = 11.3) and they were granted ipoints in exchange for their 
participation.  
 
4.4.1.2. Design and Materials  
The 16 stories used were the same as in Experiments 7 and 8. However, 
only the printed sentences referring to each of the six events (the narratives) were 
displayed on each slide.  
 
4.4.1.3. Procedure 
The procedure was the same as in Experiment 8. After having provided 
the pleasantness rating for each story as a whole, participants were asked to 
describe briefly the two moments that came to mind most readily. The following 
screen presented participants with the six printed sentences from the just-seen 
story, in scrambled order. Their task was to click on the two narratives that 
corresponded to the two descriptions they had provided in the previous screen; 
that is, they had to select the two narratives that came to mind most easily when 
thinking back at the story. 
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4.4.2. Results and Discussion 
Once again, some participants were excluded from the analyses on the 
basis of pre-determined criteria. Four participants were excluded from the 
analyses as it took them from 130 and 4372 minutes to complete the experiment; 
the average duration was 23 minutes and the pre-determined maximum duration 
allowed was 45 minutes. Three participants were excluded because the standard 
deviation of their judgements was lower than 5. This time, no participants 
neglected the typing task, so no participant was excluded according to this 
criterion. The final sample size equalled to 74, which means that 8.6% of 
participants were excluded from the analyses. Alpha was set to .05 for all 
analyses.  
 
Judgment. Pleasantness ratings for the different story types seem rather 
comparable; Start stories (M = 51.4, SD = 13.9) were rated slightly more pleasant 
than Middle (M = 49.3, SD = 13.7) and End stories (M = 48.5, SD = 13.1). Once 
again, the Control lists attracted the highest ratings (M = 69.0, SD = 15.9). Figure 
4.4 below summarises these findings.  
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Figure 4.4 Mean pleasantness ratings as a function of story type. Error bars 
indicate SEM (Exp.9) 
 
The main effect of story type was a significant, F(3, 219) = 79.2, p < 
.001, p2 = .52. Planned comparisons once more revealed that the Control stories 
were rated as the most pleasant (all ps < .001). End lists were rated as more 
unpleasant than Start stories (t(73) = 2.1, p < .05, d = .26), while the difference 
between Middle and Start stories approached significance, t(73) = 1.6, p = .06.  
As in the previous two Experiments, no significant difference were noted 
between the three different versions of the Control lists, F(2, 71) < 1. 
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Memory.22 Figure 4.5 represents the mean recall proportion as a function of 
narrative position and valence. Negative narratives (M = .70, SD = .26) were 
better recalled than the neutral ones (M = .33, SD = .24) – and this memory 
advantage seems evident across presentation positions. Furthermore, recall for 
the negative narratives increased along with presentation positions, as narratives 
presented in last position (M = .74, SD = .26) were better recalled than those 
presented in the middle (M = .69, SD = .27) and first positions (M = .67, SD = 
.29).  
 A 2 × 3 repeated measures ANOVA was run, with Valence (negative vs. 
neutral) and Position (Start, Middle, and End) as the factors. The analysis 
revealed significant main effects of Position (F(2, 146) = 14.2, p < .001, p2 = 
.16) and Valence (F(1, 73) = 142.6, p < .001, p2 = .66). Additionally, the 
Valence by Position interaction was significant, too (F(2, 146) = 4.1, p < .05, p2 
= .05); follow-up analyses revealed that this was due to recency effects (i.e. the 
recall advantage of the narrative in last position compared to the recall for the 
narratives in middle positions) being larger for Neutral narratives (t(73) = 4.9, p 
< .001, d = .57),  as compared to Negative narratives (t(73) = 2.0, p < .05, d = 
.24). 
 
                                                
22
 As in the previous two experiments, the data for Neutral events will refer to the narratives 
matched for familiarity with the Negative events 
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Figure 4.5 Mean recall proportion as a function of narrative position and valence. 
Error bars indicate SEM (Exp.9) 
 
Finally, planned comparisons confirmed that recall for the End narratives 
(i.e. negative sentences presented in last position) was significantly higher than 
the recall of Start (t(73) = 2.3, p < .05, d = .25) and Middle narratives (t(73) = 
2.0, p < .05, d = .24) – the latter two not being significantly different from each 
other, t(73) = 0.5, ns.  
 
Memory-Judgment relationships. In order to reduce the influence of potential 
anchoring effects (e.g., Chapman & Johnson, 2002) and of inter-individual 
differences in the use of the 0-100 scale, judgment scores were transformed as 
follows: For each participant, the average pleasantness rating for the Control 
stories was subtracted from the pleasantness ratings for each Start, Middle, and 
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End story – that is the stories that contained a negative item. The new corrected 
judgment scores (J’) therefore represented how much more unpleasant each Start, 
Middle, and End story was in comparison to the average Control story for each 
participant. J’ scores were then averaged for each participant, according to the 
negative narrative presentation position and whether the negative narrative 
presented in the story was recalled or not23,24.  
Overall, when the negative sentence was recalled in the memory task, 
pleasantness ratings for the narrative as a whole were lower (M = -21.2, SD = 
16.5) than when it was not recalled (M = -12.5, SD = 13.8).  Moreover, this 
relationship between memory and judgment was relatively constant across story 
types. Table 4.1 below summarises these findings.  
 
Table 4.1 Mean corrected pleasantness ratings (J') as a function of story type and 
the negative narrative being recalled or not (Exp.9) 
  Story type 
  Start Middle End 
Was the negative 
sentence recalled?  
    
No M -12.9 -17.8 -16.5 
 SD (15.7) (14.1) (15.8) 
Yes M -20.8 -21.1 -21.8 
 SD (16.0) (17.7) (16.3) 
  
                                                
23
 This analysis yielded a total of 29.7% missing values, which were missing at random as the 
MRC Little’s Test was not significant, 2 (386) = 3.2,  p > .85. Missing values were replaced 
using different methods, including mean substitution by subject, grand mean, and Expectation-
Maximization algorithm (Schafer & Olsen, 1998). As all the analyses returned the same results, 
we will be reporting the data obtained via mean by subject substitution  
24
 Due to the large amount of missing values (29.7%) correlational analyses were run between 
negative narrative recall proportion and average pleasantness ratings (averaging across trials). 
Analyses confirmed the significant associations between memory and judgment, in the expected 
direction (r = -.33, p < .01 for Start lists; r = -.45, p < .001 for Middle lists; r = -.29, p < .01 for 
End lists) 
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A 2 (Memory: Negative sentence recalled Vs. not recalled) × 3 (Story 
type: Start, Middle, and End) within-subjects ANOVA confirmed these 
observations. The main effect of Memory was significant (F(1, 73) = 29.0, p < 
.001, p2 = .28), confirming that overall ratings were more unpleasant for those 
stories where the negative narrative was recalled. The relationship between 
memory and judgment was observed regardless of presentation position, as the 
Story type by Memory interaction was not significant (F(1.6, 118.8) = 2.8, p > 
.09)25.  
Finally, retrospective evaluations were analysed depending on the 
negative sentence recall position or output position (see Table 4.2); that is, the 
analysis was broken down into the situations when the sentence was recalled as 
the first response as compared to when it was recalled as second response26. The 
underlying rationale was that narratives that are more accessible in memory are 
likely to be recalled early, i.e. as the first response—if the negative sentence is 
more accessible and recalled early we would expect its impact on retrospective 
evaluations to be higher than when it is recalled as second response or not at all.   
Overall, pleasantness ratings were slightly lower when participants 
recalled the negative sentence as the first response (M = -22.6, SD = 18.1) as 
compared to when they recalled as second response (M = -20.6, SD = 15.2). 
Judgments were most pleasant when the negative narrative was not recalled at all 
(M = -12.5, SD = 13.8).  
The main effect of recall position on pleasantness ratings was significant, 
(F(2, 146) = 23.0, p < .001, p2 = .24). Planned comparisons revealed that the 
                                                
25
 Degrees of freedom were adjusted according to the Greenhouse-Geisser correction as the 
assumption of Sphericity was not met 
26
 This analysis yielded a total of 6.4% missing values, which were once again imputed via mean 
by subject substitution  
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difference in judgments – between situations when the negative narrative was 
recalled as first as compared to second response – approached significance, t(73) 
= 1.4, p = .07. Hence, despite a trend in the expected direction, accessibility did 
not moderate retrospective evaluations.  
 
Table 4.2 Mean corrected pleasantness ratings (J') as a function of negative 
narrative recall output position (Exp.9) 
  Negative narrative recall output position 
  Not recalled 
 
Recalled as 
first response 
 
Recalled as 
second response 
 
Pleasantness 
ratings (J’) 
M -12.5 -22.6 -20.6 
 SD (13.8) (18.1) (15.2) 
 
The pleasantness ratings results were comparable to those of Experiment 
8 – as recency effects only were observed for summary assessments – however, 
the analyses of both memory measures and memory–judgment correlations 
revealed a rather different picture.  
The recall results mirrored the pleasantness ratings. First of all, negative 
narratives were better remembered than corresponding neutral items, regardless 
of their presentation position within the stories. More importantly, the memory 
pattern for the negative narratives displayed recency effects only, as was 
predicted if the memorability of the narratives moderates the retrospective 
evaluations. This result provided preliminary support to the possible influence of 
memory processes on bias in judgment in hindsight.  
Further analyses confirmed the associations between judgment and 
memory measures. First, pleasantness ratings were significantly lower for those 
stories where the negative narrative was recalled, as compared to when it was not 
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reported at all during the later memory stage. It is argued that when a negative 
narrative was not recalled in the memory task, it was also less likely to be 
available at the time of retrospective evaluations; on average, this would lead to a 
less negative assessment of the story. 
Accessibility (as ease of recall; cf. Schwarz & Vaughn, 2002) was 
expected to moderate the effect of negative narratives on judgment; namely, it 
was predicted that the lowest ratings should have been provided when the 
negative narrative was recalled as the first response. Although the predicted 
pattern was not observed, there was a trend in the expected direction in the data.  
In conclusion, by increasing the congruence in modality between the 
stimuli representations accessed during the judgment and memory tasks, clearer 
associations between memory and judgment pattern were observed. The next 
experiment attempted instead to increase the congruence between what 
information is used for judgment and memory tasks. Once again, based on the 
results of Experiment 8, recency effects only are predicted for memory and 
judgment patterns – together with clear associations between the two measures.  
 
4.5. Experiment 10 
 
In the present experiments, the stories were presented through both the 
visual and auditory modalities –as in Experiment 8– the narratives for each story 
were printed on the slides and played through speakers/headphones; moreover, 
they were accompanied by a picture. Participants were once again asked to rate 
the pleasantness of each story. However, one important change was implemented 
in regard to the memory task participants performed subsequently. Instead of 
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asking participants to describe the two pictures that come to mind most easily 
from the just-seen story, participants were asked to recall the two moments which 
are most readily available. The assumption was that this change would increase 
the correspondence between the information accessed by participants when 
performing the two tasks. It seems reasonable to argue that when participants are 
assessing the story for its pleasantness, they are thinking back at the different 
events which were described within the story. By asking participants to recall the 
most memorable moments, it is more likely that the same representation of the 
story is accessed in order to comply with the memory task instructions. This 
should in turn allow us to observe clear associations between memory and 
judgment, or at least clearer in comparison to Experiment 8, where participants 
accessed in memory the degraded pictorial trace of the story in order to perform 
the recall task.  
 
4.5.1. Method 
 
4.5.1.1. Participants 
A total of 74 participants (36 males) took part in an internet-based 
experiment, advertised through ipoints®. Participants’ age ranged from 23 to 68 
years (M = 44.9, SD = 10.7) and they were granted ipoints in exchange for their 
participation.  
 
4.5.1.2. Design and Materials  
The materials employed were the same as in Experiments 7 and 8.  
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4.5.1.3. Procedure 
 The procedure was exactly the same as in Experiment 8. The only 
difference concerned the memory tasks. As soon as participants provided the 
summary assessment for a given story, participants were asked to “type a brief 
description of the two moments of the story that come to mind most easily”. 
After participants entered the two descriptions, a screen displayed all the slides 
from the story, in random order. The participants’ task was to click on the two 
pictures that corresponded to the two descriptions they had just provided27.  
  
4.5.2. Results and Discussion 
Five participants (i.e. 7% of the total sample size) were excluded from the 
analyses according to the same pre-determined criteria as in the previous 
Experiments. Three participants were excluded from the analyses as it took them 
from 85 to 204 minutes to complete the experiment; the average duration was 22 
minutes and the pre-determined maximum duration allowed was 45 minutes. 
Two participants were excluded because the standard deviation of their 
judgements was lower than 5. All the participants performed thoroughly the 
typing task, so no participant was excluded according to this criterion. The final 
sample size was n = 69. Alpha was set to .05 for all analyses.  
 
Judgment. Recency effects were observed for the pleasantness ratings: End 
stories (M = 39.9, SD = 14.6) were rated as more unpleasant than Middle (M = 
                                                
27
 As in Experiments 8 and 9, this second memory task was simply used to validate the 
descriptions typed in by participants; no analyses were run on the selection task only  
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43.6, SD = 14.8) and Start stories (M = 45.0, SD = 15.5). As in the previous three 
Experiments, the Control lists were rated as the most pleasant story type (M = 
64.2, SD = 17.0).  
A repeated-measures one-way ANOVA revealed that the main effect of 
Story type (Start, Middle, End, and Control) was significant, F(3, 204) = 87.6, p 
< .001, p2 = .56. Planned comparisons revealed once more that the Control 
stories were rated as the most pleasant (all ps < .001). End stories were rated as 
less pleasant than Start (t(68) = 4.5, p < .001, d = .54) and Middle stories (t(68) = 
3.6, p < .001, d = .43); the difference in pleasantness ratings between Start and 
Middle stories approached significance, t(68) = 1.4, p = .08. Figure 4.6 below 
summarises these findings.  
As for the previous two Experiments, no significant difference were 
noted between the three different versions of the Control lists, F(2, 66) = 1.4, p > 
.23.  
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Figure 4.6 Mean pleasantness ratings as a function of story type. Error bars 
indicate SEM (Exp.10) 
 
Memory.28 Figure 4.7 represents the mean recall proportion as a function of event 
position and valence. Negative events (M = .69, SD = .31) were better recalled 
than the neutral ones (M = .32, SD = .23) – this memory advantage being evident 
across presentation positions. Memory performance for the negative events 
decreased linearly across presentation positions: Negative events presented in 
last position (M = .77, SD = .31) were better remembered than those presented in 
middle positions (M = .69, SD = .30), which in turn were recalled more 
frequently than the negative events presented at the beginning of the stories (M = 
.61, SD = .33).  
                                                
28
 As in the previous two Experiments, the data for Neutral events will refer to the narratives 
matched for familiarity with the Negative events 
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 A 2 (Valence: negative vs. neutral) × 3 (Position: Start, Middle, and End) 
repeated measures ANOVA confirmed these observations. The analysis revealed 
significant main effects of Position (F(2, 136) = 32.7, p < .001, p2 = .33) and 
Valence (F(1, 68) = 94.6, p < .001, p2 = .58). The interaction between Valence 
and Position was significant, too (F(2, 136) = 9.7, p < .001, p2 = .13). Follow-up 
analyses revealed different recall patterns for negative and neutral events: For the 
former Middle events were better remembered than Start events (t(68) = 2.1, p < 
.05, d = .26), while this was not true for neutral events, t(68) = 0.7, ns.  
Most importantly, negative End events were better remembered than 
Middle (t(68) = 2.2, p < .05, d = .28) and Start negative events (t(68) = 4.1, p < 
.001, d = .49). 
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Figure 4.7 Mean recall proportion as a function of event position and valence. 
Error bars indicate SEM (Exp.10) 
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Memory-Judgment relationships. As for Experiment 9, analyses were run on 
corrected judgment scores (J’), which represented how much more unpleasant 
was each story which contained a negative event (Start, Middle, and End) 
compared to the Control stories. J’ scores were again averaged for each 
participant, according to the negative event presentation position and whether the 
negative event presented in the story was recalled or not29,30.  
As in Experiment 9, when the negative event was recalled in the memory 
task, pleasantness ratings for the story as a whole were lower (M = -23.5, SD = 
17.2) than when it was not recalled (M = -14.7, SD = 14.6).  Moreover, this 
relationship between memory and judgment was relatively constant across story 
types. Table 4.3 below summarises these findings.  
 
Table 4.3 Mean corrected pleasantness ratings (J') as a function of story type and 
the negative event being recalled or not (Exp.10) 
  Story type 
  Start Middle End 
Was the negative  
event recalled?  
    
No M -14.6 -19.1 -20.3 
 SD (15.4) (15.8) (16.0) 
Yes M -22.8 -22.7 -24.6 
 SD (18.3) (17.8) (17.9) 
 
                                                
29
 This analysis yielded a total of 32.1% missing values, which were missing completely at 
random as the MRC Little’s Test was not significant, 2 (73) = 7.6,  p > .55. Missing values were 
replaced once again via mean by subject substitution  
30
 As the missing values represented a large amount of cases (32.1%) correlational analyses were 
run as for Experiments 9 in order to confirm the association between memory and judgment 
measures. The negative event recall proportion correlated significantly with the average 
pleasantness ratings (r = -.40, p < .001 for Start lists; r = -.52, p < .001 for Middle lists; r = -.21, 
p < .05 for End lists) 
- 181 - 
A 2 × 3 within-subjects ANOVA was run with Memory (Negative event 
recalled Vs. not recalled) and Story type (Start, Middle, and End) as the factors. 
The significant main effect of Memory confirmed the association between 
memory and judgment measures, F(1, 68) = 30.0, p < .001, p2 = .31. The 
relationship between memory and judgment was observed regardless of 
presentation position, as the Story type by Memory interaction only approached 
significance (F(1.7, 116.9) = 3.4, p = .07)31.  
Finally the effects of accessibility (e.g., Schwarz, 1995; Schwarz & 
Vaughn, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) of negative events on summary 
assessments were tested. In order to do so, pleasantness ratings were analysed 
depending on the negative narrative output position (see Table 4.4) – whether it 
was recalled as first or second response32.  
 
Table 4.4 Mean corrected pleasantness ratings (J') as a function of negative event 
recall output position (Exp.10) 
  Negative event  recall output position 
  Not recalled 
 
Recalled as 
first response 
 
Recalled as 
second response 
 
Pleasantness 
ratings (J’) 
M -14.7 -24.6 -20.9 
 SD (14.6) (17.6) (17.5) 
 
As expected, judgments were more unpleasant when the negative event 
was recalled as the first response (M = -24.6, SD = 17.6) as compared to when it 
was recalled as the second response (M = -20.9, SD = 17.5). Judgments were 
                                                
31
 Degrees of freedom were adjusted according to the Greenhouse-Geisser correction as the 
assumption of Sphericity was not met. Moreover, follow up analyses revealed that pleasantness 
ratings were lower when the negative event was recalled compared to when it was not recalled, 
regardless of its presentation position (all ps < .001) 
32
 This analysis yielded a total of 8.2% missing values, which were once again imputed via mean 
by subject substitution  
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clearly most pleasant when participants did not recall the negative event at all (M 
= -14.7, SD = 14.6).  
A one-way ANOVA was run and revealed a significant main effect of 
negative event output position, F(2, 136) = 18.7, p < .001, p2 = .22. Planned 
comparisons confirmed that negative events recalled as first response were 
associated with more unpleasant ratings that those recalled as second response 
t(68) = 3.1, p < .01, d = .59. Obviously, the situations which attracted the most 
pleasant ratings were those when the negative event was not recalled (both ps < 
.001). 
The results for the present Experiment showed that, when measures are 
taken to align the information accessed in both memory and judgment tasks, 
clear associations between recall and judgment measures can be observed. The 
results for retrospective evaluations produced the same pattern observed in the 
previous three experiments: the later in the story a negative event was presented, 
the larger its impact on pleasantness ratings. It seems that participants “look 
back” at the just-presented story and they are influenced by the mostly presented 
events.  
As in Experiment 9, the memory results mirrored those obtained for 
judgment. Negative events, which were arguably most distinctive within the 
stories, were better remembered than neutral items – and this was true across 
presentation positions. More importantly, memory performance for the negative 
events increased along presentation positions: the later a negative event 
happened within the story, the more likely that it was remembered.  
The correlational analyses confirmed that memory and judgment 
measures were associated. First, as predicted by the availability principle (i.e. 
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availability as content of recall; cf. Schwarz & Vaughn, 2002), stories for which 
the negative event was recalled were rated as more unpleasant than those stories 
for which it was not recalled. Secondly, accessibility (i.e. availability as ease of 
recall; cf. Schwarz & Vaughn, 2002) moderated the impact of the negative event 
on summary assessments: the most unpleasant ratings were provided when the 
negative event was recalled as the first response – that is, when it was most 
easily accessible in memory.  
 
4.6. General Discussion 
The general objective of the present series of studies was to test a 
memory-based approach to retrospective evaluations with stimuli other than lists 
of words. The results described in the experiments reported in Chapters 2 and 3 
highlighted that memory may bias retrospective evaluations through two 
different dynamics (i.e. heuristics). First, judgments seemed to be based on the 
content of recall (cf. Schwarz & Vaughn, 2002): lists where the negative word 
was recalled at the memory stage were rated as more unpleasant than those 
where it was not recalled. Second, the influence of a negative item on summary 
assessment was moderated by its accessibility (i.e. its ease of recall; cf. Schwarz 
& Vaughn, 2002; Tversky & Kahneman, 1973); the easier it was to access in 
memory the negative item, the larger its impact on retrospective evaluations. The 
same results were obtained with short stories told through slideshows, which 
arguably represent more cohesive and ecologically valid stimuli than lists of 
semantically unrelated words. In doing so, we ruled out the possibility that the 
stimuli non-cohesiveness (i.e. being low in entitativity; cf. Campbell, 1958, cited 
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in McConnell et al., 1997) was the main reason for the memory–judgment 
relationships observed in Chapters 2 and 3.  
However, as for the experiments using word lists, the hypothesis that  on-
line judgments (i.e. the impression formed while experiencing the stimuli; e.g., 
Hastie & Park, 1986) also influence summary assessments cannot be eliminated. 
Stories where the negative event was not recalled were still rated as more 
unpleasant than Control stories, where no negative event was presented at all (by 
12.5 units on average in Experiment 9 and 14.7 units in Experiment 10). A 
potential explanation of this finding invokes both on-line and memory-based 
processes (see also Chapter 2). When providing summary assessments, 
participants formed an on-line impression of the story while it was being told; 
when prompted with the rating task, participants may have adjusted this 
impression depending on the events that were most easily available in memory. 
The present series of studies highlighted two important and novel 
findings. First, it was shown how summary assessments for slideshow stories 
produce different patterns compared to lists of words – when the same type of 
position manipulation was implemented. For word lists, a negative stimulus 
presented in the first or last positions affected pleasantness ratings to a greater 
extent than a negative item presented in the middle positions. That is, both 
primacy and recency effects were observed for retrospective evaluations. On the 
other hand, only recency effects were observed for story pleasantness ratings.  
A simple memory-based approach to bias in summary assessments can 
accommodate these findings. The summary assessments were predicted by the 
memory participants exhibited about the negative and distinctive stimulus 
inserted within the series. Both primacy and recency effects were observed for 
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memory for negative words (Experiments 2 and 3) while only recency effects 
were found for slideshow stories (Experiments 9 and 10). Correlational analyses 
provided findings which are in accordance with the availability heuristic 
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973), according to which retrieval may be the most 
likely process that bias retrospective judgments. 
Another important observation that can be drawn on the basis of the 
evidence collected in this Chapter is that the way memory is tested may have a 
large repercussion on the memory–judgment relationships. The extent to which 
recall tasks cue the same information that participants called to mind when 
providing the judgments may prove to be a key factor in the study of memory 
and judgment associations (see also Moser, 1992; Shedler & Manis, 1986). In 
Experiment 8 participants were asked to assess the pleasantness of the stories– 
which arguably was determined by the pleasantness of the events that formed 
them – but were asked to describe the two pictures that come to mind most 
easily. As the two tasks tapped into different representations of the just-seen 
stories, different memory and judgment patterns were observed. On the other 
hand, when during the memory tasks participants were asked to recall the 
information upon which they most likely formed their judgments, clear 
associations between memory and judgment measures were observed 
(Experiments 9 and 10).  
In conclusion, it was shown that distinctive moments within a story 
impact retrospective judgments in a way that is predicted by a memory-based 
approach to biases in summary assessments. The reported results provide 
compelling evidence in favour of a viewpoint where remembered episodic 
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information has a biasing effect on judgment in hindsight even for slideshow 
stories. 
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5.1. Summary of empirical work  
 
5.1.1. Why are people biased when evaluating the past? 
Review of rationale and aims 
The aim of the present work was to investigate some of the cognitive 
processes underlying judgment biases in retrospective evaluations. Retrospective 
evaluations are simply summary assessments provided in hindsight. 
Understanding how evaluations of the past are generated is of import as they 
often constitute the basis of future decisions: How an experience is evaluated 
affects the decision to repeat (or not repeat) the experience itself or recommend it 
to others (e.g., Kahneman, 2000a; 2000b). Previous research has shown that 
when people retrospectively assess life events, they are heavily influenced by 
specific moments within the episode. For instance, the “Peak-End” rule states 
that the most intense (the “Peak”) and the last moments of an event (the “End”) 
are the best predictors of global assessments, while more holistic features (e.g., 
event duration and its average quality) are neglected (Fredrickson & Kahneman, 
1993). Strikingly, while these judgment biases have been widely documented 
(e.g., Ariely & Carmon, 2000), a comprehensive cognitive account of why these 
biases arise is somehow missing.   
In the present thesis, it was hypothesised that memory may play an 
important role in biasing retrospective evaluations. It was argued that, as 
memorability of items increases when they are distinctive (e.g., Hunt, 2006), so 
the most intense moments of an episode are more readily available in memory. 
The increased memorability of these moments would in turn affect retrospective 
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judgments – as they would be overweighed in the judgments of the episode as a 
whole. While covering research areas such as social cognition (e.g., Hogarth & 
Einhorn, 1992) and behavioural decision making (e.g., Ariely, 1998), the present 
work addressed the broader debate surrounding the relationships between 
memory and judgment (e.g., Hastie & Park, 1986). On the one hand, 
Independence models (e.g., Anderson, 1989) claim that judgments are formed 
on-line, while the event is being experienced; thus, retrospective evaluations do 
not depend on the information about the event people hold in memory. On the 
other hand, several empirical findings have suggested that judgment depends, at 
least in part, on memory processes (e.g., Schwarz, 1998; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973).  
 
Chapter 2: The role of memory in retrospective evaluations 
An experimental paradigm was devised in order to contrast the 
predictions of different approaches to judgment bias in retrospective evaluations, 
including the “Peak-End rule” (Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1993), the “Belief-
Adjustment” model (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992), and the “Value-Account” 
(Betsch, Plessner, Schwieren, & Gütig, 2001). The contribution of memory 
processes to these biases was investigated in a controlled and systematic way – 
while using a range of memory measures. The results showed that the impact of a 
negative item on the pleasantness ratings of word lists was largely influenced by 
its presentation position. As expected on the basis of primacy and recency effects 
in memory for this type of stimuli (e.g., Murdock, 1962), the most unpleasant 
lists were the ones where the negative word was presented either at the beginning 
or at the end. Further analyses supported the association between memory and 
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judgment measures. For instance, the ease with which a negative word was 
retrieved from memory (accessibility; Schwarz, 1998; Schwarz & Vaughn, 2002; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) was a predictor of its negative impact on 
retrospective assessments; the most unpleasant ratings were provided in those 
situations when the negative item was most easily recalled.  
Also, the results from Experiments 2 and 3 provided some insight into the 
influence of memory task demands on the relationships between memory and 
retrospective judgment. The results suggested that a challenging memory task, 
where participants were asked to recall as much information as they could, 
weakened the relationships between memory and retrospective judgment. On the 
other hand, the clearest correlations between memory and judgment measures 
were observed with a novel task, which was introduced to lower the memory task 
demands.  
 
Chapter 3: The effects of manipulating accessibility 
As in Chapter 2 there was some clear evidence of an association between 
memory and judgment measures, Chapter 3 was attempted to investigate the 
nature of the relationship further. The experiments run in Chapter 3 offered a 
stricter test of a memory-based approach to retrospective judgment. Relying on 
well-established memory phenomena, memory of the to-be-assessed episode was 
manipulated and judgment predicted a priori. For instance, in Experiment 5, 
negative items which were preceded and followed by a temporal interval were 
better recalled than non-isolated negative words (temporal isolation effect; 
Brown, Neath, & Chater, 2007). Accordingly, pleasantness ratings for the lists 
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including the former type of distinctive items were lower than for the lists where 
the negative item was not isolated.  
Furthermore, a very important methodological issue was addressed. As in 
most of the studies which investigated memory–judgment relationships (see 
Hastie & Park, 1986 for a review), a dual task paradigm was used: participants 
had to both assess and remember the materials they were presented with. It can 
be argued that when the memory task precedes the judgment task, correlations 
between memory and judgment might be inflated because participants are 
artificially induced to rely on their memory outputs in order to provide summary 
assessments (e.g., Schwarz, Strack, & Mai, 1991). For this reason, it was decided 
to present participants with the opposite task order. However, when the memory 
task follows the judgment task, the observed correlations between memory and 
judgment might be inflated as well; after all, participants might be accessing the 
to-be-assessed information from memory at the time they provide the judgment 
simply because they know they have to perform a memory task subsequently. 
Experiment 6 ruled out this possibility, as availability and accessibility biases 
were observed even when participants were presented with a surprise memory 
task. 
 
Chapter 4: Retrospective evaluations of stories  
Chapter 4 asked whether the above findings could be replicated with 
different stimuli. Participants attended to and evaluated short stories told through 
slideshows, which arguably represent more ecologically valid and cohesive 
episodes than lists of semantically unrelated words. Moreover, it was more likely 
that participants could develop a representation of the episode based on “gist” 
- 192 - 
(e.g., Brainerd & Reyna, 1992). Biases in retrospective evaluations were 
different from those observed in Chapters 2 and 3 – but were mostly accounted 
for by a memory-based approach. The most unpleasant stories were those that 
ended with a negative event, which was more readily available in memory than 
negative events happening at any other point during the story.  
Chapter 4 also provided some insight into the nature of the representation 
accessed in memory in order to provide summary assessments. It was suggested 
that the alignment between the information cued by the judgment and memory 
task is important. When the memory and the judgment tasks cued different 
features of the episode, no associations between memory and judgment were 
observed (Experiment 8). When the recall task tapped more into the content that 
was likely to be called to mind – at least according to a memory-based approach 
– in order to provide the evaluations, memory–judgment correlations were again 
observed (Experiments 9 and 10).  
 
Conclusions 
The present thesis focused on the biases in retrospective evaluations and 
sought to empirically address the question of why these biases arise. The results 
suggest that memory processes may be at the base of the overweighing of 
specific moments when retrospectively assessing an experience.  
 
5.2. A memory-based approach 
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Considerations about the retrospective judgment patterns  
While both primacy and recency effects were observed for pleasantness 
ratings of lists of words, recency effects only were observed for assessments of 
slideshow stories. Despite the fact that the position of a negative and distinctive 
stimulus was manipulated in the same manner for lists of words (Chapter 2) and 
slideshow stories (Chapter 4), its effects on summary assessments differed. Lists 
of words which included a negative item either in first or last positions were 
more unpleasant than those lists where the negative item was presented in the 
middle positions (i.e., primacy and recency effects). On the other hand, when a 
negative event was inserted within a short story told through slideshows, it 
affected retrospective judgment the most when it was presented at the end 
(recency effects).  
This observation has implications for previous accounts of retrospective 
evaluations. According to the “Peak-End” rule (Fredrickson & Kahneman, 
1993), retrospective evaluations are best predicted by an average of the quality 
experienced during the most intense moment of the episode (the “Peak”) and its 
final moments (the “End”). As such, this general formulation of the “Peak-End” 
rule could explain the results observed for slideshow stories. When a negative 
event (the “Peak”) was presented at the end of a story, its effects on judgment 
were the largest – “Peak” and “End” coincided. For lists of words, the 
consistently observed primacy effects in retrospective judgments cannot be 
predicted by the “Peak-End” rule. The negative word inserted in the to-be-
assessed lists is the most likely candidate for the “Peak” or more distinctive item. 
From the perspective of the “Peak-End” rule, there is no reason to expect an 
increased weight in the summary assessment when the negative item is presented 
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in first position. It follows that, based on the Peak-End rule, the pleasantness 
ratings for those lists where the “Peak” was presented in the first position should 
be similar to the ratings observed when the negative item was in the middle 
positions. It is acknowledged here that typical “Peak-End” effects have been 
observed mostly with experiential and continuous stimuli like mechanical 
pressure (Ariely, 1998) and movie clips (Fredrickson & Kahneman, 1973) – 
contrary to the discrete nature of the stimuli used in the present work33. 
Furthermore, recent evidence has shown that segmentation can lessen the biases 
predicted by the “Peak-End” rule (e.g., Ariely & Zauberman, 2000; 2003). 
Nonetheless, it is important to notice that both lists of words and slideshows 
were presented to participants in a discrete manner, as both items and slides were 
separated by a temporal gap. Arguably then, what differed between the two types 
of stimuli was not their discrete nature per se, but the cohesiveness of the 
representation called in mind in order to evaluate the events.  
The present series of findings cannot be accommodated by the “Value-
Account” (Betsch et al., 2001). According to this summative approach to 
retrospective judgments, what matters the most is the amount of negative and 
positive information within a to-be-assessed sequence – no specific hypotheses 
are put forward relative to the position of such information.  
In the “Belief-Adjustment” model (Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992), the type of 
bias observed in retrospective judgments depends on how the to-be-assessed 
information is mentally processed. In Step-by-Step processing, the judgment of 
the series is adjusted after each piece of information; thus, recency effects are 
predicted, as the last encountered information is weighed as much as all the 
                                                
33
 However, recent evidence has highlighted “Peak-End” effects also for stimuli which were 
discrete, semantic and relative short in nature (e.g., Do et al., 2008; Langer et al., 2005) 
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aggregated information that preceded it. Instead, End-of-Sequence processing 
involves one single adjustment, where the initial impression is integrated with all 
the succeeding information; this leads to primacy effects in retrospective 
judgment. The type of processing used depends both on stimuli-related features – 
like their length and complexity – and the familiarity with the task. As neither 
changed substantially between trials, it could be argued that the “Belief-
Adjustment” model would have predicted either primacy or recency effects for 
the current paradigm.  
 
The association between memory and judgment measures  
The evidence presented in this thesis supports theories and approaches 
which include memory processes amongst the cognitive precursors of judgment 
biases (e.g., Dougherty, Gettys, & Ogden, 1999; Schwarz, Bless, Wanke, & 
Winkielman, 2003; Stewart, Chater, & Brown, 2006; Tversky & Kahneman, 
1973; Weber & Johnson, 2006). Despite some experimental dissociations 
between memory and judgment (e.g., Experiment 4), most of the studies reported 
seem in favour of an association between them.   
Generally, pleasantness ratings were lower in those situations in which 
the negative and distinctive stimulus (either a word or an event) was recalled in 
the memory component of the task – as compared to when it was not recalled. 
This finding seem to support the influence of availability, and the claim that 
judgments were based on what comes to mind (e.g., Higgins, 1996; Reyes et al., 
1980).  
Moreover, the most unpleasant ratings were observed when the negative 
word (or event) was most easily recalled – if output order is considered an 
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acceptable indicator of ease of recall. Thus, it also seemed that accessibility, 
operationalised as ease of retrieval, moderated retrospective judgments.  
It could be argued that during all the experiments described in the present 
thesis participants could form on-line judgment (e.g., Anderson, 1996; Anderson 
& Hubert, 1963; Hastie & Park, 1986); that is, they could evaluate the stimuli as 
they were presented to them. According to the “Independence models” (cf. 
Hastie & Park, 1986), this situation should have led to dissociations between 
memory and judgment measures most of the time. After all, from this 
perspective, participants simply had to rely on the impression of the stimuli they 
formed while attending to them – retrieving information about the episodes was 
not necessary in order to evaluate them in hindsight. While the role of on-line 
judgment cannot be completely ruled out – and it will be addressed below – the 
observed associations between memory and judgment seem to go against the 
predictions of Independence models.  
The present thesis also showed that it is possible to predict retrospective 
evaluations on the basis of memory. The memorability of distinctive moments 
within an episode was manipulated, through serial position (Experiments 1, 2, 
and 3) and isolation effects (Experiment 5). As a consequence, the impact of 
those moments on summary assessments was affected: Their effect was greatest 
when they were most easily available in memory. These results are of a certain 
importance as, to our knowledge, few studies in the literature tested a priori 
hypotheses on retrospective evaluations depending on the memory manipulation 
that was implemented (e.g., Gabrielcick & Fazio, 1984; Lewandowsky & Smith, 
1983). Moreover, the few that did so mainly involved frequency judgments, 
whose underlying cognitive processes, as discussed in Chapter 1, may differ 
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substantially from those underpinning quality judgments (i.e., estimation tasks; 
cf. Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992; p. 9).  
Overall, the retrospective evaluations participants provided closely 
mirrored their memory of the to-be-assessed stimuli. Primacy and recency effects 
were observed for the recall of negative words – and primacy and recency effects 
were observed for the pleasantness ratings of lists of words. In Chapter 4, 
recency effects only were observed for both the recall of negative events and the 
pleasantness ratings for those stories which encompassed them. Thus, the 
observed biases in retrospective evaluations can be accounted for by the biases 
observed for the recall of the negative stimulus within the to-be-assessed 
episode. 
Why did the memory biases differ depending on the stimuli used? One 
explanation may lie in the effects of rehearsal. Arguably, participants may have 
engaged more readily in some rehearsal when presented with word lists – as 
compared to when they attended to short slideshows. In turn, the primacy effects 
observed in Chapter 2 may have been due to the larger number of rehearsals for 
the early items presented, as compared to later items. Empirical evidence has 
indeed suggested that the probability of recalling early items can be influenced 
by the number of rehearsals they receive, which are usually more numerous than 
for later items (Rundus, 1971; cited in Tan & Ward, 2000). On the other hand, 
slideshow stories included more complex stimuli, where each event was 
described in a multi-modal manner, through a picture and a description which 
was both typed and spoken. Moreover, slideshows represented more cohesive 
experiences than lists of words, as for the former it was undoubtedly easier for 
participants to form a gist (Brainerd & Reyna, 1992). Combined, these features 
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may induced participants to rehearse the events in the stories to a lesser extent – 
or not at all; as a consequence, when “looking back” at the just-attended story, its 
events were more readily available in memory the later they happened – which 
resulted in the observed recency effects and very little primacy.   
 
Factors that moderate the memory–judgment relationships 
The data of the present thesis have provided some further interesting 
findings about the relationships between memory and judgment. In Chapter 2, 
the clearest associations between memory and judgment measures were observed 
when the memory task was the least exacting. A memory task was devised and 
involved participants having to recall the two items that came to mind most 
readily, and any other item they may remembered subsequently. The major 
difference with a free recall task is that in the latter participants are asked to 
recall as many items as they can remember – which undoubtedly places greater 
demands on participants. Thus, it appears that the cognitive demands associated 
with the memory task can affect the correlations between memory and judgment. 
These findings are in the line with previous research which highlighted how 
people seem reluctant to consult all the information they retain about a stimulus 
in order to judge it; in fact, it seems that they stop their search in memory rather 
early, as soon as some degree of subjective certainty is achieved (Schwarz & 
Vaughn, 2002; see also Higgins, 1996). Similarly, Kitayama and Burnstein 
(1989) have argued that typical recall tasks, which require participants to 
perform an exhaustive search in memory, can hinder the underlying associations 
between memory and judgment. As people seem to base their evaluations on 
partial information – on the elements they can retrieve and that are most easily 
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accessible – it is perhaps not surprising that previous research which used 
standard and demanding memory tasks struggled to find correlations between 
memory and judgment measures (e.g., Anderson & Hubert, 1963; Hastie & Park, 
1986; Shedler & Manis, 1986). 
In line with the above, it is suggested that the way memory is tested can 
largely determine whether memory and judgment measures will be associated 
(see also Moser, 1992). More specifically, the underlying relationship between 
memory and judgment is most likely to be detected when the memory task cues 
the same information as that which the judgment was most likely to be based 
upon. On the other hand, when retrospective evaluations are obtained in one 
context and memory for the materials is assessed in a different manner, the above 
correlations may be hindered. For instance, in Experiment 8, where participants 
were asked to rate the pleasantness of the stories but were asked to remember the 
pictures that most readily came to mind, memory and judgment measures were 
not associated. On the other hand, when participants were asked to rate the 
stories and then to retrieve the two moments that most readily came to mind, 
correlations between memory and judgment were observed again (Experiment 
10).  
It can be concluded that, in order to thoroughly assess the role memory 
plays in biasing retrospective evaluations, care has to be taken to cue the 
appropriate information at the time memory is probed; the memory test has to 
adequately reflect the what was relied upon at the time of judgment.  
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Could  memory–judgment associations be judgment-driven?  
A few theoretical approaches hold that the correlations between memory 
and judgment measures are a result of the influence of evaluative processes on 
memory. Here are a few illustrations of this idea. The “Incongruent-based 
encoding” hypothesis (Hastie, 1984; see also the “Biased encoding” account; 
Alba & Hasher, 1983) proposes that judgment processes bias memory during the 
encoding phase. Information that is incongruent with an initial judgment (i.e., a 
sort of “first impression” of the to-be-evaluated stimuli) is better remembered 
than congruent information. In a study by Hastie and Kumar (1979), participants 
were presented with behaviour descriptions about a hypothetical character; later, 
they were asked to judge her personality. During a following memory test phase, 
the behaviours that were incongruent with the personality appraisal were better 
remembered. The authors argued that incongruent behaviours received special 
processing during the encoding phase, which led to their observed memory 
advantage. The “Biased retrieval” hypothesis (Leamer, 1974), despite predicting 
the bias to happen at a different memory stage, still holds that it is judgment 
which causes memory, and not the other way around.  
One of the main findings of Chapter 3 seems to rule out the above 
described judgment-driven view, at least for the present experimental paradigm 
and stimuli. In Experiment 5, lists which included isolated negative items were 
rated as more unpleasant than those where the negative words were not isolated. 
It was argued that, by isolating the negative items, their memorability increased; 
as a consequence, the effects of negative items on the pleasantness ratings were 
larger. The opposite argument – which would explain the increased memorability 
of isolated items on the basis of the decreased pleasantness of the lists which 
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included them – seems to struggle more to account for the following finding. The 
decrease in pleasantness ratings for lists which included an isolated negative item 
was observed only when the negative words were recalled. When a negative item 
was not recalled, its isolation did not moderate retrospective judgments, as these 
were relatively low regardless of isolation. 
 
Relevance to models of judgment and decision making 
The present findings are also relevant to recent models which relate 
memory and judgment processes in order to explain decision-making phenomena 
(e.g., Dougherty et al., 1999; Stewart et al., 2006). In their Decision-by-Sampling 
(hereafter DbS) model, Stewart and colleagues (2006) propose that, when facing 
a choice, people retrieve from memory instances similar to those at hand (i.e., the 
decision sample). To make a decision, people rank the present option within the 
decision sample; the outcome of this comparison will determine the subjective 
value of the to-be-evaluated stimulus. A direct implication of DbS is that the size 
of the retrieved decision sample can affect judgments and choices. Working 
memory, which in this case determines how large the decision sample retrieved 
is, plays a central role in moderating the extent to which specific decision-
making biases are observed. For instance, temporal discounting, i.e. preferring 
smaller gains because they are nearer in time, is greater when higher demands 
are placed on working memory (Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2003). Also, 
Dougherty and Hunter (2003a; 2003b) showed that people with higher memory 
spans displayed less subadditivity bias in probability judgments; that is, they 
were less likely to judge the probability of a whole to be smaller than the 
probability of its components. However, recent evidence has suggested that 
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individual differences in working memory capacity might not be sufficient to 
explain the wide array of decision-making biases (e.g., framing effects and 
overconfidence bias; Bruza, Welsh, & Navarro, 2008).  
In light of the findings of the present thesis, it could be suggested that 
incorporating the notion of accessibility into DbS may improve its predictive 
power. Simply put, when making a decision, it is not only what people retrieve 
from memory (and its associated probability of being retrieved; Stewart et al., 
2006) that matters; it is also important how easily each bit of information in the 
decision sample is recollected. Indeed, even people with greater working 
memory spans who retrieve larger decision samples, are biased in their decisions 
to some extent, possibly because they overweigh the information which they 
retrieved most easily. Previous research has shown that people tend to base their 
judgments on the subset of information that comes to mind most readily (e.g., 
Bodenhausen & Wyer, 1987; Higgins, 1996). Some results of the present thesis 
seem to indicate that, even within this subset, people do not equally weigh the 
information; rather, they seem less influenced by this information as its ease of 
retrieval decreases.  
 
On-line anchoring and memory-driven adjustment 
A consistent result of Chapters 2 and 3 was that pleasantness ratings were 
lower for those lists where the negative item was presented but not recalled – as 
compared to those lists where no negative words were presented at all (the 
“Control” lists). This was also so for the slideshow stories in Chapter 4.  
These results do not allow us to discard the role of one of the theoretical 
pillars of “Independence” models, i.e. on-line judgment (e.g., Anderson, 1989; 
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Betsch et al., 2001). Simply put, it can be argued that participants adjusted their 
pleasantness ratings after each word (or slide) was encountered. As soon as a 
negative word was processed, it decreased the (on-line) pleasantness rating; 
consequently, it did not matter whether the negative item was available at the 
time the retrospective evaluation task was prompted – and for that matter, during 
the memory task, either. Indeed, in the present thesis, none of the results can 
preclude the possibility that participants did not form an impression of the 
episode as they were attending to it. 
Despite the above compelling argument, two alternative explanations are 
considered here. First, it could be that at the time of retrospective judgment, the 
negative item was available. However, at the point of recall, in the memory task, 
that item was no longer accessible. This would imply that the negative item had 
an impact on the judgment, but was nevertheless not retrieved during the 
memory component of the task. Situational factors may have led to this 
dissociation; for instance, output interference could have hindered the likelihood 
of recalling the negative item within the memory task more on some trials than 
others (Nairne, 1990).  
A second explanation would combine on-line and memory-driven 
processing. Retrospective evaluations can be the result of an on-line impression 
and the adjustment that follows when a summary assessment is produced. This 
adjustment would be driven by the information about the just-experienced event 
that comes to mind most readily. The latter phase would serve as a form of 
“verification” of the on-line impression. This “hybrid” approach would go some 
way towards explaining the findings of the present thesis. First, it could explain 
why a negative stimulus affected retrospective evaluations even when it was not 
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recalled. That is, people evaluate episodes as they experience them. Second, it 
could explain the set of results that consistently indicated associations between 
memory and judgment.  
 
5.3. Future research  
 
Suggestions for future research 
Because of the dual nature of the task and the time lag between the 
judgment and memory tasks, the representation of the stimuli accessed at the 
time of the two tasks may have differed. This inconsistency – despite the 
attempts to minimise it – may have slightly altered the overall picture of the 
relationships between memory and judgment. The following scenario (previously 
described) represents an example. A negative item is retrieved from memory at 
the time of judgment and it causes a decrease in the pleasantness rating of the list 
which included it. However, because of one of many possible factors (e.g., 
output interference; Nairne, 1990) the same item is not retrieved at the later 
recall stage. This may have resulted in lists, whose negative item was not 
recalled, to be rated as more unpleasant than lists which contained no negative 
item. In order to test this hypothesis, a follow-up memory task could be 
administered after a conventional recall task. This memory task would call upon 
implicit recognition measures and it would allow us to ascertain with a higher 
degree of certainty whether a non-recalled negative item was available at the 
time of judgment. 
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Further studies could be run in order to validate the conclusion that 
judgment biases can be predicted a priori on the basis of memory manipulations. 
The double manipulation used in Experiment 5, involving a distinctive colour 
and temporal isolation, was, after all, rather manifest. A further and more subtle 
experimental manipulation would be to control the delay between stimulus 
presentations and evaluations – and to predict judgments according to well-
known memory phenomena associated to differential delays (see Neath & 
Surprenant, 2003). As an alternative, a more ecologically valid and less overt 
memory manipulation is priming, which could be applied to slideshow stories. 
For example, before viewing the slideshow stories, participants could be 
presented with a word-stem completion task, during which some target words 
would be primed. Then, participants would be presented with two types of 
slideshow stories, equated for unpleasantness on the basis of normative databases 
(e.g., Bradley & Lang, 1999; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999). The first type of 
slideshow would include events where a central word has been previously 
primed; the other slideshows would still include a negative event, but none of its 
items were previously primed. It is predicted that the former type of slideshows, 
despite being normatively equally unpleasant, will be rated as the most 
unpleasant because of the increased accessibility of its negative event.  
 
5.4. Conclusion 
 
Biases in retrospective evaluations are observed when the to-be-evaluated 
information is presented sequentially or the to-be-assessed event unfolds over 
time. Thus, their occurrence ranges across several domains, including consumer 
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behaviour (Russo, Meloy, & Medvec, 1998), economics (Langer et al., 2005) and 
medical procedures (e.g., Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996). Previous research has 
established that specific moments within an experience are overweighed in the 
summary assessment people provide in hindsight (e.g., Fredrickson & 
Kahneman, 1993; Hogarth & Einhorn, 1992).  
The present thesis has drawn on the memory literature in order to 
approach the question of why specific moments determine summary assessments. 
The findings suggest that, when assessing an event in retrospect, the memory of 
the event is accessed and what is retrieved impacts the judgment in hindsight. In 
addition, it was also shown that the ease with which information is brought to 
mind moderates its impact on retrospective evaluations of affective episodes – in 
line with what has been reported for frequency judgments (e.g., Schwarz, 1998; 
Tversky & Kahneman, 1973). Finally, the results suggest that judgments in 
hindsight can be manipulated. By hindering the memorability of negative 
information it was possible to reduce its impact on retrospective assessments. 
These results are at odds with the predictions of “Independence” theories (e.g., 
the “Value-Account”, Betsch et al., 2001) which argue that retrospective 
evaluations are solely based on on-line judgments. Although it is likely that 
people form on-line evaluations as events unfold – especially if they are 
forewarned of the upcoming assessment task – the results reported in this thesis 
strongly suggest that the most memorable moments of the episode are brought to 
mind at the time of the judgement and either determine the judgment or 
significantly bias it.  
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Appendices 
 
 
 
Appendix I – Screenshot samples 
 
 
 
Figure A.1.1. Rating screen, after one participant had initially clicked at the mid-
point of the scale (Experiment 2) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.1.2. One slide from story no. 6 being displayed (Experiments 7–10)  
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Appendix II – Materials  
Table A.2.1. The 42 lists of words used in Experiment 5.34 The asterisks (*) 
indicate the negative items.  
 
List no. Word VAL ARO FAM KFFRQ NPHN 
1 ulcer* 1.8 6.1 423 5 4 
 dove 6.9 3.8 415 4 3 
 swamp 5.1 4.9 438 5 5 
 statue 5.2 3.5 444 17 6 
 garment 6.1 4.5 440 6 6 
 sphere 5.3 3.9 457 22 3 
 nursery 5.7 4.0 461 13 5 
2 deceit* 2.9 5.7 440 2 5 
 rattle 5.0 4.4 448 5 4 
 hairpin 5.3 3.3 441 1 5 
 errand 4.6 3.9 441 7 5 
 lantern 5.6 4.1 441 13 6 
 context 5.2 4.2 460 35 8 
 foam 6.1 5.3 462 37 3 
3 assault* 2.0 7.5 470 15 5 
 patent 5.3 3.5 426 35 6 
 cabinet 5.1 3.4 472 17 7 
 fabric 5.3 4.1 477 15 6 
 alien 5.6 4.9 479 16 5 
 tower 5.5 4.0 463 13 3 
 saint 6.5 4.5 463 16 4 
4 devil* 2.2 6.1 474 25 4 
 silk 6.9 3.7 482 12 4 
 cliff 4.7 6.3 479 11 4 
 vest 5.3 4.0 472 4 4 
 owl 5.8 4.0 477 2 2 
 violin 5.4 3.5 468 11 6 
 virtue 6.2 4.5 469 30 5 
5 riot* 3.0 6.4 490 7 4 
 priest 6.4 4.4 484 16 5 
 trunk 5.1 4.2 485 8 5 
 hawk 5.9 4.4 504 14 3 
 journal 5.1 4.1 486 42 4 
 stool 4.6 4.0 531 8 4 
 crown 6.6 4.3 531 19 4 
                                                
34
 For each item, the following are reported: ratings from the ANEW database (Bradley & Lang, 
1999) about item’s valence (VAL) and arousal (ARO); item’s familiarity (FAM), Kucera-Francis 
frequency index (KFFRQ) and number of phonemes (NPHN). 
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List no. Word VAL ARO FAM KFFRQ NPHN 
6 debt* 2.2 5.7 494 13 3 
 doll 6.1 4.2 503 10 3 
 barrel 5.1 3.4 487 24 5 
 nun 4.9 2.9 500 2 3 
 tidy 6.3 4.0 490 1 4 
 fur 4.5 4.2 530 13 2 
 runner 5.7 4.8 531 1 4 
7 horror* 2.8 7.2 501 17 4 
 bench 4.6 3.6 488 35 5 
 tender 6.9 4.9 510 11 5 
 tank 5.2 4.9 511 12 4 
 cannon 4.9 4.7 498 7 5 
 lawn 5.2 4.0 534 15 3 
 honey 6.7 4.5 533 25 4 
8 poison* 2.0 6.1 504 10 4 
 highway 5.9 5.2 488 40 4 
 dawn 6.2 4.4 507 28 3 
 whistle 5.8 4.7 505 4 4 
 frog 5.7 4.5 507 1 4 
 autumn 6.3 4.5 533 22 4 
 vehicle 6.3 4.6 534 35 5 
9 jealousy* 2.5 6.4 500 4 6 
 intellect 6.8 4.8 507 5 8 
 humane 6.9 4.5 508 5 6 
 charm 6.8 5.2 514 26 4 
 breeze 6.9 4.4 511 14 4 
 poster 5.3 3.9 545 4 5 
 engine 5.2 4.0 543 50 5 
10 agony* 2.4 6.1 509 9 5 
 trumpet 5.8 5.0 490 7 7 
 appliance 5.1 4.1 493 5 7 
 umbrella 5.2 3.7 511 8 7 
 poetry 5.9 4.0 512 88 6 
 cottage 6.5 3.4 543 19 5 
 cork 5.2 3.8 544 9 3 
11 punishment* 2.2 5.9 515 21 9 
 nonsense 4.6 4.2 522 13 7 
 column 5.2 3.6 519 71 5 
 humble 5.9 3.7 519 18 5 
 rabbit 6.6 4.0 523 11 5 
 tune 6.9 4.7 545 10 4 
 flag 6.0 4.6 545 16 4 
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12 tragedy* 1.8 6.2 521 49 7 
 market 5.7 4.1 518 155 5 
 hammer 4.9 4.6 515 9 4 
 jelly 5.7 3.7 521 3 4 
 spray 5.5 4.1 521 16 4 
 chin 5.3 3.3 545 27 4 
 item 5.3 3.2 545 54 4 
13 crisis* 2.7 5.4 521 82 6 
 avenue 5.5 4.1 529 46 6 
 vision 6.6 4.7 529 56 6 
 passage 5.3 4.4 525 49 5 
 queen 6.4 4.8 527 41 4 
 patient 5.3 4.2 538 86 6 
 social 6.9 5.0 497 380 5 
14 failure* 1.7 5.0 542 89 5 
 movie 6.9 4.9 523 29 4 
 village 5.9 4.1 524 72 5 
 tennis 6.0 4.6 528 15 5 
 wonder 6.0 5.0 530 67 5 
 board 4.8 3.4 546 239 3 
 corner 4.4 3.9 556 115 4 
15 crime* 2.9 5.4 537 34 4 
 theory 5.3 4.6 534 129 4 
 nurse 6.1 4.8 537 17 3 
 locker 5.2 3.4 538 9 4 
 pet 6.8 5.1 541 8 3 
 infant 7.0 5.1 513 11 6 
 cellar 4.3 4.4 467 26 4 
16 anger* 2.3 7.6 541 48 4 
 moral 6.2 4.5 535 142 5 
 coast 6.0 4.6 541 61 4 
 ink 5.1 3.8 542 7 3 
 ankle 5.3 4.2 543 8 4 
 bland 4.1 3.3 436 3 5 
 wink 6.9 5.4 521 7 4 
17 hatred* 2.0 6.7 544 20 6 
 machine 5.1 3.8 549 103 5 
 medicine 5.7 4.4 547 30 7 
 opinion 6.3 4.9 550 96 7 
 salad 5.7 3.8 554 9 5 
 muscular 6.8 5.5 527 16 8 
 swift 6.5 5.4 507 32 5 
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List no. Word VAL ARO FAM KFFRQ NPHN 
18 disaster* 1.7 6.3 548 26 7 
 method 5.6 3.9 556 142 5 
 athletics 6.6 6.1 548 9 8 
 stomach 4.8 3.9 547 37 6 
 daylight 6.8 4.8 547 15 5 
 decorate 6.9 5.1 489 2 7 
 solemn 4.3 3.6 453 12 5 
19 insult* 2.3 6.0 552 7 5 
 yellow 5.6 4.4 555 55 4 
 bake 6.2 5.1 549 12 3 
 dream 6.7 4.5 553 64 4 
 bowl 5.3 3.5 557 23 3 
 shadow 4.4 4.3 536 36 4 
 plain 4.4 3.5 551 48 4 
20 rape* 1.3 6.8 555 5 3 
 iron 4.9 3.8 555 43 3 
 fish 6.0 4.0 548 35 3 
 kettle 5.2 3.2 551 3 4 
 paint 5.6 4.1 551 37 4 
 muddy 4.4 4.1 541 10 4 
 trust 6.7 5.3 548 52 5 
21 accident* 2.1 6.3 564 33 8 
 industry 5.3 4.5 559 171 8 
 beverage 6.8 5.2 566 5 7 
 contents 4.9 4.3 566 16 7 
 scissors 5.1 4.5 559 1 5 
 storm 5.0 5.7 555 26 4 
 advantage 7.0 4.8 562 73 8 
22 injury* 2.5 5.7 568 27 6 
 material 5.3 4.1 559 174 8 
 quality 6.3 4.5 560 114 7 
 metal 5.0 3.8 559 61 4 
 candy 6.5 4.6 559 16 5 
 news 5.3 5.2 560 102 4 
 mountain 6.6 5.5 574 33 6 
23 bomb* 2.1 7.2 566 36 3 
 horse 5.9 3.9 560 117 3 
 quart 5.4 3.6 568 3 3 
 coin 6.0 4.3 564 10 3 
 elbow 5.1 3.8 564 10 4 
 mail 6.9 5.6 554 47 3 
 health 6.8 5.1 577 105 4 
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List no. Word VAL ARO FAM KFFRQ NPHN 
24 pain* 2.1 6.5 569 68 4 
 farm 5.5 3.9 564 125 3 
 garden 6.7 4.4 567 60 5 
 flower 6.6 4.0 566 23 4 
 event 6.2 5.1 574 81 5 
 youth 6.8 5.7 551 82 3 
 taste 6.7 5.2 580 59 4 
25 fear* 2.8 7.0 569 127 3 
 name 5.6 4.3 573 294 3 
 space 6.8 5.1 576 184 4 
 wine 6.0 4.8 570 72 3 
 cook 6.2 4.4 568 47 3 
 church 6.3 4.3 560 348 5 
 part 5.1 3.8 579 500 3 
26 dead* 1.9 5.7 581 174 3 
 office 5.2 4.1 566 255 4 
 river 6.9 4.5 565 165 4 
 square 4.7 3.2 576 143 4 
 pie 6.4 4.2 576 14 2 
 white 6.5 4.4 590 365 3 
 mind 6.7 5.0 591 325 4 
27 sick* 1.9 5.0 571 51 3 
 lamp 5.4 3.8 578 18 4 
 hat 5.5 4.1 580 56 3 
 rock 5.6 4.5 583 75 3 
 lake 6.8 4.0 583 54 3 
 habit 4.1 4.0 583 23 4 
 black 5.4 4.6 603 203 4 
28 afraid* 2.0 6.7 575 57 5 
 corridor 4.9 3.6 579 17 6 
 foot 5.0 3.3 583 70 3 
 quiet 5.6 2.8 577 76 5 
 circle 5.7 3.9 581 60 4 
 wife 6.3 4.9 585 228 3 
 dark 4.7 4.3 598 185 3 
29 hurt* 1.9 5.9 579 37 3 
 milk 6.0 3.7 588 49 4 
 seat 5.0 3.0 597 54 3 
 fork 5.3 4.0 584 14 3 
 grass 6.1 4.1 587 53 4 
 rain 5.1 3.7 604 70 3 
 red 6.4 5.3 607 197 3 
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30 mad* 2.4 6.8 590 39 3 
 cat 5.7 4.4 582 23 3 
 bar 6.4 5.0 592 82 2 
 dress 6.4 4.1 588 67 4 
 adult 6.5 4.8 590 25 5 
 arm 5.3 3.6 608 94 2 
 boy 6.3 4.6 606 242 2 
31 angry* 2.9 7.2 600 45 5 
 pencil 5.2 3.1 598 34 5 
 window 5.9 4.0 621 119 5 
 clothing 6.5 4.8 614 20 6 
 butter 5.3 3.2 615 27 4 
 restaurant 6.8 5.4 593 41 7 
 street 5.2 3.4 602 244 5 
32 terrible* 1.9 6.3 605 45 6 
 teacher 5.7 4.1 599 80 5 
 serious 5.1 4.0 593 116 6 
 clock 5.1 4.0 608 20 4 
 truck 5.5 4.8 620 57 4 
 building 5.3 3.9 607 160 7 
 answer 6.6 5.4 605 152 4 
33 cuisine 6.6 4.4 335 1 6 
 banner 5.4 3.8 381 8 4 
 glacier 5.5 4.2 409 1 6 
 kerosene 4.8 4.3 418 6 7 
 gender 5.7 4.4 450 2 5 
 egg 5.3 3.8 608 12 2 
 chair 5.1 3.2 617 66 3 
34 nectar 6.9 3.9 344 3 5 
 agility 6.5 4.9 397 3 7 
 prairie 5.8 3.4 416 21 5 
 kerchief 5.1 3.4 439 1 6 
 mystic 6.0 4.8 455 3 6 
 sugar 6.7 5.6 608 34 4 
 tree 6.3 3.4 613 59 3 
35 sentiment 6.0 4.4 471 23 9 
 thermometer 4.7 3.8 481 10 8 
 hay 5.2 4.0 486 19 2 
 coarse 4.6 4.2 506 10 3 
 unit 5.6 3.8 513 103 5 
 glass 4.8 4.3 611 99 4 
 letter 6.6 4.9 610 145 4 
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36 cord 5.1 3.5 477 6 3 
 basket 5.5 3.6 485 17 6 
 indifferent 4.6 3.2 502 11 8 
 pig 5.1 4.2 509 8 3 
 phase 5.2 4.0 516 72 3 
 radio 6.7 4.8 644 120 5 
 colour 7.0 4.7 582 141 4 
37 stove 5.0 4.5 525 15 4 
 cow 5.6 3.5 529 29 2 
 employment 6.5 5.3 531 47 9 
 tool 5.2 4.3 532 40 3 
 custom 5.9 4.7 538 14 6 
 person 6.3 4.2 620 175 4 
 paper 5.2 2.5 635 157 4 
38 lamb 5.9 3.4 519 7 3 
 art 6.7 4.9 529 208 2 
 orchestra 6.0 3.5 533 60 7 
 obey 4.5 4.2 538 8 3 
 bandage 4.5 3.9 546 4 6 
 girl 6.9 4.3 645 220 3 
 book 5.7 4.2 643 193 3 
39 modest 5.8 4.0 546 29 6 
 army 4.7 5.0 555 132 3 
 save 6.5 5.0 559 62 3 
 moment 5.8 3.8 560 246 6 
 hotel 6.0 4.8 565 126 5 
 door 5.1 3.8 630 312 2 
 face 6.4 5.0 612 371 3 
40 manner 5.6 4.6 546 124 4 
 ship 5.6 4.4 553 83 3 
 chance 6.0 5.4 563 131 5 
 history 5.2 3.9 564 286 7 
 smooth 6.6 4.9 570 42 4 
 woman 6.6 5.3 623 224 5 
 air 6.3 4.1 608 257 1 
41 green 6.2 4.3 583 116 4 
 month 5.2 4.0 598 130 4 
 blue 6.8 4.3 593 143 3 
 natural 6.6 4.1 594 156 6 
 bottle 6.2 4.8 591 76 4 
 city 6.0 5.2 616 393 4 
 thought 6.4 4.8 603 515 3 
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42 nice 6.6 4.4 583 75 3 
 table 5.2 2.9 599 198 4 
 plant 6.0 3.6 592 125 5 
 key 5.7 3.7 603 88 2 
 watch 5.8 4.1 576 81 4 
 hand 6.0 4.4 601 431 4 
 water 6.6 5.0 641 442 4 
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Figure A.2.1. Story example: pictures and narratives used for story no. 8  
(Experiments 7–10)  
 
 
A. Sophie works as a legal secretary** 
 
 
 
 
 
 
B. Sophie goes to the office downtown 
 
 
 
 
 
 
C. On her way, she sees a man playing music 
 
 
 
 
 
D. At home, she looks out on the lake 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E. She takes a stool back to the kitchen 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
F. Sophie thinks of her sister who committed suicide*  
 
 
 
 
 
* Negative slide  
 
** Neutral slide matched for familiarity with the negative slide 
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Table A.2.2. Pictures and narratives used for the 16 slideshow stories 
(Experiments 7–10).35  
 
Story 
no. 
Picture 
ID VAL ARO FAM 
 
Narratives 
1 5972* 1.6 4.6 4.4 
Tony and Jane learn that yesterday's 
tornados claimed lives 
  7006 3.7 2.2 5.7 
They start setting the dining room 
table for dinner 
  4605 5.0 3.1 5.2 
Tony and Jane do the crosswords in 
the daily paper  
  8260 4.2 3.2 5.1 
Tony watches the grand prix 
motorcycle race on television 
  7500 3.9 1.7 5.7 
Jane does some work on her latest 
project as an architect 
  2880** 4.0 1.7 4.6 
Tony and Jane look at some 
pictures together 
2 9910* 1.8 4.1 4.2 
Matt looks out of his window and 
sees a car accident 
  7031 3.8 2.0 6.0 
He takes his old shoes off and puts 
them to one side 
  5410** 5.3 3.2 4.5 
Matt listens to some music on the 
radio 
  7351 5.2 3.2 5.6 
He puts his favourite pizza in the 
oven 
  7217 4.0 1.6 6.1 
He gets into more comfortable 
clothes and hangs-up his jacket 
  5740 5.2 1.6 6.7 
Matt waters his new plant in the 
rear garden 
3 2205* 1.8 3.7 4.0 Robert thinks of his old parents 
  2840** 3.8 2.5 4.0 Robert plays chess with his son 
  7150 4.9 2.3 6.4 It starts raining outside 
  8311 5.3 2.9 5.9 He watches some golf on TV 
  8320 5.0 2.6 4.2 He watches a bit of car racing 
  5731 5.8 2.7 5.4 Robert goes out for a walk 
4 2141* 1.8 3.2 3.6 
Sarah starts to organise her father's 
funeral 
  7050 4.0 1.9 6.0 She washes and dries her hair 
  2221** 3.7 2.7 3.6 Sarah calls her paternal uncle 
  7700 4.1 2.7 5.4 
She starts tidying-up the storage 
room 
  5220 5.1 3.1 5.9 
She goes out for a walk in the 
nearby park 
  7620 4.5 2.6 6.2 
Sarah picks up her husband at the 
airport 
                                                
35
 For each picture, the following are reported: the picture number within the IAPS database 
(Picture ID; Lang, Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1999), its valence (VAL), arousal (ARO), and familiarity 
(FAM). The narratives that accompanied each slide are reported, too. 
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Story 
no. 
Picture 
ID VAL ARO FAM 
 
Narratives 
5 2751* 1.7 5.5 4.9 
George gets fined for drinking 
while driving 
  7010 4.4 1.6 4.1 
He prepares to go and get the 
clothes on the line 
  7030 1.6 4.2 1.9 He gets ready to iron some clothes 
  7550 4.1 1.9 6.7 
George works on his desktop 
computer 
  7320 4.9 2.2 5.3 He eats some fresh fruit as a snack 
  7496** 4.0 3.0 4.9 George goes out for some groceries 
6 2900* 1.9 3.6 5.6 
Jonathan learns that his son is 
bullied at school 
  7224 4.3 1.2 7.0 
Jonathan has a busy morning at the 
office 
  1600 6.0 3.0 6.4 
In the afternoon, he goes for a horse 
riding lesson 
  2749** 4.1 2.1 5.4 
Jonathan smokes a cigar and 
watches some TV 
  7590 4.1 3.1 6.4 He drives to a council meeting 
  7130 4.2 2.3 7.2 A sofa is delivered to his house 
7 2691* 2.0 4.3 2.6 
James hears on the news about 
violent riots 
  7080 4.2 2.2 6.7 
He gets the cutlery out and prepares 
some food 
  2575** 4.1 2.0 2.5 
James works on a new propeller 
design 
  2570 4.6 2.3 6.4 
James works as a professional 
engineer 
  7560 4.0 2.8 6.7 
He drives down the motorway to 
get home 
  5395 4.6 3.0 5.4 
He goes for a short walk in the 
harbour 
8 9000* 2.0 4.8 4.8 
Sophie thinks of her sister who 
committed suicide 
  7025 4.1 1.6 6.7 She takes a stool back to the kitchen 
  7705 3.9 1.4 5.5 Sophie goes to the office downtown 
  2487 4.3 2.4 4.7 
On her way, she sees a man playing 
music 
  2383** 4.3 2.8 4.8 Sophie works as a legal secretary 
  5390 6.0 2.0 5.4 At home, she looks out on the lake 
      
      
      
      
      
      
      
- 240 - 
Story 
no. 
Picture 
ID VAL ARO FAM 
 
Narratives 
9 6210* 2.0 4.4 4.2 
Darren is told that his brother got 
robbed 
  7175 4.6 1.7 8.1 He buys a lamp for his living room 
  2210 3.5 1.9 5.0 
He comes to the decision to shave 
his beard 
  2600 4.8 2.9 5.4 He meets a cousin of his at the pub 
  1450** 4.7 1.8 4.6 
Darren reads the latest issue of 
National Geographic 
  7710 5.0 3.2 5.5 
Darren makes a start on changing 
the bed 
10 2710* 2.3 3.2 3.0 
Peter finds out that his brother takes 
drugs 
  7020 4.8 2.3 7.2 
Today, it is a particularly hot and 
humid day 
  7950 4.2 1.9 6.9 He gets a tissue to blow his nose 
  2280 4.2 2.2 6.2 
Today Peter goes for a trip with his 
family 
  7490** 4.0 2.0 3.2 Peter now lives in the countryside 
  7140 4.6 2.4 6.9 
He sees a large coach parked by the 
green 
11 2120* 2.7 3.6 4.2 
Barry's furious boss calls and fires 
him 
  7170 4.5 2.3 6.4 He changes a light bulb in the hall 
  2200 3.8 2.2 5.6 Barry surfs the Internet for a while 
  7235 4.7 2.0 7.4 He fixes one of the dining chairs 
  7491 4.1 2.4 5.3 
In the afternoon, he goes out for a 
short walk 
  5455** 4.1 2.6 3.5 
Barry books a return ferry ticket on-
line 
12 2100* 3.3 3.1 4.3 
Paul has a violent argument with 
his son 
  5875** 5.4 2.9 4.5 Paul goes for a bike ride on the hills 
  2480 3.9 2.4 5.3 Paul looks outside the window 
  2372 4.3 2.2 6.0 
He has a long chat with his 
daughter 
  7510 5.0 2.6 6.2 He looks at city break brochures 
  2560 5.4 3.9 5.1 He has a picnic with his family 
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Story 
no. 
Picture 
ID VAL ARO FAM 
 
Narratives 
13 7211 4.0 1.9 8.5 
His evening music class finishes at 
6pm 
  7002 4.5 2.6 6.4 Mark has a quick shower upstairs 
  2000 5.1 2.5 6.8 His stepfather comes to pick him up 
  2270 5.3 2.4 6.7 
Mark gets ready for his day at 
school 
  7286 5.1 2.8 5.8 
Mark eats some small pancakes for 
breakfast 
  7595 4.8 2.0 7.7 
They drive back home through the 
city 
14 7000 4.6 1.6 6.4 
He finds his rolling pin in the 
bottom drawer 
  2010 5.3 2.1 6.8 
Jack wants to organise a dinner 
with some friends 
  7090 4.5 1.8 6.3 
Jack gets his old recipe book from 
the shelf 
  7402 4.9 3.6 5.7 
He prepares some desserts and 
arranges them on a plate 
  7495 5.1 2.5 5.9 
Jack goes to buy some missing 
ingredients 
  5720 5.0 2.8 6.4 
The end of the day is warm and 
sunny 
15 7009 4.5 1.8 6.3 
He washes one of his mugs before 
making tea 
  7034 3.8 1.3 7.7 Steven does some DIY in the house 
  2215 4.4 2.1 5.6 
He calls a colleague of his at lunch 
time 
  2020 5.2 1.4 6.2 Steven has a day off from the office 
  1560 4.3 3.3 3.9 
He watches a documentary on 
wildlife 
  5500 4.1 2.1 6.3 
He cooks pasta with fresh 
mushrooms 
16 7004 4.1 2.0 7.2 
He prepares to have an afternoon 
snack 
  7035 4.6 2.0 7.0 He drinks one of his usual beers 
  2214 4.5 2.4 5.6 
Andrew is just back from a trip 
abroad 
  7289 5.0 3.0 6.0 
He goes to the restaurant with his 
wife 
  7234 4.4 2.3 6.3 
Andrew washes and irons his 
clothes 
  5020 6.0 3.2 6.2 He goes out to buy some flowers 
 
* Negative slide 
 
** Neutral slide matched for familiarity with the negative slide 
 
